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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Jihadism in Africa: 
Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances 
The transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century feeds on local and 
regional conflicts, without which most terrorist groups would never have 
appeared in the first place. That is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
Syria and Iraq, as well as in North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa. 
Groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in Somalia, Nigeria and 
Algeria operate within and profit from local conflicts. Anyone wishing to 
understand (and counteract) such forces must delve into the specific cir-
cumstances within these countries, as well as others such as Mali and the 
region they are based in. The effects of the multitude of personal ties, 
recruiting networks and ideological influences connecting jihadist move-
ments are felt across countries, regions and even continents. Yet under-
standing the specific conditions on the ground remains key to analysing 
events currently playing out in a group of countries running from East 
Africa to Mauritania and extending as far north as Tunisia and south to 
the Swahili coast. 
Research, politics and public debate frequently emphasise the supra-
regional and global aspects of jihadism, while underestimating the local 
anchoring of individual groups and national differences between them. 
For these reasons the picture of a jihadist threat directed towards large 
parts of the continent also shapes the solutions put forward by the West, 
where sweeping approaches are prioritised at the expense of addressing 
local causes. 
The African arc of instability discussed in this connection underpins a 
Western approach to counter-terrorism that often transpires to be counter-
productive. But the narrative also serves the interests of governments in 
the affected countries themselves. Pointing to the rising risks of terrorism 
allows them both to secure security cooperation with Western countries, 
and to justify increasingly restrictive security legislation. 
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Jihadism in Africa: An Introduction 
Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 
The State, the Economy and Terrorism in Africa 
The State 
One great problem of the African continent is the weakness of its states. 
Few succeed in penetrating all the territory nominally belonging to them. 
Frequently the central state governs the periphery through representatives 
(Ethiopia), permits proxies to establish minor quasi-state entities of their 
own (Somalia) or appears primarily in the guise of the forces of order, 
especially the army and border police (Nigeria). 
In some of the countries in which jihadist organisations have emerged, 
the state possesses little in the way of legitimacy, with governments failing 
to guarantee security or offer social services. The population also lacks con-
fidence in the organs of state, in fact often perceiving them as a source of 
threat. The state exists above all in the capital, where the country’s 
political elite is based. Depending on the degree of democracy, the socio-
economic, geographical and cultural periphery is represented to a greater 
or lesser extent there. 
Especially in states characterised by large distributional disparities in 
conjunction with elite economic interests in the periphery (such as 
resources, oil), it is not necessarily advantageous for the outlying areas to 
attract greater attention from central government. Populations in border 
regions and groups operating in the black economy may in fact benefit 
from the centre’s neglect. And moving up the agenda of the political 
centre will not automatically mean resources being distributed more equi-
tably or improvements being made to physical and political infrastructure. 
In many African states, especially those adjoining the Sahel, population 
groups on the peripheries often enjoy closer ties across borders than to 
their own governments in the mostly coastal capitals. For example, Tuareg 
in Algeria are closer to Tuareg in Mali than to the political elite in Algiers. 
Examining African countries and regions in terms of their peripheries 
reveals networks and ties a great deal older than those of modern jihad-
ism. Historically, it was the kingdoms of the Sahel, not the port cities, that 
symbolised wealth and civilization: Timbuktu, the kingdoms of northern 
Nigeria. It was the Middle Passage – the triangular slave trade of the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries – that made the port cities into the locus of 
trade and political power. This is when the Sahel became the hinterland. 
Such a change of perspective is vital for understanding jihadism in Africa, 
as well as for tackling the growing problems associated with it. 
Where states prove unwilling or unable to ensure security, enforce the 
law or distribute public goods, smaller entities often assume these roles in 
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their place. The ethnic group, tribe, clan, armed movement, smuggling net-
work or jihadist group takes over where the absent state leaves a vacuum. 
This also offers political and criminal entrepreneurs such as provincial 
grandees or smuggling gangs opportunities to exploit jihadist influence 
for their own ends or to exercise political violence in its shadow. Alarming 
collaborations appeared in the 2003 Nigerian elections, where a local 
politician mobilised Boko Haram to campaign for him in the mosques and 
to intimidate opponents.1 
In contrast to the liberation movements of the 1960s, today’s jihadist 
groups are not principally seeking to capture government power in their 
capitals. In Mali, for example, we see the armed groups in the north show-
ing a great deal more interest in neighbouring regions of Niger, Libya, 
Algeria and Mauritania than in their own country’s south or its capital 
Bamako. For many jihadists the nation-state model has been superseded by 
a transnational perspective where national frontiers are increasingly irrel-
evant. Ever more frequently, their actions are guided by a vision of a global 
“Islamic community”. 
Nevertheless, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda groups in Mali (at 
least until the French intervention in January 2013) exhibit growing inter-
est in controlling captured territory and establishing state structures. This 
is sometimes reflected in changes in their military tactics: whereas Boko 
Haram long concentrated on car bombings and suicide attacks, it now also 
pursues conventional military methods, such as attempting to capture 
military bases.2 
Society 
Both the collapse of a society and its opposite – tightening of social ties 
and associated hierarchies – can make it easier for jihadists to recruit. The 
destruction of social networks in Somalia through more than two decades 
of state failure and violent conflict made it easy for al-Shabaab to recruit 
new fighters. In the countries of the Maghreb, as well as in Kenya, broken 
promises of social advancement represent important reasons for joining 
the armed struggle. In particular young people who experience initial 
success, such as a state school qualification, develop high expectations of 
state and society that are then often disappointed. With few jobs waiting, 
many school-leavers see no possibility to marry and found a family. Wheth-
er the social structure is eroding or functioning, what both cases share is 
ideas about the future – in particular young men’s ideas – colliding with 
reality. Jihadist organisations offer them an attractive alternative that 
addresses historical and personal traumas such as colonialism, repression 
 
1  Jean-Christophe Hoste, Tackling Terror in Africa: What Local Roles for Insurgency Groups? 
Africa Policy Brief 10 (Brussels: Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations, July 
2014), 5. 
2  Peter R. Neumann, The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot (London: International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, in collaboration with the BBC, 2014). 
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and displacement and permits the fighting “mujahid” to perceive himself 
as a hero.3 
Where some jihadists understand their new role more as judge than 
potential breadwinner, this also calls into question the authority of the 
traditional leaders. Sufi sheikhs, clan elders and patriarchs find themselves 
virtually powerless against the terror. Where jihadists gain the upper 
hand, the brutalisation of society through public executions, draconian 
hudud punishments, the destruction of entire villages and the kidnapping 
of children destroys their connections to their traditional base. 
Alongside social mobility and dysfunctionality of social networks, funda-
mentalist religious education also promotes openness towards militant 
groups. In Somalia for example, the destruction of state education struc-
tures was followed by a proliferation of Saudi-funded private schools 
teaching primarily religious content of Wahhabi provenance. 
The Economy 
Weak statehood favours the emergence of alternative partly criminal or 
terrorist structures. Distribution conflicts concerning access to resources, 
political participation, and provision of common goods such as education 
and health make it easier for jihadists to recruit. In the countries of the 
Sahel, and also northern Nigeria, certain population groups that are mar-
ginalised by the state instead organise themselves without heed to existing 
borders. This insight has also found its way into the EU’s Sahel strategy, 
which identifies the region not merely as a climatic zone along the south-
ern margin of the Sahara Desert, but an intersection of economic and 
human movements and an area of operations for jihadist organisations.4 
The mostly pastoral groups in the Sahara were involved in organised crime 
long before the rise of jihadism. Like human trafficking, drug smuggling 
via Nigeria, Mali and Niger through the Sahara to Libya and on to Europe 
is frequently conducted by locals who neither accept the state nor have 
anything positive to expect from it.5 
The networks in the Sahel function so well that the economy of violence 
is also able to exploit jihadism, with ideological roles tending to play a sub-
ordinate role. Instead the criminal groups have discovered a new resource, 
now adopting jihadist practices such as kidnapping for ransom. Here they 
profit from their smuggling experience and knowledge of the trade routes 
through the Sahel. 
In Somalia and the East African coast on the other hand, mobilisation 
for the armed struggle tends to be driven by the opposite motivation. Here 
 
3  Maleeha Aslam, Gender-Based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist 
Islam and Terrorism (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012). 
4  Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, European External Action Service, http:// 
eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf (accessed 20 January 2015). 
5  “Not-so-Ideological, al Qaeda-linked, Islamist Narco-terrorists on the Run in Mali”, 
Selected Wisdom, 29 January 2013, http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=954 (accessed 20 January 
2015). 
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it was not the cohesion but the collapse of social structures through con-
flict and traumatisation that severely weakened society. The clans, 
embroiled in conflict and corruption, also lost legitimacy. Here, al-Shabaab 
proclaims a community much larger than a subclan and a system of 
authority comprising more than the territory between two roadblocks. 
In Africa, as in other parts of the Islamic world, the view that Islam is 
under attack and must be defended against the West and its local collabo-
rators is gaining increasing credence. Financial incentives appear equally 
crucial, whether in the form of direct payments or the prospect of loot. 
This applies especially in regions where youth unemployment is high, 
earning possibilities poor, land questions unclarified and advancement 
within traditional structures difficult. Especially under such circumstances, 
membership in a self-funding armed movement that offers opportunities 
for advancement is extraordinarily attractive and lucrative. 
As well as the expectation of immediate access to cash, other motives 
play a role too. One northern Nigerian reported that he wanted to join 
Boko Haram in the hope of benefiting an amnesty of the kind declared in 
Niger, which would have guaranteed him a job.6 
Jihadism between Local Embeddedness and 
Transnational Networks 
Just as there is no such thing as an African arc of instability for Europe to 
tackle with a single concept, nor is there a global terror network con-
trolled by al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. This point is clearly illustrated 
by the example of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, which was 
regarded as a branch of al-Qaeda but in fact always operated as an inde-
pendent organisation. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the IS cali-
phate in June 2014 left no doubt about this. In fact jihadists always operate 
in a continuum between local anchoring and transnationalist aspiration, 
where their actions are often much more strongly shaped by the situation 
in their home country than one might think from their ideological 
vocabulary with its talk of solidarity with the community of all Muslims 
(umma) and shared objectives such as the liberation of Palestine. Since 
2003, and even more so since 2011, clear signs of a “regionalisation” of 
jihadist activity can be observed, in the sense of terrorist groups increas-
ingly concentrating on their own home region. This applies to North 
Africa, where jihadist activity has proliferated following the collapse of the 
Libyan state and the weakening of the state apparatus in Tunisia. The same 
applies to the sub-Saharan region, where ideological, religious and cul-
tural ties to the east of the Arab world – where the ideology of al-Qaeda 
originates – are weaker than in North Africa. 
The localism of jihadist movements has tended to strengthen since 
2011, ending a long trend towards internationalisation. From the mid-
 
6  Alexis Akwagyira, “Islamist Radicalism: Why Does It Lure Some Africans?”, BBC Africa 
(online), 30 May 2013. 
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1990s jihadists from different countries joined forces following the failure 
of uprisings and coups in their home countries. Examples include Egypt 
and Algeria, where at roughly the same time in 1995 it became clear that 
the Islamists would not succeed in toppling their governments. Many Arab 
jihadists subsequently regrouped in Afghanistan, where in 1997 they 
founded al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Aiman az-
Zawahiri. Some of them had moved to Sudan with bin Laden at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, where they had established contacts with both Arab 
organisations and African ones such as the Somali al-Ittihad al-Islami. The 
consequence was terrorist attacks on US targets in East Africa, Yemen and 
ultimately in the United States itself. 
From 2001 the jihadist movements turned back to their home countries 
again, and from 2003 a number of al-Qaeda regional organisations formed. 
Although they are often referred to as “branches” or “offshoots”, they are 
independent from the al-Qaeda centre and operate as its allies. They chose 
to call themselves al-Qaeda in the hope that the label would help them to 
bind more internationally-minded recruits, attract financial donations 
from wealthy al-Qaeda sympathisers in the Gulf states, and give them an 
aura of strength and invincibility. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
formed in Saudi Arabia in 2003 (and was defeated by 2006), al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia (which later became IS) in Iraq in 2004, and a new al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen in 2009. A small al-Qaeda group already 
operating in Africa was central to the 1998 US embassy bombings in 
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam that killed hundreds. The Algerian Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et 
le combat, GSPC) was the first North African organisation to take this step, 
renaming itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb at the beginning of 2007. 
Despite suffering repeated setbacks, it was ready and waiting in 2011 when 
the toppling of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Muammar al-Gaddafi 
in Libya offered new opportunities for action. 
One important reason for the regionalisation of jihadism has been the 
weakness of the al-Qaeda centre in Pakistan, where the organisation has 
lost numerous leaders and fighters to US drone attacks in the tribal 
regions since 2008. By 2010 al-Qaeda had concluded that there was a need 
to establish new structures in Africa, and to that end sent fighters to 
Somalia to assist al-Shabaab, which was already seeking to join al-Qaeda 
(although it was not actually permitted to do so until 2012, under Bin 
Laden’s successor Zawahiri). But the powerlessness of the al-Qaeda centre 
was so glaring that the regional organisations made little effort to disguise 
their unwillingness to follow orders from Pakistan. This intensified fol-
lowing the death of bin Laden in May 2011, as his successor lacked the 
authority required to impose his will on recalcitrant regional leaders from 
his hiding place in Pakistan. 
The process of regionalisation received another boost through the “Arab 
Spring” of 2011. As a whole, the regimes weakened by the unrest had for 
decades suppressed terrorism extremely brutally – but also effectively. This 
was revealed dramatically in Syria, but also in Libya, where government 
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forces surrendered when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed in October 
2011 after a brief civil war. In the subsequent years Libyan jihadists ex-
ploited the ensuing power vacuum to expand their influence. But the con-
sequences were gravest in Mali and neighbouring regions in the Sahara, 
where the Sahara fighters of the Algerian al-Qaeda joined an uprising 
against the central government in Bamako that had been sparked by 
Tuareg mercenaries returning from Libya. In alliance with these and other 
jihadist groups, al-Qaeda succeeded in gaining control over the whole of 
northern Mali. It took a French military intervention in January 2013 to 
stop the jihadists, most of whom then withdrew, at least partially and tem-
porarily, to Libya. 
The loss of state control in Libya encouraged increasing activity by 
jihadist groups in North Africa, the Sahara and the Sahel. No other region 
in the world demonstrates quite so clearly just how greatly weak statehood 
plays into the hands of jihadists. This also applies to Somalia, where the 
grip of a bloody civil war since 1991 is what made the rise of al-Shabaab 
possible in the first place. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been able to expand 
its operations and engulf the mainly Muslim north in crisis because north-
ern Nigerians feel excluded from the considerable oil revenues and dis-
advantaged in the distribution of power in the capital. The same applies to 
Mali, where the jihadists adroitly joined a local uprising that exploited 
dissatisfaction among the northern population, first and foremost the 
Tuareg. And even in Tunisia groups like Ansar al-Sharia profit from major 
socio-economic imbalances between regions as well as the state’s great 
difficulties controlling its territory and its borders to Algeria and Libya 
since the fall of the dictator Ben Ali. What the African jihadists all have in 
common, especially those south of the Sahara, is that their activeities are 
more strongly local than is the case with their Arab counterparts to the 
north. To comprehend them, one must examine the specific local causes 
and motivations in each case. While that does not mean there are no 
transnational influences, they are often weaker than would appear at first 
sight. 
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Al-Shabaab: Youth without God 
Annette Weber 
Somalia’s Mujahideen Youth Movement (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen) 
is not only the leading jihadist organisation in the Horn of Africa, but also 
the essence of Somalia’s problem as a failed state with a dysfunctional 
society. Decades of clan-based warlordism have left the country a frag-
mented formation of diverse state entities and competing forces. 
While the group’s focus was initially on Somalia, it most recently hit the 
headlines with its April 2015 attack on a Kenyan University in Garissa, 
near the border with Somalia, in which 148 people were killed, mainly stu-
dents. Al-Shabaab first gained global infamy with a previous spectacular 
attack in Kenya. In September 2013 the group attacked the Westgate Shop-
ping Mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. In fact the group has been fight-
ing for years against the government and the African Union’s mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM). Since 2008 it has shifted from a guerrilla strategy to 
more terrorist tactics, such as suicide attacks, kidnappings and bombings. 
In 2012 al-Shabaab was accepted as an official member of al-Qaeda. In their 
structure and objectives, parts of al-Shabaab are similar to the Taliban. And 
while al-Shabaab professes loyalty to al-Qaeda in its ideological rivalry with 
the Islamic State (IS) and uses the al-Qaeda label to recruit fighters, the 
group actually continues to operate largely autonomously. 
Al-Shabaab’s origins lie in earlier Somali Islamist groups, such as the 
Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islami, AIAI), which for decades conducted rela-
tively unspectacular terrorist operations across the entire region. As well 
as bringing clan-backed violent non-state actors to power, the conflicts that 
have wracked the country since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 have also 
eroded established mechanisms of social order and weakened traditional 
authorities. In the process, the widely practised Sufi-oriented Islam of the 
majority Muslim population has increasingly been challenged by Wahhabi 
influences. Since 1991 Somalia has been embroiled in a civil war that has 
destroyed the state and created the breeding ground for al-Shabaab’s suc-
cessful recruitment of male youth. In a context of state failure, al-Shabaab 
became a locally anchored, regionally operating and internationally re-
cruiting jihadist organisation. 
Various external actors have pursued interests in Somalia. One need 
only mention the failed US invasion of 1992, which was planned as a 
humanitarian intervention to address famine, but ended in disaster after 
the mission took the side of one of the two warlord factions. After a Black 
Hawk helicopter was shot down and its crew killed on the streets of Moga-
dishu, the Americans withdrew and the United Nations took over the 
mission – but proved unable to make any progress towards stabilisation or 
a peace agreement. The Ethiopian intervention of 2006, which was moti- 
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Map 2: Horn of Africa 
vated primarily by concerns about Ethiopia’s own security, is regarded in 
Somalia as a violation of sovereignty and ultimately represents a mobilis-
ing factor for al-Shabaab. These outside interests and the actions of ex-
ternal actors have left deep scars in the country’s social and political 
matrix and currently determine the reality – one could almost say the nor-
mality – in Somalia. It remains to be seen how the future of al-Shabaab will 
shape up after its leader Ahmed Abdi Godane (alias Mukhtar Abu Zubair) 
was killed in American air strikes on 1 September 2014.1 But the increas-
ing frequency of attacks in both Kenya and Mogadishu underline that 
al-Shabaab is certainly not going to disappear any time soon.2 
 
1  Also known as Mukhtar Abdirahman Godane and Ahmad Abdi Godane. 
2  “US Confirms al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane Killed”, BBC News Africa (online), 5 
September 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29086800 (accessed 5 September 
2014). On the future of al-Shabaab see Abdi Aynte, Al Shabaab after Godane (Mogadishu: 
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, September 2014), http://www.heritageinstitute.org/ 
shabaab-after-godane/ (accessed 3 September 2014). 
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Political Islam in the Horn of Africa 
One cannot understand al-Shabaab historically without considering the 
dynamic of political Islam in the Greater Horn of Africa. Sudan became 
home and training camp to a multitude of violent and Islamist organisa-
tions after the National Islamic Front took power there in 1989, serving as 
an ideological and physical base for forces such as Hezbollah, Abu Nidal, 
Osama Bin Laden and Carlos “the Jackal”. The networks of Sunni Islamists, 
first and foremost al-Qaeda in East Africa, proliferated far beyond Sudan’s 
own borders. 
At the same time the influence of Wahhabi preachers and schools ex-
panded in Somalia, leading – in a situation without a state school system – 
to the dissemination of revivalist practices throughout society. This also 
lends a symbolic meaning to al-Shabaab’s destruction of the Sufi shrines in 
Mogadishu in 2010. Those acts of desecration demonstrated that it would 
act not only against “unbelievers” and the government, but also against 
Somalia’s widespread Sufi “folk Islam”. 
The al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), founded in 1983 by Sheikh Ali Warsame, 
understood itself as a political and military movement. Like Hasan at-
Turabi’s National Islamic Front in Sudan, the AIAI’s leaders were also in-
fluenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and some of them had 
studied in Cairo, Mecca or Medina. The organisation’s goals were to restore 
Greater Somalia and introduce sharia. For AIAI’s charismatic leader Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys, global jihad was of secondary importance.3 While the 
group failed to overcome the structurally defining order of the Somali 
clans, AIAI splinter groups were central to the emergence of both political 
Islam and jihadist organisation at the Horn of Africa. It is out of them that 
al-Shabaab later arose. After its founding in 2004, al-Shabaab was com-
manded by Aden Hashi “Ayro”, an Afghanistan veteran and confidant of 
Osama bin Laden.4 Mukhtar Robow (alias Abu Mansoor) and the later emir 
Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubair (alias Godane) also rose to particularly promi-
nent positions in al-Shabaab. 
Historical Context 
During the final period of Siad Barre’s dictatorship the Somali state split 
into warring clan-based factions, none of which succeeded in conquering 
power in the civil war that followed. After the fading of Cold War clien-
telism in the Horn of Africa, Somalia slid into oblivion and was largely 
ignored by the international community, and above all by its neighbours. 
The north-west, formerly British Somaliland, declared independence im-
mediately after the fall of Barre and has since functioned as an autono-
mous state without international recognition. 
 
3  Medhane Tadesse, Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia (Addis Abeba: 
Mega Printing Enterprise, 2002). 
4  Roland Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment of the Somali ‘Harakat Al-Shabaab’”, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (April 2009): 381–404. 
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Two missions, the American UNITAF and the United Nations UNOSOM I 
and II, sought to supply humanitarian aid between 1992 and 1994, but 
were unable to quell the conflict. Taking sides for one of the two warlord 
factions that controlled Mogadishu became UNITAF’s downfall and further 
exacerbated the conflict. It was during this phase that Somalia became a 
refuge for al-Qaeda East Africa, which used the country as a base to plan and 
conduct both the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 
1998 and the attacks on an Israeli hotel and airliner in Mombasa in 2002. 
Numerous outside attempts by the international community to mediate 
a government of national unity ended in failure. In 2006 warlords and 
businesspeople joined forces in the so-called Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counter-Terrorism, which was funded by Washington and also 
regarded as neighbouring Ethiopia’s favourite.5 In June 2006 the militia of 
the Union of Islamic Courts – which was later to become al-Shabaab – 
defeated the Alliance and the Islamic Courts took power. 
The Union of Islamic Courts was an alliance of the sharia courts that 
still retain primary responsibility for regulating family matters in Somalia 
today. After decades of absence of state structures, many parts of the popu-
lation therefore welcomed the restoration of public order by the militias.6 
But the reign of the Islamic Courts was not to last. After just half a year, 
in December 2006, they were driven out by an Ethiopian intervention 
force determined to stamp out any Islamist government in its neighbour-
hood. The political leaders of the Courts fled to Eritrea, their armed wing 
remained in the country. The Ethiopian occupation generated enormous 
support for al-Shabaab, with many Somalis regarding neighbouring 
Ethiopia as the arch-enemy. This applied especially to the irredentist forces 
looking to return the Ogaden to Somalia, and the Islamists, who declared 
war on the Christian majority in the Ethiopian leadership. Under these 
conditions al-Shabaab succeeded in mobilising both nationally-minded 
and jihadist fighters to produce the hybridisation of national liberation 
and jihadism it has come to embody so successfully. 
Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in 2009, after an African Union mis-
sion (AMISOM) arrived in 2008 to guarantee the security of the successive 
transitional governments. To al-Shabaab AMISOM is a crusader operation 
that must be fought not only within Somalia, but also in the countries 
from which its forces originate. Above all Uganda and Kenya, both of 
which are AMISOM troop providers, have suffered attacks on their territory. 
The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohammud, which took 
power in September 2012 but faces opposition from al-Shabaab, is the first 
since 1991 to be based in Mogadishu. 
 
5  International Crisis Group (ICG), Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained? Africa Report 116, 10 
August 2006, 5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/ 
Can%20the%20Somali%20Crisis%20Be%20Contained (accessed 20 August 2014). 
6  Annette Weber, “Islam and Symbolic Politics in Somalia”, in The Challenge of Islamists for 
EU and US Policies: Conflict, Stability and Reform: Joint Publication of SWP and United States Institute 
of Peace (USIP), ed. Muriel Asseburg and Daniel Brumberg, SWP Research Paper 12/2007 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2007), 37–43. 
The Origins of al-Shabaab 
SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
17 
The Origins of al-Shabaab 
The movement in Somalia presently numbers between seven and fifteen 
thousand fighters. The number of foreign jihadists is in the three-figure 
region, including about four hundred Kenyans and at least sixty Ameri-
cans.7 Impressive growth for an organisation that began with a few hun-
dred Islamic Court militiamen. It is not known how many fighters operate 
under the banner of al-Shabaab in the broader region, but the spate of 
attacks claimed by al-Shabaab in various parts of Kenya suggests growth in 
the number of its fighting associates there. 
The influence of Islamic revivalist movements, all of which oppose the 
traditional Somali Sufi Islam, has grown since the 1960s. The Muslim 
Brotherhood group al-Islah, many of whose members are represented in 
the serving government, stand for a pragmatic political Islam. Al-Ittihad al-
Islami and al-Shabaab on the other hand belong to the Salafist current that 
seeks to establish Islamic rule by force, whether as a state (AIAI) or a cali-
phate (al-Shabaab).8 
Religious marginalisation within Somalia plays no role in participation 
in al-Shabaab. It is the perception of a global threat to Islam that is deci-
sive.9 The emergence and acceptance of al-Shabaab in certain parts of 
Somalia needs to be discussed in the context of Somali politics. The col-
lapse of state order, privatisation of security and occupation by neighbour-
ing countries might explain the rise of an armed group, but not necessarily 
of a jihadist movement. Not even religious motivation supplies a convinc-
ing explanation. The ideological positioning of al-Shabaab is in fact not ter-
ribly far removed from that of the government. When President Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed introduced sharia in 2009 the move was widely welcomed. 
Nor does the conservative bent of the serving government of President 
Hassan Sheikh Mohammud, who formerly belonged to al-Islah, stand in 
strong contrast to the ideas about the umma expounded by al-Shabaab. But 
in the doctrine of global jihad, al-Shabaab follows a backward-looking Sala-
fist ideology. Some of its international jihadists regard Somalia as a base 
 
7  The BBC gives the number of fighters as seven to nine thousand; official AU estimates 
speak of fifteen thousand. The number of jihadists from the United States and the United 
Kingdom is put at three hundred. “Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabab?” BBC News Africa (online), 
16 May 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689 (accessed 30 September 
2014); David Smith, “Al-Shabaab Rebuilds Forces in Somalia as African Union Campaign 
Stalls: Extreme Islamist Group Is Now ‘an Extended Hand of al-Qaida’, Declares Somali 
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud”, Guardian (online), 28 October 2013, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/28/al-shabaab-somalia-african-union (accessed 30 Sep-
tember 2014); “Letter Dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Com-
mittee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and 
Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, United Nations Security Council, 
S/2013/413, 12 July 2013, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_413.pdf (accessed 30 September 2014). 
8  Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, The Anatomy of al-Shabab, 8 July 2010, 12ff, http://de.scribd.com/ 
doc/34053611/The-Anatomy-of-Al-Shabaab-by-Abdi-Aynte (accessed 20 August 2014). 
9  Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia, ISS 
Paper 266 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies [ISS], September 2014), 6. 
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from to plan and organise the armed struggle in other regions. Others be-
lieve Somalia should be governed by al-Shabaab under a strict Islamist order. 
This ambivalence between national political agenda and global jihad 
presents absolutely no obstacle to recruitment, offering as it does the pos-
sibility to bind fighters with widely differing motives to the organisation. 
Leadership and Organisational Structure: 
Personnel and Social Base 
Al-Shabaab’s leadership is in permanent flux. The original core is genuinely 
Somali, and includes Hashi Ayro, Mukhtar Robow and Abdullahi Nahar 
(Abu Qutaiba). The first cell formed as a militia of the Islamic Courts under 
the spiritual mentorship of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.10 After the Union 
of Islamic Courts took power in Mogadishu in 2006 it established an eight-
een-member executive committee largely comprising members of AIAI and 
al-Shabaab, whose secretary-general was Mukhtar Abu Zubair “Godane”. 
Godane succeeded to the leadership after Aden Hashi Ayro was killed in an 
American air strike in 2008. In the course of the transition it became very 
clear that al-Shabaab had two wings: one pursuing a primarily national 
agenda, a second dedicated to global jihad. The famine that afflicted Soma-
lia in 2011 also supplied evidence, with al-Shabaab leaders like Mukhtar 
Robow arguing to supply food to the suffering population, because they 
saw the group as the authority on the ground. But the senior leadership 
around Godane blocked aid deliveries to underline their rejection of 
Western humanitarian organisations, and the needs of the Somali popula-
tion controlled by al-Shabaab had to take second place. 
Godane originated from Somaliland. Although he possesses no great clan 
base in southern Somalia, his influence within the organisation quickly 
grew. His international orientation, successful recruitment of internation-
al jihadists, dissolution of the shura leadership council and establishment 
of an elite security and intelligence force (the Amniyat) quickly made him 
untouchable. After all Godane’s remaining critics were killed in 2013 he 
appeared invincible, until he was killed by a US drone in September 2014. 
Abu Ubaidah, a close confidant of Godane’s who had played an im-
portant role in the Amniyat, succeeded Godane as leader. Abu Ubaidah 
comes from the border region with Ethiopia but was born in Ogaden and 
belongs, like Godane, to none of the powerful southern clans.11 Like his 
predecessor, he immediately declared his loyalty to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab’s 
spokesman Mohammud Ali Mahmoud Rage “Ali Dheere” also belonged to 
Godane’s circle. Others, such as Fuad Shongole, see themselves more 
serving a national duty. The conflict between national and global interests 
 
10  Roland Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab 
Al Mujaheddin in Somalia (Paris: SciencesPo, March 2011), http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/ 
sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/art_RM2.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
11  “New Al-Shabaab Chief Said to Be Experienced But Difficult”, Voice of America, http:// 
www.voanews.com/content/new-al-shabab-chief-ubaidah-said-to-be-experienced-but-difficult/ 
2442960.html (accessed 7 May 2015). 
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has already cost founding members like Mukhtar Robow their positions, 
and others such as Ibrahim al-Afghani their lives.12 
Although the inner circle consists largely of Somalis, foreigners play a 
major role in the organisation.13 Omar Hammami “Abu Mansour al-Am-
riki”, a Syrian-American jihadist, has conducted successful publicity work 
and internet recruitment; Abu Suleiman al-Banadiri (Yemen) was an 
adviser to Godane. Sheikh Mohammed Abu Faid (Saudi Arabia) is funder 
and manager, Abu Musa Mombasa (Pakistan) chief of security and training. 
Mohamoud Mujajir (Sudan) is responsible for recruiting suicide bombers.14 
Three prominent figures who could have posed a threat to Godane all died 
in unexplained circumstances in 2013: Ibrahim al-Afghani, Omar Ham-
mami al-Amriki and Maa’lim Hashi. 
After the drone strike against Godane in September 2014 several other 
high-ranking members of al-Shabaab were killed, including Tahlil Abdi-
shakur, intelligence chief responsible for suicide attacks and successor to 
Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, who was killed in December 2014.15 Abdi 
Nur Mahdi alias Yusuf Dheeg, al-Shabaab’s Chief of External Operations 
with responsibility for intelligence and security planning was killed by 
drone in January 2015, and Adnan Garaar, a top al-Shabaab official sus-
pected of masterminding the 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping mall 
in Nairobi was also killed by drone attack in March 2015. 
Olow Barow, senior commander of Al-Shabaab in Somalia’s Middle 
Shabelle region was reportedly captured by the Somali National Army in 
February 2015, along with Sheikh Hassan Dhubow and Sheikh Abdi 
Barow.16 
Intelligence chief Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi surrendered to Somali 
government forces in December 2014 followed in March 2015 by Bashaan 
Ali Hassan aka Mohamed Ali, senior intelligence officer in Lower Shabelle 
and Bakool.17 
 
12  On the al-Shabaab leadership, see Daniel E. Agbiboa, “Terrorism without Borders: 
Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and the Global Jihad Network”, Journal of Terrorism Research 5, no. 1 
(special issue, February 2014): 27–34 (27ff.). 
13  The connections between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are explained in: ISVG (Institute for 
the Study of Violent Groups), Al Shabaab: Visualizing East Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group 
(Boston: University of New Haven, 8 September 2011), http://www.isvg.org/follow/blog/2011/ 
09/08/al-shabaab-visualizing-east-africas-most-notorious-terrorist-group/ (accessed 9  Febru-
ary 2015). 
14  ICG, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, Africa Briefing 74 (Nairobi and Brussels, 18 May 2010), 8, 
fn. 45, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B74%20 
Somalias%20Divided%20Islamists.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
15  “US Strike Killed Shabaab Intelligence Chief”, BBC, 31 December 2014. http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-africa-30635240?print=true (accessed 11 May 2015). 
16  “Al Shabaab Commander Captured in Somalia”, Goobjoog, 3 February 2015, http:// 
goobjoog.com/english/?p=9765 (accessed 12 May 2015). 
17  “US Strikes Target Top al-Shabaab Militant”, Topnews, 30 December 2014, http:// 
topnews.az/en/news/138591/US-strike-targets-top-alShabaab-militant.html (accessed 10 May 
2015). 
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Structure and Administration 
Al-Shabaab quickly built organisational and administrative structures. The 
top of the hierarchy of fighters is the leadership council (qiyadah), followed 
by foreign fighters and Somalis with foreign passports (muhajirun); the 
lowest level is the ansar, the local Somali fighters.18 
When it controlled large parts of southern Somalia, al-Shabaab appointed 
various ministries (maktab) and regional administrations (wilayat), which 
concerned themselves above all with the implementation of sharia. Here 
there was no strict separation between civil administration, military struc-
ture and religious moral policing. 
Al-Shabaab’s most important ministries are defence (difaa), intelligence 
and security (the Amniyat), the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Orienta-
tion (daawa), a kind of interior ministry concerned above all with questions 
of governance in the areas controlled by al-Shabaab (Siyasaada iyo Go-
bolada), the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Finance. The 
Ministry of Information, which is responsible for public relations work, 
also operates the Twitter accounts, blogs and other social media used for 
purposes of recruitment.19 There is also a religious police to enforce the 
implementation of sharia. If regulations such as the ban on television are 
ignored they impose immediate punishment and are not afraid to kill. 
This zealotry in particular has made them extremely unpopular among 
the population.20 
Ideology and Motivation 
Al-Shabaab is driven by a backward-looking vision that it seeks to realise 
through a postmodern fighting strategy. Its concept of the future is based 
on both the life of the Prophet and the “golden age” when the Sultans of 
Zanzibar ruled the Swahili coast from what is now Tanzania as far as 
Somalia. Trade (including slaves from the East African interior) with the 
Arabian Peninsula as well as India and China brought wealth and influ-
ence. Today the jihadists see themselves surrounded by states with Chris-
tian majorities and governments that treat their Muslim populations as 
second-class citizens. 
Somalis claim direct descent from the Hashemite branch of the Proph-
et’s Quraysh tribe.21 The golden age when Islam united all the clans and 
nomadic tribes and Islamic sultans ruled the entire Swahili coast is not 
only conjured in the idea of the caliphate. The loss of the Ogaden to Ethio-
pia, the civil war during the end of Siad Barres’ reign and the warlordism 
that followed left the people disempowered, and millions of Somalis left 
 
18  Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, Anatomy of al-Shabab (see note 8), 18. 
19  Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement (see note 10), 21. 
20  “Inside an al-Shabaab Training Camp”, Channel 4 News, 16 December 2013, http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=enRVsBDz1oo (accessed 1 October 2014). 
21  Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, “Islam in Somali History: Fact and Fiction”, in The Invention of 
Somalia, ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995), 1–27. 
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the country. In particular the experience of powerlessness towards ex-
ternal actors and watching one’s own political elite fail, paired with an 
idealised view of the past, produces anger and frustration that strengthen 
the willingness to sacrifice oneself for “the cause”.22 
Violence as a Tool of Social Advancement 
The means al-Shabaab chooses for achieving its goals include guerrilla war-
fare against the government and AMISOM, terror as a political and mili-
tary instrument, and a media strategy of international recruitment and 
legitimation. The prospect of personal glory is dangled before every muja-
hid, whether in the here and now or the hereafter. Al-Shabaab follows the 
specifically jihadist doctrine that distinguishes not only between Muslims 
and non-Muslims but also declares all those not following the only true 
belief to be apostates (murtadd) and as such legitimate targets of jihadist 
destruction.23 
The spectacular violence this brings forth can be interpreted as referenc-
ing both the Saudi-Arabian practice of corporal punishments and teach-
ings from the time of the Prophet. The aspect of cleansing violence, as 
found for example in the writings of al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Bakr 
Naji,24 can also be read into the acts of al-Shabaab. In fact, al-Shabaab’s cul-
ture of violence appears closer to the rituals of ancient cults of violence 
than to the industrialised mass killing practised by terror regimes of 
modernity such as the Nazis. 
In their tactics al-Shabaab are not entirely dissimilar to totalitarian 
terror regimes like the Cambodian Khmer Rouge. The glorification of the 
in-group and the derivative legitimation to destroy others, be they close or 
distant enemies, however, extends beyond the nationally bounded rule of 
terror embodied by such regimes. Self-aggrandisement and the promise of 
exercising practically unrestricted power – indeed the obligation of true 
religion to do so – is particularly attractive to young men. It allows them to 
overcome the restrictions of clan and generation, to compensate a sub-
jective emasculation (for example from seeing more successful sisters or 
independent mothers), but also to obliviate the weakness of the fathers 
that is experienced in many diaspora and war families. The opportunities 
for ideological identification offered by jihadism integrate historical and 
experienced personal traumas such as colonialism, occupation, repression 
 
22  Michael Shank, “Understanding Political Islam in Somalia”, Contemporary Islam 1, no. 1 
(2007): 89–103. 
23  ICG, Somalia’s Divided Islamists (see note 14), 4. 
24  “Meanwhile, the mujahids engages [sic] (in destruction) for the sake of truth, justice, 
and the victory of the religion of God and to prevent the punishment of God from de-
scending upon the Umma.” Quoted in Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most 
Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass, trans. William McCants, (Boston: Harvard 
University, May 2006), 247. 
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and displacement and permit the fighting mujahid to become a hero, or at 
least to feel like one.25 
Their new roles turn the male jihadists from breadwinners into judges. 
Their destructive operations, their brutalisation through public execu-
tions, beheadings, corporal punishments, the destruction of whole villages 
and the kidnapping of children alienate the fighters from the base they 
originate from. In that sense, they also challenge the authority of the tra-
ditional leaders, the Sufi sheikhs, the clan elders, the patriarchs, who can 
do nothing to oppose their terror. 
There is little in the way of theology to be found in the recruitment 
videos on the al-Shabaab website “al-Kataib” (The Battalion) or in its social 
media.26 Instead they present a male-bonded action group where images of 
military drill alternate with portraits of individual mujahideen.27 Al-
Shabaab’s videos intersperse depictions of spectacular violence, such as the 
beheading of prisoners, with reassuring images of the group and the com-
munity of brothers in arms, conveyed via the shared flag and uniform.28 
Strategy and Tactics 
After participating in an asymmetrical guerrilla war against the occupa-
tion, al-Shabaab had to regroup and set new objectives when the Ethiopian 
troops withdrew in 2009. Following its relatively rapid spread across large 
parts of Somalia, al-Shabaab had already been attempting to establish an 
“Islamic state” since 2006, assuming administrative tasks and enforcing 
the Salafist moral and behavioural code.29 As the increasing frequency of 
attacks on women and children and targeted killings of clan elders since 
2013 reveal, the new al-Shabaab is increasingly distancing itself from its 
Somali roots. At the same time, it instrumentalises both the clans and the 
government (which it has infiltrated) to achieve its ends.30 
 
25  Maleeha Aslam, Gender-Based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist 
Islamism and Terrorism (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012). 
26  “Nasheed – Bikataibil Imaan [The Battalions of Faith]”, 24 November 2010, https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-2YVy7SBQQ (accessed 1 October 2014). 
27  Abu Mansuur al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi, Part 1, https://azelin.files. 
wordpress.com/2012/05/omar-hammami-abc5ab-mane1b9a3c5abr-al-amrc4abkc4ab-22the-
story-of-an-american-jihc481dc4ab-part-122.pdf (accessed 20 January 2015). 
28  For a comparison of jihadi and gang videos, see A. Aaron Weisburd, “Comparison of 
Visual Motifs in ‘Jihadi’ and ‘Cholo’ Videos on YouTube”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, 
no. 12 (December 2009): 1066–1074. 
29  Abdulkadir Khalif, “Al-Shabaab Militants Destroy Khat in Southern Somalia”, Africa 
Review (online), 14 October 2013, http://www.africareview.com/News/Al-Shabaab-militants-
destroy-khat-in-southern-Somalia/-/979180/2031832/-/puhsk8z/-/index.html (accessed 1 Oc-
tober 2014). 
30  On the targeted killing of clan elders, see ICG, Somalia: Al-Shabab – It Will Be a Long War, 
Africa Briefing 99 (Nairobi and Brussels, 26 June 2014), 14, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
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Godane formally applied for al-Shabaab to join the al-Qaeda network in 
2008, but it was to be four years before the application was accepted.31 His 
interest in al-Qaeda came at a point where al-Shabaab had been militarily 
weakened by the successes of AMISOM. Instead of governing regions, the 
group now increasingly switched to suicide attacks against international 
targets in Somalia and kidnappings of tourists, Kenyan police and humani-
tarian aid workers in the Kenyan-Somali border region. Attacks intensified 
on infrastructure in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, in the region bordering 
Somalia (including the exceptionally brutal attack on the university in 
Garissa in April 2015), and in the tourist resorts on the coast. Although 
membership of al-Qaeda was motivated above all by attracting foreign 
fighters, Kenyan jihadists fighting in the network regard al-Shabaab rather 
than al-Qaeda as their model and ally. 
Al-Shabaab increasingly seeks out targets in countries supplying 
AMISOM troops, above all Kenya, having suffered major territorial losses 
after AMISOM forces, joined by an Ethiopian contingent in 2014, experi-
enced success with their strategy of military strikes against a small num-
ber of carefully selected Shabaab strongholds such as the port of Kismayo. 
While Al-Shabaab was originally concentrated in the south and centre of 
the country, the military operations have scattered it across the entire ter-
ritory, but without complete control over any significant contiguous areas. 
It is nonetheless still capable of attacking well-protected and strategically 
important targets within the country. At the beginning of July 2014 the 
group conducted its second assault within a space of months on the presi-
dential palace in Mogadishu, and at the beginning of September attacked 
the state security prison.32 Assassination attempts on Somali parliamentar-
ians have also cumulated in recent months.33 
As well as attacks within Somalia and in neighbouring countries, there 
has been an increase in executions, including of clan elders, and in the 
abuse of women for violations of the un-Somali Wahhabi dress code. 
Efforts to maximise popular support have given way in at least some parts 
of the country to the rule of terror. Al-Shabaab also earns approval for its 
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rigorous methods, however, because in some of the areas under its control 
crime has fallen and security improved.34 
The Regionalisation of al-Shabaab 
The most deadly attack by al-Shabaab took place in April 2015, when the 
group claimed responsibility for the killing of 148 people, mainly stu-
dents, at the Garissa University College Campus in northeastern Kenya, 
near the border to Somalia. The attack appeared to reference the targeting 
of schools and students by Boko Haram, and was a clear signal that the orga-
nisation had not been weakened by the death of its leader Godane in 2014. 
In September 2013 a small group of jihadists attacked the Westgate 
Shopping Mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, killing sixty-seven before 
most of the group escaped unapprehended. The operation earned al-Sha-
baab great kudos in jihadist circles. Westgate was the organisation’s most 
successful attack, with the Kenyan police and army requiring days to 
regain control of the shopping centre, when the jihadists had in fact long 
since fled.35 The operation to recapture an empty complex degenerated 
into a humiliating embarrassment for the Kenyan security apparatus. 
Deploying only limited resources, the Westgate attack succeeded in 
making a laughing stock of the Kenyan security forces and revealing their 
ties to Western backers (United States, United Kingdom, Israel). And the 
attack has placed the Kenyan population, especially the local middle class 
and expatriates who most commonly frequent such facilities, in a state of 
permanent alert. Al-Shabaab commentated the events live on Twitter, as it 
also does for its military confrontations with AMISOM forces in Somalia. 
The frequency of attacks in Kenya has risen since the Westgate opera-
tion, with churches, buses, police stations and individuals attacked in 
Nairobi, on the Kenyan coast and in the border region to Somalia. Within 
the space of a few weeks hundreds of civilians died in multiple attacks.36 
This has affected not only Kenya’s tourist industry, but also its economy as 
 
34  “Inside an al-Shabaab Training Camp” (see note 20). 
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attacks, see “Somalia”, New York Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/ 
countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html, and Murithi Mutiga, “Kenyan President Sacks 
Security Minister after Latest al-Shabaab Attack”, Guardian (online), 2 December 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/02/kenyan-president-sacks-minister-shabaab-
attack (accessed 17 February 2015). 
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a whole.37 Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan sister organisation al-Hijra (formerly Mus-
lim Youth Centre, MYC), recruits actively to al-Shabaab and was already 
contributing to its funding.38 The repressive measures against all Kenyans 
of Somali origin with which Nairobi responded to the attacks uninten-
tionally strengthened the jihadist elements in Kenya’s Muslim popula-
tion.39 Entire Somali quarters in Nairobi were combed by the police, resi-
dents held for hours in sports stadiums, hundreds of Somalis deported. 
Figures associated with al-Hijra, such as the influential Sheikh Makaburi 
and Sheikh Aboud Rogo, were assassinated in Mombasa without perpetra-
tors being identified.40 
Al-Shabaab has recently begun conducting attacks in other countries too. 
At the end of May 2014 there was a double explosion in a French restau-
rant in Djibouti mainly used by foreigners. This was the first time al-Sha-
baab had used a female suicide bomber, justifying the attack as a response 
to the French intervention in the Central African Republic (where they were 
fighting against a coalition of Muslim rebel groups called the Séléka).41 
Several planned attacks have also been reported from Ethiopia, most of 
them prevented by the Ethiopian security agencies.42 In 2013 a bomb ex-
ploded prematurely, before the two Somali suspects were able to detonate 
it in a crowded sports stadium in the capital Addis Abeba. The Ugandan 
government issued several terror warnings in 2014, and in June 2014 
al-Shabaab members attempted to enter Uganda using fake UN registra-
tion plates.43 The prosecutor in the al-Shabaab “World Cup” bombing of 
 
37  Kenya is planning to construct a refinery and shipping terminal on the island of Lamu 
for oil arriving along the projected transport corridor from South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda 
and Ethiopia; http://www.lapsset.go.ke. 
38  Security Council Report, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012), S/2013/440, 25 July 2013; Fred Mukinda, “Master-
minds Target Youth to Execute Terror Attacks”, Daily Nation (online), 3 March 2014, http:// 
mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Masterminds-target-youth-to-execute-terror-attacks/-/1950946/ 
2228164/-/format/xhtml/-/a542q3z/-/index.html (accessed 1 October 2014). 
39  “Kenya Police Admit ‘Extrajudicial Killings”, al-Jazeera (online), 8 December 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2014/12/kenya-police-admit-extrajudicial-killings-
201412894130719731.html (accessed 15 December 2014). 
40  Benard Sanga and Stanley Mwahanga, “Radical Cleric Sheikh Abubakar Shariff alias 
Makaburi Shot Dead”, Standard (online), 2 April 2014, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 
thecounties/article/2000108386/radical-cleric-makaburi-shot-dead (accessed 2 October 2014); 
“‘Al-Shabab Supporter’ Aboud Rogo Mohammed Killed in Kenya”, BBC News Africa (online), 
27 August 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19390888 (accessed 2 October 2014). 
41  Hamza Mohamed, “Al-Shabab Claims Deadly Djibouti Blasts”, al-Jazeera (online), 27 May 
2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/al-shabab-claims-deadly-djibouti-blasts- 
2014527154632977410.html (accessed 2 October 2014). 
42  “Ethiopia Arrests 25 Al-Shabaab Suspects in Terror Sweep”, Allafrica (online), 5 June 
2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201406060131.html (accessed 2 October 2014). 
43  Godfrey Olukya, “Suspected Al-Shabaab Terrorists Enter Uganda in ‘UN’ Registered 
Vehicles”, The Africa Report, 10 June 2014, http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/ 
suspected-al-shabaab-terrorists-enter-uganda-in-un-registered-vehicles.html (accessed 9 Feb-
ruary 2015). 
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2010, which killed seventy-six people watching the final on television in 
Kampala, was shot dead in March 2015 in the Ugandan capital.44 
Publicity Work 
Al-Shabaab was quick to begin disseminating its ideology via the media. 
There is an interesting disjoint between the strict media ban enforced by 
the al-Shabaab police among the population and the organisation’s enthu-
siastic use of social media to communicate and recruit.45 Al-Shabaab’s 
audience is the population of Somalia and East Africa, as well as young 
diaspora Somalis. The languages of communication are Somali and Eng-
lish, with little in the way of websites in Arabic. 
During the Ethiopian occupation al-Shabaab recruited new members 
and propagated its ideology largely through local radio stations. Today 
they hijack stations or use their own such as al-Andalus and al-Furqaan.46 
Speeches by senior officials to al-Shabaab graduation classes at training 
sites for recruits in jihadist warfare and ideology, and sermons at mosques 
are the means of choice for disseminating al-Shabaab’s ideas. Poems, 
which enjoy great significance in Somali narrative culture, are especially 
widely used. Godane was renowned for his propensity to quote his own 
and others’ poems in his rare public speeches. In so doing he was referenc-
ing the Somali national hero and poet Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (the 
“Mad Mullah”), who led an uprising against British colonial rule in Somali-
land at the beginning of the twentieth century, and communicated his 
thoughts on liberation in letters to the British public. 
Tweets, YouTube videos and Al-Shabaab blogs are widely disseminated.47 
Foreign jihadists in particular have circulated the call to join the jihad in 
Somalia in rap lyrics and social media messaging. The Al-Kataib Founda-
tion for Media Productions creates professional recruiting videos, such as 
the series “Mujahideen Moments”.48 Abu Mansur al-Amriki hit the head-
lines with his autobiographical “Story of an American Jihadi”,49 and his 
tweets found a wide audience. A series of videos dedicated specifically to 
the AMISOM forces castigates them as African “crusaders”.50 
 
44  “Uganda Prosecutor in al-Shabaab Bomb Case Shot Dead,” BBC, 31 March 2015, http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32125134 (accessed 11 May 2015). 
45  Since 2014 Al-Shabaab has banned access to the internet in Somalia, but commentates 
its own attacks live on Twitter. “First Smoking, Football, Films and Bras – Now al-Shabaab 
Has Banned the Internet”, Independent (online), 10 January 2014, http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/world/africa/first-smoking-football-films-and-bras--now-alshabaab-has-banned-
the-internet-90520 45.html (accessed 1 October 2014). 
46  Nel Hodge, “How Somalia’s al-Shabab Militants Hone Their Image”, BBC News Africa (on-
line), 5 June 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367 (accessed 2 October 2014). 
47  Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabab” (see note 4): 46. 
48  “Mujahideen Moments”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6rN-iugM-g (since removed). 
49  Abu Mansuur al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi (see note 27); Andrea Elliott, 
“The Jihadist Next Door”, New York Times, 27 January 2010. 
50  “Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions Presents: ‘The African Crusaders’”, http:// 
jihadology.net/2010/06/29/al-kataayb-foundation-for-media-productions-presents-the-african- 
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Funding 
Although al-Shabaab lost its revenues from Somalia’s largest market, the 
Bakara Market in Mogadishu, and from the lucrative charcoal trade (2012: 
$25 million) after it was driven out of Mogadishu (in 2011) and Kismayo (in 
2012), its financial situation is by no means poor. In fact, a United Nations 
report of July 2013 speaks of increasing revenues.51 Through its connec-
tions to local authorities, specifically to the quasi-state entity of Jubbaland 
whose territory includes Kismayo, and to criminal networks within the 
AMISOM forces, al-Shabaab continues to profit from commerce in Kismayo. 
For a time it also controlled the port city of Barawe, which lies between 
Mogadishu and Kismayo and was captured by AMISOM forces in October 
2014. The revenues are reinvested in goods imported to smuggle to neigh-
bouring states,52 sugar for the Kenyan market being just one example.53 
Other sources of funding include taxes and levies on all commercial 
activities, mafia-like protection schemes and kidnapping for ransom.54 
There are also reports of income from piracy and connections to ivory 
smugglers.55 Al-Shabaab also generates steady revenues through collecting 
social and religious levies (zakat) and a jihad tax, and through financial 
donations from supportive individuals and states.56 Finally, al-Shabaab 
generates ransoms by kidnapping staff of humanitarian organisations, 
while certain Islamic charities are suspected of making donations.57 
External Contacts 
Despite its regional networking and international recruitment, al-Shabaab 
remains an independent and largely Somali organisation whose external 
contacts are in the hands of individual members. Even though al-Shabaab’s 
cadres have gathered experience abroad and fight alongside foreign jihad-
ists inside Somalia, its operational network barely extends beyond East 
Africa.58 But there, and especially in Kenya, it is spreading rapidly, con-
 
crusaders/ (not available any more). Still available at https://archive.org/details/The-
African-Crusaders (accessed 20 January 2015). 
51  “Letter Dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant 
to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea” (see note 7), 427. 
52  Ibid., 147. 
53  Bosire Boniface, “Kenya: Sugar Imports from Somalia Fund Al-Shabaab, Kenyan 
Officials Say”, Allafrica (online), 24 April 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201304250180. 
html?viewall=1 (accessed 2 October 2014). 
54  On al-Shabaab’s funding, see also Money Jihad: Combating Terrorist Financing: Al Shabaab 
[blog], https://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/tag/al-shabaab/. 
55  Nir Kalron and Andrea Crosta, “Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: Al-Shabaab and Conflict 
Ivory”, Elephant Action League (online), 2011/2012, http://elephantleague.org/project/africas-
white-gold-of-jihad-al-shabaab-and-conflict-ivory/ (accessed 2 October 2014). 
56  UN Monitoring Reports S/2014/726 (13 October 2014) and S/2012/571 (13 July 2012). 
57  Andre Le Sage, “Islamic Charities in Somalia”, in Understanding Islamic Charities, ed. Jon 
B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, 2007), 147–65. 
58  ICG, Somalia’s Divided Islamists (see note 14). 
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necting with local groups, and finding support among Kenyans of Somali 
origin and other Kenyan Muslims. For a brief spell Yemen was regarded as 
a relevant connection, and in 2010 Godane called for support for al-Qaeda 
in Yemen.59 Following the successful AMISOM offensive in 2012, foreign 
al-Shabaab cadres in particular fled to Yemen. Although there are reports 
of letters between al-Shabaab and Boko Haram promising mutual support, 
one cannot speak of networking in that case.60 
Even before the founding of al-Shabaab there were East African al-Qaeda 
groups operating in Somalia,61 but the country was regarded as impen-
etrable and unsuited for foreigners.62 For Somali jihadists from the United 
States, however, who often find themselves at the receiving end of resent-
ment in the Arab world, such as Syria and Iraq, al-Shabaab remains the 
first port of call.63 Al-Shabaab’s media strategy devotes particular attention 
to them.64 Somalis from Minneapolis and other diaspora communities 
represent the largest contingent of foreign jihadists joining al-Shabaab, 
although volunteers from the same communities do also join IS in Syria 
and Iraq.65 
 
59  “Shabab Militias Pledge Fighters to Support Yemeni al Qaeda”, France 24 (online), 1 Jan-
uary 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20100101-al-Shabab-muslim-yemeni-al-qaeda-
somalia/ (accessed 2 October 2014) 
60  “Al-Katāi’b Media Presents a New Video Message from Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujā-
hidīn’s Shaykh Mukhtar Abū al-Zubayr: ‘Muslims of Bangui and Mombasa: A Tale of Trag-
edy’”, jihadology (online), 21 June 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/14/al-kataib-media- 
presents-a-new-video-message-from-%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-shabab-al-mujahidins-shaykh-
mukhtar-abu-al-zubayr-muslims-of-bangui-and-mombasa-a-tale-of-tragedy/ (accessed 2 Oc-
tober 2014); Robin Simcox, “Boko Haram and Defining the ‘al-Qaeda Network’”, al-Jazeera 
(online), 6 June 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-
qaeda-20 1463115816142554.html (accessed 2 October 2014); Cleophus Tres Thomas III 
and Fuad Ahmed, “Al-Shabaab Support for Boko Haram Reflects Group’s Own Sordid Past 
with Children”, Sabahi (online), 16 May 2014, http://www.sabahionline.com/en_GB/ 
articles/hoa/articles/features/2014/05/16/feature-01 (accessed 2 October 2014). 
61  Bill Roggio, “Bin Laden Urges Jihad against New Somali Government”, The Long War 
Journal, 19 March 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/bin_laden_ 
urges_jiha.php (accessed 2 October 2014). 
62  Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro and Vahid Brown, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of 
Africa (West Point: Combating Terrorism Centre, July 2007) (Harmony Project). 
63  Seth G. Jones, “The Terrorist Threat from Al Shabaab: Testimony Presented before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 3, 2013” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT400/RAND_CT 
400.pdf (accessed 2 October 2014). 
64  “Al-Katāi’b Media Presents a New Video Message from Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn: 
‘The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of the Two Migrations’”, jihadology 
(online), undated, http://jihadology.net/2013/08/07/al-kataib-media-presents-a-new-video-
message-from-%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-shabab-al-mujahidin-the-path-to-paradise-from-the-
twin-cities-to-the-land-of-the-two-migrations/ (accessed 2 October 2014). See also “The 
Rageh Omaar Report: From Minneapolis to Mogadishu”, al-Jazeera (online), 15 July 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ragehomaarreport/2010/07/201071583644674720. 
html (accessed 2 October 2014). 
65  On the case of an American rapper who went to fight with ISIS in Syria, after a class-
mate had already joined al-Shabab in 2008, see Laura Yuen and Sasha Aslanian, “Minne-
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Aside from personal networking, Al-Shabaab fighters receive military 
training abroad, and the organisation also receives external financial sup-
port. In the past Eritrea was conspicuous for military aid and Qatar for 
financial support, although evidence of Eritrean training assistance has 
dried up in recent years.66 
The Future 
The killing of Godane ushered in a new phase in the history of al-Sha-
baab.67 His death places the organisation in a precarious position, given 
that he only shortly beforehand, in 2013, had almost all the other influen-
tial leaders killed including his designated successor Afghani. The power 
struggle that has flared up over the succession could lead to a further 
strengthening of regional cells and satellites such as al-Hijra. With the 
Somalis within the organisation likely to secure the support of the clans, 
one could expect a process of Somalisation and fragmentation not unlike 
that observed with the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Somali warlords in 
the 1990s. As Godane’s successor al-Shabaab has named Abu Ubaidah 
(Ahmed Omar, Ahmed Dhere), who hitherto commanded parts of the coun-
try under its control.68 
Since Godane’s death more al-Shabaab functionaries have been killed by 
drones, and the organisation has increasingly lost territory and conse-
quentially sources of income. If funding remains scarce and the leadership 
divided, the government’s offer of amnesty might even become attractive 
to some of its fighters.69 On the other side, al-Shabaab attacks continue to 
increase in the Kenyan border region and on the Kenyan coast, so al-Sha-
baab’s future lies more in regionalisation than in the pursuit of national 
Somali interests. 
 
 
sota Pipeline to al-Shabab”, Minnesota Public Radio News (online), 25 September 2013, http:// 
minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/ongoing/somali_timeline/ (accessed 2 October 2014). 
66  Colum Lynch, “Qatar’s Support for Islamists Muddles Its Reputation as Neutral Broker 
in Mideast”, Washington Post (online), 28 November 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/qatars-support-for-islamists-muddles-its-reputation-as-neutral-broker- 
in-mideast/2012/11/28/a9f8183a-f92e-11e1-8398-0327ab83ab91_story.html (accessed 2 Oc-
tober 2014). 
67  “US Targets Al-Shabaab Leader in Somalia Air Strike”, Daily Nation (online), 2 Septem-
ber 2014, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/US-targets-Al-Shabaab-leader-in-air-strike/-/ 
1066/2438990/-/n7mkk/-/index.html (accessed 2 October 2014). 
68  Tres Thomas, “Analysis: Is al-Shabaab Stronger or Weaker after Godane’s Death?”, 
Somalia Newsroom (online), 22 September 2014, http://somalianewsroom.com/2014/09/22/ 
analysis-is-al-shabaab-stronger-or-weaker-after-godanes-death/ (accessed 2 October 2014). 
69  “Somalia Offers al-Shabab Members Amnesty”, BBC (online), 3 September 2014, http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29044368 (accessed 2 October 2014). 
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Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market 
Wolfram Lacher 
If Algeria was central to North Africa’s jihadist movements in the past, Libya 
is where their future lies. After decades underground or abroad, Libya’s 
jihadists grasped the opportunity offered by the collapse of the Gaddafi 
regime. Like all political forces that have emerged since the 2011 uprising, 
Libya’s jihadist groups are first and foremost local phenomena that have 
gained a foothold only in individual cities. But they are far more closely 
networked transnationally than other actors, and have been able to turn 
their strongholds into hubs of regional exchange with the Maghreb, the 
Sahel and Syria. Their rapid growth at the local level was initially driven 
by a strategy of operating openly amidst society, with their provision of  
charitable and state-like services cultivating a positive or at least ambiva-
lent public image. Subsequently, they exploited the escalation of political 
tensions into renewed civil war. With the ongoing conflicts preventing any 
rebuilding of the state, Libya’s role as the epicentre of North African jihad-
ism is set to grow in coming years. 
Origins and Evolution 
Three successive generations of Libyan jihadists have been shaped by very 
different experiences – and consequently responded differently to the pos-
sibilities opened up by Gaddafi’s demise. Most of the older generation, to 
the extent they are still politically active, have arrived in the mainstream 
Islamist spectrum or even joined non-Islamist currents. This generation 
includes those born in the 1960s and early 1970s, whose activities peaked 
between 1988 and 2001. Their formative experiences began with the 
armed struggle in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s. Many were not 
only motivated by the idea of anticommunist jihad, but were also fleeing 
the repression of the Gaddafi regime, which imprisoned thousands of 
young Islamists in 1989.1 From 1993 onwards, some Libyan Afghanistan 
veterans went to Algeria, where they joined the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA). Most of those who escaped death in battle and survived the internal 
purges returned home disillusioned by the organisation’s brutality.2 
Others followed those jihadists to Sudan from whose ranks the al-Qaeda 
leadership was later to emerge. 
 
1  Fathi al-Fadhli, “The Political Alternative in Libya and the State after the Revolution” 
(Arabic), part 10, 18 March 2007, http://www.libya-watanona.com/adab/ffadhli/ff22047a. 
htm (all websites cited in this contribution accessed 10 September 2014). 
2  Kamil al-Tawil, Al-Qaeda and Its Brothers: The History of the Arab Jihadists (Arabic), (London, 
2007), 125–32. 
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Map 3: Libya 
Veterans of the Afghanistan war also founded the Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (LIFG, al-Jama’a al-Islamiya al-Muqatila bi-Libiya), which organised 
in secret for a number of years before announcing its existence in 1995.3 
Reflecting the international experiences of its leaders, the LIFG saw itself 
not only as the spearhead of jihad against the tyrannical Gaddafi regime, 
but also as an integral component of a global jihadist movement. Between 
July 1995 and July 1998, LIFG cells clashed frequently with Libyan security 
forces. Three attempts to assassinate Gaddafi failed, one of them only 
narrowly.4 
The regime responded ruthlessly, including by sending the air force to 
bomb LIFG positions in the mountains surrounding the port city of Derna. 
Mass arrests of supporters of the organisation and relatives of its members 
also swept up many others suspected of holding radical ideas. More than 
1,200 prisoners died in a massacre at the infamous Abu Salim prison in 
Tripoli in June 1996, most of them Islamists of various currents.5 This wave 
of repression prepared the ground for the emergence of the next genera-
tion of jihadists. 
 
3  Omar Ashour, “Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist 
Movements”, Terrorism and Political Violence 23 (2011): 377–97. 
4  Al-Fadhli, “The Political Alternative” (see note 1). 
5  Human Rights Watch, Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison (New York, 2006). 
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Although its members originated from all regions of Libya and conducted 
operations in the Greater Tripoli area, the LIFG had two main strongholds: 
Benghazi and Derna in the north-east. These two cities supplied a dispro-
portionate number of known LIFG members, and bore the brunt of their 
attacks.6 This peculiarity had historical roots, as Benghazi and Derna had 
been the seat of urban elites that enjoyed great sway during the monarchy 
(1951–1969) but were marginalized by Gaddafi and subsequently went into 
opposition. Like the north-east as a whole, Benghazi and Derna were also 
economically neglected by the regime, all the more so after the insurgency 
of the 1990s. Regime repression hit both cities especially hard, thus giving 
a further boost to radical local currents. 
By mid-1998, the LIFG had been practically destroyed within Libya, and 
many of its leaders had fled back to Afghanistan, where they came into 
contact with the al-Qaeda leadership. Although, by their own account, they 
maintained ideological distance and warned against using Afghanistan as 
a base for direct attacks on the United States,7 they still attracted the 
scrutiny of Western intelligence services after 11 September 2001. Several 
high-ranking LIFG members were detained outside Afghanistan and 
rendered to Libya by the United States and the United Kingdom.8 
In 2005, Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam initiated a dialogue between the im-
prisoned LIFG leadership and the regime, mediated by Libyan and foreign 
Islamic scholars. When LIFG members in Afghanistan announced in 2007 
that the group had joined al-Qaeda, this was immediately denied by the 
imprisoned leadership in Libya.9 The dialogue ultimately led six members 
of the LIFG leadership council (majlis al-shura) to revise their understand-
ing of jihad on theological grounds, now arguing that violence should not 
be used to bring about political change in Muslim countries.10 In the 
course of this process, more than four hundred of the group’s members 
and sympathisers were released from prison between 2007 and 2011 – the 
last 110 on 16 February 2011, the first day of the uprising against Gadda-
fi.11 Many of them, having just renounced the armed struggle against the 
regime, now played a leading role in the revolution. 
 
6  See for example the list of LIFG members killed between 1995 and 1998 in al-Fadhli, 
“The Political Alternative” (see note 1). 
7  See for example the statements by Abd al-Wahhab Gaid and Sami al-Saadi in David 
Kirkpatrick, “Political Islam and the Fate of Two Libyan Brothers”, New York Times, 6 Octo-
ber 2012, and Human Rights Watch, Delivered into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of 
Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya (New York, 2012), 25. 
8  The former leader of LIFG, Abd al-Hakim Belhaj, his deputy, Khalid al-Sharif, and the 
group’s leading scholar, Sami al-Saadi, are three particularly prominent cases. Human 
Rights Watch, Delivered into Enemy Hands (see note 7). 
9  “Libyan Islamists ‘Join al-Qaeda’”, BBC News, 3 November 2007. 
10  Sami al-Saadi, Muftah al-Dhawadi, Mustafa Qanaifid, Abd al-Hakim Belhaj, Abd al-
Wahhab Gaid and Khalid al-Sharif. Revisions of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group: Corrective 
Studies on the Understanding of Jihad, Moral Policing and Rule over People (Arabic), ed. Salman 
al-Auda (Cairo, 2010). 
11  Al-Sadiq al-Raqi’i, “The Islamists in Libya: History and Jihad (2)” (Arabic), 26 December 
2011, http://www.alwatanlibya.com/more-18910-23-الاسلاميون في ليبيا ..تاريخ وجهاد (2) .. 
بقلم الصادق الرقيعي; also Ashour, “Post-Jihadism” (see note 3), 389. 
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Meanwhile, a second generation of jihadists had come through. The dis-
mantling of the LIFG made it harder for jihadists to organise in Libya, and 
following 11 September 2011, resistance against the American “war on 
terror” moved centre stage. The period from 2001 to 2010 was therefore 
characterised by two different types of jihadist socialisation. Firstly, a new 
generation was radicalised during imprisonment at Abu Salim. Most of the 
activists concerned had not been LIFG members, and paid only lip service 
(if even that) to the revisionist turn.12 Secondly, networks emerged to fun-
nel Libyan recruits into Iraq, where they came into contact with what was 
then the most radical current in jihadism. According to documents seized 
by US forces in Iraq, Libyans formed the second-largest group among seven 
hundred foreign fighters who joined the al-Qaeda offshoot Islamic State in 
Iraq (ISI) between August 2006 and August 2007. In relation to national 
population, the Libyans were first by a long way. Even more telling was the 
cities they came from. More than half originated from Derna, which has a 
population of only about 100,000, while almost a quarter came from 
Benghazi.13 So Libya’s jihadists remained strongly characterised by their 
local origins, though their networks increasingly detached themselves 
from those of the LIFG. 
Finally, members of the third generation gathered their first combat 
experiences during the revolution or joined jihadist groups after the fall of 
the regime. Their radicalisation largely occurred after the end of the 2011 
civil war. Although jihadists of various stripes had been prominently in-
volved in the struggle against Gaddafi, the units they fought in were never 
exclusively Islamist. In many groups, former LIFG members and younger 
jihadists fought side by side with non-Islamist revolutionaries; this was the 
case in the Martyrs of Abu Salim brigade from Derna, the Umar al-Mukhtar 
brigade from Benghazi and Ajdabiya, the Rafallah al-Sahati brigade from 
Benghazi and the Martyrs of the Capital brigade based in the western 
Libyan city of Nalut.14 Former LIFG supporters generally sought to present 
themselves first and foremost as revolutionaries rather than jihadists. This 
applied all the more to former senior leaders like Abd al-Hakim Belhaj. In 
summer 2011, Belhaj established direct relations with Qatar, which allowed 
him to mobilise arms deliveries for the group in Nalut, and became head 
of Tripoli Military Council following the fall of the capital in August 
2011.15 Former LIFG members thus rose to prominence through the revo-
lution, but not as jihadists. 
 
12  Mary Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place: Libya’s Islamists during and after the 2011 Up-
rising”, in The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, ed. Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (Lon-
don, 2015), 177–204. 
13  Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the 
Sinjar Records (West Point: CTC Harmony Project, 2008). 
14  Interviews with former members of these groups, Benghazi, Tripoli and Nalut, Novem-
ber 2012 and February 2014. See also Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place” (see note 12). 
15  Peter Cole, “The Fall of Tripoli”, in The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, ed. Cole and 
McQuinn (see note 12), 55–104. 
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Soon after the uprising had begun, however, signs emerged that extrem-
ists would use the revolution to promote interests extending beyond the 
fight against the regime. In Derna, two figures said to have connections to 
al-Qaeda began forming armed groups. Sufian bin Qumu, who had fol-
lowed Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan to Sudan in the 1990s, had been 
arrested in 2001 in Pakistan, then rendered from Guantánamo Bay to Libya 
in 2007. Abd al-Basit Azuz appeared in Derna in May 2011, supposedly on 
behalf of al-Qaeda’s number two, Aiman al-Zawahiri.16 When General Abd 
al-Fattah Younis, Gaddafi’s interior minister who defected to command the 
rebel forces in the north-east, was assassinated in July 2011, militant Islam-
ists immediately came under suspicion. Circumstantial evidence pointed 
to the Abu Ubaida Ibn al-Jarrah brigade led by former Abu Salim inmate 
Ahmed Abu Khattala.17 
The chaos that followed the collapse of the regime offered ideal condi-
tions for local armed groups, regardless whether tribal militias, brigades 
controlled by politicians and businessmen, criminal gangs – or jihadists. 
After the unifying goal – the fall of Gaddafi – had been achieved, revolu-
tionary brigades began to differentiate along political lines. Many volun-
teers who felt their task had been accomplished with the end of the regime 
returned to civilian life. Countless new recruits filled their places. The 
looting of state arsenals created a virtually limitless supply of weapons, 
while the weak transitional government soon began registering and pay-
ing the numerous armed groups. These cemented their local positions and 
prevented the restoration of state control. Jihadist elements increasingly 
separated out, but continued to benefit from relationships and sympathies 
established during the revolution. Many of them remained integrated in 
the funding flowing to parastatal units, and tolerated in their respective 
local contexts. Whereas representatives of the first generation of jihadists 
were now claiming leadership positions and playing by democratic rules – 
at least no less than their political opponents – the second generation was 
free to recruit members of the third to new jihadist splinter groups. 
Libya’s Jihadists in the Post-revolutionary Era 
Most post-revolutionary jihadist groups formed openly in the midst of 
society. While distancing themselves from the state in their public state-
ments, they stood in continuous exchange with state representatives – at 
least until mid-2014, when power struggles led to a split in state institu-
tions and two rival governments emerged. These ambivalent relations were 
not only conditioned by state weakness, but also enabled by the growing 
 
16  Rob Nordland and Scott Shane, “Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts”, 
New York Times, 24 April 2011; Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Source: Al Qaeda 
Leader Sends Veteran Jihadists to Establish Presence in Libya”, CNN, 30 December 2011; 
Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Jomana Karadsheh, “Libyan Official: U.S. Drones 
Seeking Jihadists in Libya”, CNN, 7 June 2012. 
17  David Kirkpatrick, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi”, New York Times, 28 December 2013. 
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influence exercised by former LIFG leaders and other non-jihadist Islamists 
in state and parastatal structures. 
Political Moderation, Ambivalence and Fluid Boundaries 
Most former LIFG leaders had softened ideologically and in some cases 
undergone remarkable transformations. Before the July 2012 elections to 
the General National Congress (GNC), Abd al-Hakim Belhaj founded the Al-
Watan Party, which brought together former LIFG members with moder-
ate Islamists and non-Islamists (in a combination that transpired to be less 
than successful electorally). The LIFG stamp was more clearly identifiable 
in the Al-Umma Party, in which Sami al-Saadi, Abd al-Wahhab Gaid and 
Khalid al-Sharif played leading roles. Nonetheless, Al-Umma was also based 
on a clear commitment to the democratic process, theologically under-
pinned by al-Saadi.18 Gaid later became a prominent GNC member and 
mediated in numerous extra-parliamentary conflicts. Many former LIFG 
leaders ended up in top government positions.19 Khalid al-Sharif was 
appointed deputy defence minister in January 2014, filling a post already 
occupied by another former LIFG member before him: Saddiq al-Mabruk 
al-Ghithi, who switched to the federalist camp after his dismissal and thus 
joined the political opponents of Islamist currents in north-eastern Libya. 
In the shape of Abd al-Jawad al-Badin, another former LIFG fighter was 
already active among the federalists. Other former members of the group, 
such as the Afghanistan veteran Isa Abd al-Quyum, even became vehement 
critics of all Islamist tendencies. 
Their political enemies often simply labelled former LIFG members as 
“al-Qaeda” – without any evidence for the attribution, and ignoring all 
signs of a genuine change of heart on the part of the activists. However, for 
all its political centrism, the milieu around the former LIFG preserved am-
bivalent relations with extremist circles of the younger generation. For 
example, the “National Guard” that Khalid al-Sharif created soon after his 
liberation from Abu Salim in August 2011 also included – alongside groups 
organised along local or tribal lines – brigades of jihadist character such as 
the Al-Nur brigade in Derna.20 On paper, the National Guard was integrated 
into al-Ghithi’s border guards, ensuring access to pay and equipment. 
The relationships between the big revolutionary brigades of Benghazi 
and Ansar al-Sharia were also obscure. The latter emerged out of the 17 
 
18  See for example a speech by al-Saadi on the topic of democracy in January 2013, http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHEPb6Fib8Q. 
19  As well as those already mentioned, two others are worth highlighting: Muftah 
al-Dhawadi, a former member of the LIFG Shura Council, who became Deputy Minister of 
Martyrs’ Affairs under Prime Minister Abd al-Rahim al-Kib and retained the post under 
al-Kib’s successor Ali Zeidan until February 2014, when he died in a plane crash in Tuni-
sia; and Abd al-Basit Abu Hliqa, also a former member of the Shura Council, who became 
Deputy Interior Minister under Zeidan. 
20  According to a National Guard document of September 2012, “The Units That Have 
Adhered to the Flag of the National Guard” (Arabic). See also Fitzgerald, “Finding Their 
Place” (see note 12). 
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February and Rafallah al-Sahati brigades, whose leaders were associated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood or the former LIFG circles, but which also 
included more radical elements. In early 2012, the extremists split away to 
found Ansar al-Sharia, led by Muhammad al-Zahawi, a former Abu Salim 
inmate and representative of the second generation of jihadists. But the 
extremists continued to maintain relations with their former brothers in 
arms. Such connections also enabled the group’s first public appearance in 
June 2012 at a “forum for implementation of sharia” held in central Ben-
ghazi. Ansar al-Sharia and like-minded groups paraded dozens of pick-ups 
mounted with heavy guns, and condemned democracy as heresy.21 Where-
as the 17 February and Rafallah al-Sahati brigades provided security for the 
July 2012 vote, Ansar al-Sharia opposed the elections. 
As well as LIFG veterans, many other interest groups succeeded in ex-
ploiting the weakness of the transitional government to their own ends, 
and to the advantage of the jihadist milieu. For example, the government 
sought the repatriation of “political prisoners” of Libyan extraction from 
countries like Iraq and Russia,22 but it remained unclear whether this 
occurred at the behest of relatives or of former comrades. That also applied 
to the case of a former LIFG member and Afghanistan veteran who was for 
a time wanted by the Americans in connection with the 1998 East African 
embassy bombings, yet managed to return home in February 2014 on 
board a plane bringing the Libyan national football team back from South 
Africa.23 The family of the Libyan jihadist Mohamed al-Drisi, who was im-
prisoned in Jordan, was suspected of being behind the kidnapping of the 
Jordanian ambassador in Tripoli in April 2014. Al-Drisi was later returned 
to Libya in exchange for the ambassador.24 
 
21  The al-Faruq brigade from Misrata and groups from Derna, Ajdabiya, Sirt and Sabra-
tha were represented at the forum. Some vehicles from the 17 February and Libya Shield 
(Dar‘ Libiya) brigades also participated. Author’s observations, Benghazi, 7 June 2012, and 
discussions with former members of the Rafallah al-Sahati brigade, Benghazi and Tripoli, 
June and November 2012. 
22  The prisoners in Russia are mostly veterans of the Chechen war. Libyan negotiators 
sought to exchange them for Russian and Belarusian mercenaries captured during the 
civil war. “Furtia: We Are Seeking the Release of 150 Libyan Prisoners in 30 States” 
(Arabic), Libiya al-Jadida, 5 September 2013 (no longer available online). 
23  The individual concerned was Ibrahim al-Tantush, who stated that he was free to 
leave South Africa because the international arrest warrant against him had already been 
withdrawn and there were no other charges open against him. Television interview with 
Ibrahim al-Tantush on Libiya li-kull al-Ahrar, 22 April 2014. 
24  Libyan government negotiators had already designated al-Drisi a “political prisoner” 
and sought to secure his release. Al-Drisi was serving a life sentence for his involvement 
in a planned attack on Amman airport. Upon his return, he joined the Shura Council of 
Benghazi Revolutionaries. Rana Sweis und Kareem Fahim, “Ambassador from Jordan 
Freed by Captors in Libya”, New York Times, 13 May 2014; “Libya Identifies Kidnappers of 
Jordanian Ambassador Faiz al-Itan” (Arabic), Kermalkom, 12 May 2014. 
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Conflicts over Benghazi and Derna 
However, the development of Ansar al-Sharia and other jihadist groups in 
Benghazi and Derna was not only facilitated by state weakness. It also 
occurred in a specific local context characterised by vicious power strug-
gles over control of both cities. 
The first isolated assassinations of former or active members of the army, 
police and intelligence services occurred in spring 2012. Several assassi-
nation attempts on Western diplomats in Benghazi failed. Events accelerat-
ed after the attack on a US diplomatic compound and a building used by the 
CIA in Benghazi on 11 September 2012, during which the US ambassador 
Christopher Stevens was killed. According to media reports, Ahmed Abu 
Khattala’s group and members of Ansar al-Sharia were involved in the at-
tack.25 However, the demonstrations that followed the attack were direct-
ed not only against Ansar al-Sharia, but also against the Rafallah al-Sahati 
and 17 February brigades, which both officially stood under state control. 
Members of army units exploited the disorder to seize parts of the groups’ 
arsenals, and a power struggle flared between the revolutionary brigades 
and the remnants of the old security forces. A similar dynamic developed 
in parallel in Derna, where fragments of the old security apparatus faced 
off with the Martyrs of Abu Salim brigade, which had formed around two 
former LIFG members, Abd al-Hakim al-Hasadi and Salim Darbi. 
The conflict in Benghazi gained further momentum in June 2013, when 
a demonstration in front of the base of the officially recognised Libya 
Shield brigade degenerated into clashes in which thirty-one people were 
killed. The government responded with the formal dissolution of the unit, 
which was made up of Islamist-leaning revolutionary brigades.26 It 
remained unclear who was responsible for the now steadily accelerating 
assassination spree targeting former and active members of the security 
forces in Benghazi and Derna, as not a single investigation was brought to 
completion. Acts of revenge on Gaddafi’s henchmen for the repression of 
the 1990s certainly formed a central element, given that feuding was still 
established custom in north-eastern Libya. Where jhadists declared 
members of the security apparatus fair game as “infidels”, this was at least 
partly a rationalisation of a lust for vengeance. Beyond the jihadists, the 
suspects had to include not only the revolutionary brigades jostling with 
the old security forces, but also criminal gangs. Proponents of the revolu-
tionary camp, for their part, pointed the finger at former regime elements 
or machinators seeking to manipulate former army officers into a confron-
tation with the revolutionaries. In all probability, a combination of these 
factors was behind the killings, even if jihadists were likely responsible for 
the single largest part of them.27 
 
25  Kirkpatrick, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi” (see note 17). 
26  David Kirkpatrick, “Violence against Libyan Protesters Threatens to Undercut Power of 
Militias”, New York Times, 9 June 2013. 
27  Supposed jihadi hit lists were circulating in north-eastern Libya by the end of 2012, if 
not earlier. Suspicions that jihadists were responsible for most of the killings hardened in 
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The killings led to acts of retribution and ultimately an open conflict 
between old army units and Ansar al-Sharia, which increasingly drew in 
the revolutionary brigades. February 2014 witnessed the first open fighting 
between the army’s Saeqa special forces on one side and Ansar al-Sharia 
and the 17 February brigade on the other. In May 2014, officers of the old 
army, supplemented by civilian recruits and led by General Khalifa Haftar, 
launched a major offensive against Ansar al-Sharia and revolutionary bri-
gades in Benghazi – under the cover of counter-terrorism and in defiance 
of the military leadership.28 Units that sided with Haftar, including Saeqa, 
temporarily lost almost all their bases in the city. Haftar’s assault united 
his adversaries, who joined forces in June 2014 in the Shura Council of 
Benghazi Revolutionaries. 
Even if the Shura Council initially refrained from jihadist rhetoric, it 
turned Ansar al-Sharia from a marginal to a central force in Benghazi, 
boosting its recruitment. Its fighting strength, long estimated at about two 
hundred fifty to three hundred (with several thousand sympathisers) rose 
to three to five hundred by mid-2014.29 With Egyptian assistance, Haftar 
turned the tables again from September 2014. In the meantime, he had 
also acquired the official support of the House of Representatives in 
Tobruk – elected in June 2014 – and its new army leadership. Haftar’s 
forces and neighbourhood militias gradually forced the Shura Council out 
of all but a few quarters of Benghazi. Heavy fighting weakened Ansar al-
Sharia, with a series of leaders including Zahawi meeting their deaths.30 
Parts of the group joined forces with returnees from Syria to operate under 
the flag of the Islamic State (IS). A wave of suicide bombings demonstrated 
that the switch to IS went hand in hand with a tactical radicalisation, and 
numerous foreign fighters were now among its ranks.31 
The Rise of Ansar al-Sharia 
The public protests against the killing of US Ambassador Stevens in 2012 
represented a formative moment for Ansar al-Sharia. The organisation 
began de-emphasizing its armed wing, instead focusing public attention 
on its charitable activities.32 At the same time, it successively established a 
presence in other cities outside Benghazi, successfully spreading local 
 
April 2014, when the Shura Council of Islamic Youth was set up in Derna. It gave former 
members of the state security forces the opportunity to publicly repent for their erstwhile 
deeds – implying that those who complied would be protected from future assassinations. 
See the Shura Council’s Twitter account at http://twitter.com/shabab_IsIs (now blocked). 
28  Wolfram Lacher, Libya’s Transition: Towards Collapse, SWP Comments 25/2014 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2014). 
29  E-mail communication with Mary Fitzgerald, September 2014. 
30  Interview with a former leader of a revolutionary brigade in Benghazi, location with-
held, December 2014. 
31  See for example the list of nine “martyrs” killed in Benghazi (including five Tunisians, 
two Egyptians and two Libyans), published in November 2014 in the name of the IS prov-
ince of Cyrenaica (Wilayat Barqa). 
32  Aaron Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists beyond Benghazi”, Foreign Policy, 12 August 2013. 
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roots and adapting its approach to specific local characteristics. Unlike al-
Qaeda and its regional affiliates, Ansar al-Sharia claimed no responsibility 
for attacks and killings, instead openly seeking an exchange with society. 
But in communicating its ideology, the group was unequivocal from the 
outset. Its message was that democracy was dictated by the West, whose 
Libyan stooges had to be fought as infidels. Libya’s jihad had by no means 
ended with the fall of the tyrant Gaddafi, it argued; instead, the fight 
against all the lesser tyrants had only just begun. As long as the state was 
not based upon pure Islamic principles, it was an expression of apostasy.33 
In Benghazi, the group cleaned streets, guarded the largest hospital, 
opened a clinic for women and children, and mobilised humanitarian aid 
for victims of war and flooding in Syria, the Gaza Strip and Sudan.34 Ansar 
al-Sharia’s initiatives against drug consumption were particularly success-
ful, and gained the sponsorship of Benghazi’s popular football club. The 
forums that such activities opened up were also used to call for jihad with-
in Libya.35 The strategy was plainly successful, with the second “forum for 
implementation of sharia” in June 2013 considerably better attended than 
the first a year earlier. 
About the same time as the appearance of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, 
Sufian bin Qumu in Derna founded a brigade with the same name that 
also operated outside state structures.36 The two groups claimed to have 
arisen independently and initially denied any connection.37 Only when 
Ansar al-Sharia developed into an organisation with a central leadership, 
the Shura Council, and branches in multiple cities in the course of 2013 
did it become clear that the group in Derna also belonged to it.38 Its two 
other new centres were Ajdabiya and Sirt, where it established branches in 
summer 2013. In all three, Ansar al-Sharia was able to count on a local 
base; like Benghazi and Derna, Ajdabiya and Sirt had also seen dispropor-
tionate numbers of local young men travelling to Iraq.39 
 
33  “Ansar al-Sharia’s Doctrine and Methods” (Arabic), leaflet, Benghazi, undated; Mu’as-
sasat al-Raya li-l-Intaj al-I‘lami, “A Theological View on the Ongoing Struggle in the Libyan 
Arena” (Arabic), Benghazi, August 2014. 
34  Aaron Zelin, “When Jihadists Learn how to Help”, Foreign Policy, 7 May 2014. 
35  Wissam Salem, “The Ansar al-Sharia Forum at Benghazi University: Advertising for the 
Group or Campaign against Drugs?” (Arabic), Elkaf, 28 May 2013, http://www.el-kaf.com/ 
ViewNews.aspx?News_id=330. 
36  Al-Markaz al-I’lami Darna Libiya, “Interview with Sufian bin Qumu, commander of the 
Ansar al-Sharia Derna Brigade, in a Forest” (Arabic), 2 April 2012, http://tamimi.own0.com/ 
t97883-topic. 
37  Mary Fitzgerald, “It Wasn’t Us”, Foreign Policy, 18 September 2012; Aaron Zelin, “Know 
Your Ansar al-Sharia”, Foreign Policy, 21 September 2012. 
38  In October 2013 Ansar al-Sharia distributed sheep for the Feast of Sacrifice in Bengha-
zi, Derna and Sirt, and publicised the initiative in a PR campaign. On the television 
station Libiya li-kull al-Ahrar on 25 November 2013, Mahmud al-Bar’assi from Derna 
referred to himself as a member of the Shura Council of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. In 
March 2014 a member of the Shura Council and a member of the Derna branch of Ansar 
al-Sharia participated in a public dialogue in Derna. 
39  Felter and Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq (see note 13). 
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The group’s initiatives in these three cities resembled those in Benghazi, 
including anti-drugs campaigns and collecting donations to distribute 
sheep to the needy. In all four cities Ansar al-Sharia functioned both as 
armed group and as charitable organisation, setting up checkpoints and 
conducting well-publicised nighttime patrols. At the same time, there were 
significant differences between the local approaches. In Ajdabiya, the 
group’s situation was comparatively precarious and its actions accordingly 
more cautious. In Sirt, which was riven by internal conflicts, Ansar al-
Sharia mediated after clashes. Here the group’s roughly two hundred 
fighters incrementally established themselves as a security force, assisted 
in the process by the numerous assassinations of local members of the 
state security forces.40 
The influence of Ansar al-Sharia and other jihadists extended furthest in 
Derna, where the police, old army units and courts were gradually para-
lysed by killings and intimidation. By mid-2013, the state presence in the 
city had been restricted to a small army unit at the port. Jihadists prevented 
local citizens from participating in the elections to the constitutional com-
mittee in February 2014 and to the House of Representatives in June. The 
assassinations were now no longer restricted to members of the security 
forces, but increasingly also affected judges, activists and politicians. 
Together with other jihadists, elements of Ansar al-Sharia’s Derna branch 
established the Shura Council of Islamic Youth, which patrolled openly in 
the city for the first time in April 2014. About one hundred to one hun-
dred fifty fighters took part in the parade, then representing probably one 
third to one half of the contingent available to jihadists of the al-Qaeda or 
IS persuasion in the city. In May, the Shura Council took over the seat of 
the local council and set up an Islamic court there. In August, the court ex-
ecuted an Egyptian after he admitted having murdered a local citizen. It 
also dealt with minor offences and mediated local land ownership dis-
putes.41 Finally, in October 2014 the Shura Council declared its allegiance 
to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State, at the same time proclaiming 
Derna the seat of the IS province Barqa (the Arabic name for Cyrenaica).42 
However, the ambitions of the Shura Council, and later of the IS off-
shoot in Derna, to create the foundations of statehood met with deter-
mined resistance from the Martyrs of Abu Salim brigade. The latter 
remains Derna’s strongest military force, with more than one thousand 
fighters, according to local observers. The group’s leaders are first-genera-
tion jihadists far removed from the former LIFG’s reformed wing, who had 
also pushed to enforce their Islamic values in the city. Yet the younger 
extremists designated Abu Salim as apostates, pointing to the brigade’s ad-
 
40  See for example the interview by Free Radio Sirt on 6 July 2013 with Fawzi al-Ayat, a 
spokesperson of the group in Sirt; as well as Ansar al-Sharia, “Declaration Concerning 
Armed Clashes between the Tribes of Sirt” (Arabic), Sirt, 11 December 2013. 
41  See the @shabab_IsIs Twitter feed in August 2014 (account now blocked). 
42  “Shura Council of Youth of Islam Paves Way for Establishment of Caliphate in Derna” 
(Arabic), Al-Wasat, 6 October 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/40449/. 
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herence to parastatal units in 2012.43 Abu Salim also differed from its ad-
versaries in having no foreigners among its ranks.44 The conflict between 
the two camps, which peaked in June 2014, cost numerous lives on both 
sides.45 Abu Salim refused allegiance to IS, and in December 2014 joined 
with an Ansar al-Sharia faction and other jihadist splinter groups to form 
the Shura Council of Derna Mujahideen, as a counterweight to IS.46 
It remains largely unclear how Ansar al-Sharia and other jihadist groups 
have funded their rapid growth. Their charitable ventures were obviously 
not self-financing, despite public fundraising and business sponsorship. 
Amidst the institutional chaos, some members of the groups probably 
remained on the public payroll. Frequent robberies of banks and cash 
transporters, as well as kidnappings for ransom suggest that revenues 
from criminal activities probably played a role in Derna and Sirt. Ansar al-
Sharia also ran a network that smuggled illegal migrants from the 
Sudanese capital Khartoum via Kufra in south-east Libya to Ajdabiya, for 
onward travel to Europe from ports along Libya’s Mediterranean coast.47 
Beyond this, Ansar al-Sharia was probably able to rely upon support from 
wealthy sponsors at home and abroad. In contrast with the Islamic State’s 
well-funded operations in Syria, there is no evidence that Libyan jihadist 
groups have directly tapped into oil revenues. In early 2015, IS factions 
attacked several oilfields in central Libya, causing their shutdown, but 
made no attempt to seize control of, or siphon off, production.48 
Despite the levels of violence associated with their emergence, Ansar 
al-Sharia and like-minded groups were long able to count on the benevo-
lence or at least ambivalence of parts of their local milieu – to which Ansar 
al-Sharia’s charitable activities made a central contribution.49 Other groups 
repeatedly forced Ansar al-Sharia out of the Al-Jala hospital in Benghazi, 
only for hospital staff to insist each time on its return to guard the facil-
 
43  “Details of Killing of Ansar al-Sharia Leader in Clashes between Extremists in Derna” 
(Arabic), Al-Wasat, 10 June 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21974/. 
44  Interview with an observer from Derna, location withheld, November 2014. 
45  For example “Details of Killing of al-Qaeda Leader Ali bin Tahir in Derna” (Arabic), 
Al-Wasat, 9 April 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/12398/; “Clashes between 
al-Qaeda and the Abu Salim Brigade in Derna” (Arabic), Al-Wasat, 7 June 2014, http://www. 
alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21561/. 
46  In addition to the Abu Salim brigade and the Ansar al-Sharia faction, the Mujahideen 
Council also initially included the “Army of the Islamic State of Libya”. The latter, not to 
be confused with the local IS affiliate, had appeared in November 2013. See Mathieu 
Galtier, “The Army of Islamic State of Libya: Derna’s Mystery Militia”, Libya Herald, 7 No-
vember 2013; Martyrs of Abu Salim brigade, “Letter Concerning the Supreme Security 
Committee” (Arabic), Derna, 28 April 2015.  
47  According to a Syrian refugee who travelled to Europe by this route in 2014 and was 
housed by the Ansar al-Sharia branch in Ajdabiya. Interview by Nizar Sarieldin with 
refugee, name and location withheld, December 2014. 
48  “New Attacks on Libya’s Oil Assets Shake Nation’s Stability, Energy Markets”, Wall 
Street Journal, 8 March 2015.  
49  In March 2013 several of the author’s interlocutors in Benghazi downplayed the 
danger Ansar al-Sharia posed to the city and emphasised the group’s positive sides. 
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ity.50 Nor was there any end to attempts to integrate active jihadists into 
mainstream society through dialogue, for example in the consultations for 
the National Dialogue held in Derna in March 2014.51 As late as May 2014, 
Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Gharyani was still calling a government statement 
indirectly designating Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist group “premature”.52 
Soon after, he found himself forced to call on the group to distance itself 
from members condemning the government and army as apostates.53 
Only with the escalation of political tensions into a nationwide conflict 
in mid-2014 did jihadist groups shift fully from charitable work and dawa 
(preaching) back to open armed struggle. This was evident in Ansar al-
Sharia’s communications, now focused on the war in Benghazi. Together 
with other jihadist splinter groups and foreign fighters, some Ansar al-
Sharia factions now morphed into IS affiliates, which adopted a much 
more radical approach. In sharp contrast to Ansar al-Sharia, the IS branch-
es now publicized their suicide bombings and assassinations of foreign 
hostages.54 The jihadist presence imposed growing costs on its local strong-
holds. Large parts of Benghazi suffered major destruction and large-scale 
displacement in the war between the Shura Council and IS, as well as their 
adversaries. Forces loyal to the Tobruk House of Representatives began 
cutting off fuel and other supplies to Derna; only the Martyrs of Abu Salim 
brigade was still able to secure occasional fuel deliveries and cash trans-
ports for salary payments. After the Sirt IS affiliate entered into confronta-
tion with units from Misrata from February 2015 onwards, Sirt was equally 
cut off from essential supplies and services. While these developments put 
an end to any ambivalence in relations between local communities and 
jihadist groups, and undermined the latter’s local state-building efforts, 
they also brought a new wave of recruitment and radicalisation. 
Jihadist Localism 
For all the success Ansar al-Sharia’s strategy apparently enjoyed, there are 
clear limits to the ambitions of jihadist groups in Libya. This is due to the 
pronounced localism that characterises all of the country’s political forces, 
including jihadist movements. The difficulties jihadists have experienced 
in expanding beyond their local strongholds are striking. 
In north-eastern Libya, Derna’s neighbours were almost completely 
spared jihadist activity, and instead became strongholds of political forces 
 
50  “Staff Ask Ansar al-Sharia to Protect Al-Jala Hospital in Benghazi” (Arabic), Al-Wasat, 
1 April 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/11290/. 
51  “Outstanding Representation of Women and Islamist Currents at Official Hearing in 
Preparation for National Dialogue in Derna” (Arabic), posted on http://www.facebook. 
com/ndpc.ly, 6 March 2014. 
52  “Mufti: Accusations of Ansar al-Sharia Involvement in Events in Benghazi Are Prema-
ture” (Arabic), Al-Wasat, 6 May 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/16494/. 
53  “Mufti Calls on Ansar al-Sharia to Drop Condemnation of System as Godless” (Arabic), 
Al-Wasat, 8 June 2014, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/21673/. 
54  For an overview of IS and Ansar al-Sharia communications, see Aaron Zelin’s Jihadolo-
gy project, http://jihadology.net/category/countries/libya/. 
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opposed to the revolutionary and Islamist camp.55 In central Libya, an 
Ansar al-Sharia cell in the small town of Naufiliya in early 2015 evolved 
into a major IS faction, which maintained its independence from the 
larger IS affiliate in Sirt, 120 kilometres to the west but with a different 
tribal makeup – and neither group was able to seize control of the village 
of Harawa, situated between the two towns and populated by yet another 
community.56 In the north-west, jihadist cells failed – despite persistent 
efforts – to gain a foothold in cities like Misrata, Bani Walid and Zintan, 
even when their efforts involved members from those cities. In all three 
cities, strong local decision-making and consultative structures, as well as 
opposing interests blocked the establishment of jihadist groups. In 
Misrata, jihadist cells had emerged after the revolution from a longstand-
ing subculture, but were quickly driven out of the city. They subsequently 
re-emerged as part of Ansar al-Sharia and, later, the IS affiliate in Sirt.57 In 
Bani Walid, local recruits into jihadist factions faced tenacious resistance 
to their attempts to operate in the city, and established themselves in the 
no man’s land between Bani Walid and Sirt.58 In Zintan and many other 
cities in the north-west, the strong influence of arch-conservative Saudi-
leaning Salafists posed an obstacle to jihadists. While regarding democracy 
as an expression of unbelief, they condemn jihadism as a deviation from 
the doctrine of absolute obedience to the state.59 
In north-eastern Libya, an ethno-political discourse that has gained cur-
rency among Haftar’s forces and tribal politicians has hardened the lines 
of conflict. Certain agitators in this camp equate the Islamists with groups 
that are separate from the Sa’adi and Murabitun tribes of Cyrenaica: 
families that came to Benghazi and Derna from Tripolitania centuries ago, 
 
55  On Libya’s political camps, see Wolfram Lacher, Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political 
Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya, SWP Research Paper 4/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2013), and International Crisis Group, Libya: Getting Geneva 
Right (Brussels, 2015). 
56  Eleven young men from Naufiliya had travelled to Iraq in 2006; one of them later 
emerged as commander of the local IS branch, which also included two relatives of 
prominent figures in the local Magharba tribe, Abd al-Rahman al-Atyush and Usama al-
Jadran. “Al-Naufiliya … from Koranic Study Centers to Jihadi Thought” (Arabic), al-Wasat, 
30 March 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/68165/; “A Young Man Gets to Know 
IS from the Inside”, al -Nas, 28 April 2015.  
57  Numerous young men from Misrata had gone to fight in Iraq in 2005–7. In June 2012, 
an attack targeted the Red Cross office in Misrata. The same month, members of the al-
Faruq brigade from Misrata participated in the Ansar al-Sharia forum in June 2012. Parts 
of the brigade subsequently relocated to Sirt. The then commander of al-Faruq, Ahmad 
Ali at-Tir, later emerged as leader of the Ansar al-Sharia brigade in Sirt, where he died in 
combat in August 2013. In early 2015, two members of a prominent Misratan family, 
Usama and Hassan al-Karami, emerged as leading figures in the Sirt IS affiliate. “Terror-
ists Strike in Misrata”, Libya Herald, 12 June 2012; “Some Answers to Understand IS in Sirt 
and Libya” (Arabic), al-Nas, 7 April 2015; “La catena di comando dello Stato islamico in 
Libia”, Il Foglio, 19 March 2015. 
58  Interviews with local politicians and observers, Bani Walid, April 2014 and January 2015.  
59  This tendency is represented in Zintan by the influential local organisation and 
brigade Ansar al-Haqq. 
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as well as the Karaghla descendants of Ottoman administrators and sol-
diers, who also settled principally in Benghazi and Derna.60 The aim of the 
war in the north-east, in this increasingly popular discourse, was about the 
expulsion of “foreign” elements.61 Although this reading is far removed 
from the reality – both the LIFG and later Ansar al-Sharia included many 
members from the Sa’adi and Murabitun tribes – it has impeded jihadist 
expansion into cities largely populated by members of these tribes, such as 
Tobruk, Qubba, al-Bayda and Marj. Nor are the jihadists above indulging in 
the unabashed localism that pervades Libya’s post-revolutionary power 
struggles. A graphic distributed in summer 2014 by the Shura Council of Is-
lamic Youth proudly proclaims: “Derna – lion’s den of jihad, forge of 
men”.62 
The Local and the Global: Transnational Networks 
As the LIFG’s origins demonstrate, Libyan jihadists have always been closely 
integrated into the transnational networks surrounding al-Qaeda Central 
(or its precursors). Following the revolution, the connections to Syria ac-
quired outstanding significance in this respect, and were key to the advent 
of IS in Libya. But relationships built to support the struggle there also fa-
cilitated Libyan jihadist networking with the Maghreb states and the Sahel. 
Syria and Its Repercussions 
The establishment of networks to send Libyan fighters and weapons to Syria 
began soon after the demise of the Gaddafi regime.63 As well as LIFG veter-
ans, this also involved revolutionaries hoping to continue their fight against 
the region’s dictators in Syria. Recruitment was initially completely open 
and drew in a spectrum far beyond the jihadists. For example, Mahdi al-
Harati’s al-Umma brigade, in which numerous Libyans fought alongside 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA), could hardly be called extremist.64 But this 
changed as jihadists gained the upper hand in the Syrian civil war. Idealis-
tic volunteers returned disillusioned, and recruitment increasingly became 
the preserve of networks within the jihadist spectrum.65 Nonetheless, the 
 
60  On the Sa’adi and Murabitun tribes see Emrys L. Peters, “The Tied and the Free”, 
in idem, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal and Corporate Power (Cambridge, 1991), 
40–58; on the Karaghla and migration from Tripolitania to Cyrenaica see Faraj Najem, 
Tribe, Islam and State in Libya: Analytic Study of the Roots of the Libyan Tribal Society and Interaction 
up to the Qaramanli Rule (1711–1835), PhD thesis, University of Westminster, 2004, 109–34, 
186–90. 
61  Interviews with local tribal politicians, Tobruk, April 2015.  
62  See the @albattarly Twitter feed, August 2014 (account now blocked). 
63  UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1973 (2011) Concerning Libya, S/2014/106, 15 February 2014, and “In Turnabout, Syria Rebels 
Get Libyan Weapons”, New York Times, 21 June 2013. 
64  “Exclusive – Libyan Fighters Join Syrian Revolt against Assad”, Reuters, 14 August 2012. 
65  Discussions with local observers of the recruitment efforts, Misrata, April 2013. See 
also “Young Libyans Head to Join ISIS in Syria and Iraq”, Libya Herald, 8 September 2014. 
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Libyan contingent in Syria – as in Iraq – remained one of the strongest of 
foreign fighters, especially in relation to the size of Libya’s population.66 
At the end of 2012, Libyan jihadists formed the al-Battar brigade, whose 
founding declaration thanked the “people of Derna” and a foundation 
from Misrata for their support.67 Shortly afterwards, the brigade joined the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and participated in its operations 
against the al-Nusra-Front, the Islamic Front and the FSA. The recruitment 
of Libyan jihadists into the ranks of al-Battar and ISIS is likely to have con-
tributed significantly to further radicalisation of the milieu they originated 
from. Al-Battar obviously possessed close connections to Ansar al-Sharia in 
Benghazi and the Shura Council in Derna. When the fighting with Haftar’s 
forces broke out in summer 2014, parts of al-Battar returned to Benghazi. 
Al-Battar subsequently published death notices for jihadists killed fighting 
with Ansar al-Sharia, as well as an obituary for a prominent Ansar-al-Sharia 
member it called its “military commander”, who had been killed near 
Derna in clashes with the Martyrs of Abu Salim brigade.68 
These connections ultimately led to parts of Ansar al-Sharia and jihadist 
splinter groups mutating into IS offshoots, while other parts of Ansar 
al-Sharia struggled to maintain their independence from IS. By relying on 
backing from the Shura Councils in Benghazi and Derna, Ansar al-Sharia 
factions were able to withstand the intense pressure from IS affiliates to 
pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. In Sirt and al-Naufiliya, IS acquired clear 
dominance, making it impossible for Ansar al-Sharia to continue operating 
as a separate organization.69 As a Sirt notable observed in March 2015, the 
local IS affiliate was Sirt’s Ansar al-Sharia branch under a new name.70 But 
the advent of IS also brought larger contingents of foreign fighters – par-
ticularly from Libya’s North African neighbours – and several prominent 
figures dispatched by the IS leadership.71 
The significance of the Libyan-Syrian networks was not restricted to 
their role in ensuring the arrival of the ISIS brand of jihadism in Libya. 
They also connected the Libyan jihadist strongholds with the Maghreb 
 
66  Aaron Zelin, Foreign Jihadists in Syria: Tracking Recruitment Networks (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for Near East Policy, 19 December 2013), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
policy-analysis/view/foreign-jihadists-in-syria-tracking-recruitment-networks. 
67  “Announcement of the Libyan al-Battar Brigade in Syria” (Arabic), 13 December 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tH7me_yigUs. 
68  “Details of killing of Ansar al-Sharia leader” (see note 43). 
69  “Some Answers to Understand IS” (see note 57). 
70  “Marzuq: The Daesh Fighters in Sirt are Members of Ansar al-Sharia, We Know Them 
Personally” (Arabic), Al-Wasat, 24 March 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/news/libya/67257/. 
71  In Derna, headquarters of the IS province of Barqa, this includes the leading figures 
Abu Nabil al-Anbari (an Iraqi national, formerly head of the IS province Salah al-Din); the 
Yemeni scholar Abu al-Bara al-Azdi; and the Saudi judge Abu Habib al-Jazrawi. The IS 
branch in Tripolitania, headquartered in Sirt, has hosted the leading IS preacher Turki al-
Banali from Bahrain for public sermons, while Mauritanian and Saudi IS operatives inter-
mittently assumed leading roles in al-Naufiliya. “Some Answers to Understand IS” (see 
note 57); “La catena di comando” (see note 57); “Daesh Gives the Residents of al-Naufiliya 
Three Days to Repent” (Arabic), Al-Wasat, 12 February 2015, http://www.alwasat.ly/ar/ 
news/libya/60966/.  
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states and Egypt, with recruits arriving to train before travelling on to 
Syria, via Turkey. Ansar al-Sharia appears to have been central to these net-
works.72 There was also some evidence for ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM).73 These networks have generated a steadily growing flow 
of foreign fighters, especially from Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, joining 
Ansar al-Sharia and later the IS offshoots in Benghazi, Derna and Sirt.74 
Sabratha, from where several prominent former LIFG figures hailed,75 
has emerged as an important node in networks between local extremists 
and Tunisian jihadists. The city is said to have hosted training camps for 
Tunisian jihadists before their dispatch to Syria. Tunisian media have 
repeatedly placed the leader of the Tunisian Ansar al-Sharia, Abu Ayadh 
(originally Saif Allah bin Hussain), and one of his most important aides, 
Ahmad ar-Ruissi, in Sabratha.76 At the same time, no open Ansar al-Sharia 
or IS presence has emerged in Sabratha. Political opponents like to label 
leading figures in Sabratha “al-Qaeda” or “Ansar al-Sharia” – without citing 
any evidence.77 That the city hosts an emerging jihadist presence and 
serves as a conduit for Tunisian jihadists is, however, confirmed by a range 
of concordant sources, as well incidents in Sabratha itself.78 
 
72  See for example Aaron Zelin, New Evidence on Ansar al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Near East Policy, 8 August 2013); Nancy Youssef, “Benghazi, 
Libya, Has Become Training Hub for Islamist Fighters”, McClatchyDC, 12 December 2013; 
Alfred Hackensberger, “Islamisten sind schlimmer als Assad”, Die Welt, 15 December 2013. 
In June 2014, extremists from Derna even kidnapped nine adolescents in order to secure 
the release of an Egyptian recruit detained at Al Bayda Airport for using a forged Libyan 
passport and prevented from travelling on to Turkey. “Nine Jebel Akhdar Youths Kid-
napped then Freed in Exchange for Arrested Egyptian”, Libya Herald, 3 June 2014. 
73  One indication being the career of the Libyan jihadist Mahmud al-Wuhayshi, who was 
killed fighting in Benghazi on 1 September 2014. According to his death notice, he had 
spent seven years in northern Algeria with AQIM and GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la pré-
dication et le combat), before returning to Benghazi in 2011. See post on http://www. 
facebook.com/pages/3296388938790 10/صور-شهداء-بنغازي-ضد-الطاغوت, 4 September 2014. 
74  Interviews with a former leader in the Rafallah as-Sahati brigade, Tripoli, April, June 2014. 
75  Muftah al-Dhawadi and Abd al-Mun’im Mukhtar al-Madhuni, along with several of 
their family members. 
76  Al-Ruissi was reportedly killed fighting with IS in Sirt, in clashes with Misratan forces, 
in March 2015. “Leader of Tunisian Group Ansar al-Sharia Dies in Libya” (Arabic), Al-Sharq 
al-Awsat, 31 December 2013; “Salim ar-Riyahi, Naufil al-Wartani and Basma al-Khalfawi on 
death list of bin Qardan group” (Arabic), Assabahnews, 3 June 2014, http:// 
www.assabahnews.tn/article/86622/سليم-الرياحي-ونوفل-الورتاني-وبسمة-الخلفاوي-ضمن-قائمة-
المستهدفي ن-من-مجموعة-بن-قردان; “‘Tunisia Now’ network confirms detention of terrorist 
Ahmad ar-Ruissi by Libyan revolutionaries” (Arabic), Tunisia Now Network, 29 August 2014, 
http://www.tunisianow.org/شبكة-تونس-الآن-تؤكد-القبض-على-الارهاب.html. 
77  See for example the statements about Umar al-Mukhtar al-Madhuni, Muftah al-Dha-
wadi and Abd al-Rahman al-Zlitni in “Libyan Sabratha Exports Terrorism to Tunisian 
Cities of Sfax and Gabès” (Arabic), al-Ikhbariya al-Tunisiya, 9 September 2014, http:// 
alikhbaria.com/index.php/alikhbaria-ettounisia/al-a5bar/32061-2014-09-09-08-11-12.html, 
and “Killing of Ansar al-Sharia Leader Abu al-Walid al-Zawi” (Arabic), Afrigatenews.net, 
7 September 2014, http://www.afrigatenews.net/content/مقتل-أبو-الوليد-الزاوي-القيادي-في-
تنظيم-أنصار-الشريعة. 
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The Mali Connection 
By early 2012 at the latest, extremists from Derna and Benghazi had estab-
lished contacts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its offshoots in 
northern Mali. According to the Moroccan authorities, several Moroccans 
at that point travelled via Benghazi to northern Mali with the assistance of 
Ansar al-Sharia, to join the Group for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO), before returning to Benghazi.79 In late 2012, Ansar al-Sharia sent 
at least one convoy of fighters and arms to northern Mali, crossing Libya 
without difficulty, apparently with an official permit.80 From January 
2013, several dozen jihadists from Derna and Benghazi participated in the 
fight against the French army in northern Mali.81 In June 2014, a leader of 
the Ajdabiya branch of Ansar al-Sharia was killed in Mali, according to his 
own circles.82 In view of these networks, it comes as no surprise that the IS 
branch in Tripolitania published a video in January 2015 featuring Tuareg 
fighters with northern Malian accents calling on their brothers in Mali 
and Algeria to join IS in Libya. 
Connections between northern Mali and north-eastern Libya also played 
a role in the attack on the Algerian gas plant at In Amenas in January 
2013.83 The attackers were a multinational group including a conspicuous 
number of Egyptians and Tunisians.84 Particularly the large Egyptian con-
tingent was atypical for AQIM and its offshoots, and should be seen in the 
light of the exchanges between Cyrenaica and northern Mali. According to 
French intelligence sources, several of the attackers had been trained by 
Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Algerian sources even claimed that some of 
those involved had been implicated in the 2012 attack on the US com-
pound in Benghazi.85 
Southern Libya, on the other hand, has served above all as a transit 
region. Following the launch of the French intervention in northern Mali 
and the In Amenas attack, both of which occurred in January 2013, West-
ern media outlets spread rumours based on intelligence sources that 
southern Libya hosted numerous jihadist camps. However, In Amenas 
 
radio station said to have offered a forum for jihadists. Other reports, such as one in July 
2014 claiming fourteen soldiers killed near Sabratha, have turned out to be deliberate 
disinformation. 
79  Report by Salé criminal investigation department, on record with the author, Salé, 2012. 
80  Discussions with militia leaders and politicians, Sabha and Ubari, September 2013. 
See also Wolfram Lacher, Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability, Security Assessment 
in North Africa, Dispatch 3 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, February 2014). 
81  Discussions with associates of those concerned, Benghazi, March 2013. 
82  http://www.facebook.com/alshaheed.hamza.yaseen.omar. 
83  On the In Amenas incident, see the contribution by Wolfram Lacher and Guido Stein-
berg in this volume, p. 79. 
84  African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, “Updated Incident Prelimi-
nary Analysis: The In-Amenas Terrorist Attack, in Algeria”, January 2013, http://www. 
caert.org.dz/Medi-review/Special-editions/TIGUENTOURINE-Analysis.pdf. 
85  “Some Algeria Attackers Are Placed at Benghazi”, New York Times, 22 January 2013; 
“Al Qaeda’s Widening North African Jihad Confounds Foes”, Reuters, 9 August 2013; “Mili-
tants in Benghazi Attack Tied to a Qaeda Affiliate”, New York Times, 20 November 2014. 
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proved only that groups based in northern Mali could move through 
southern Libya with the aid of local accomplices. Even if some extremists 
fleeing northern Mali also found refuge there, they did not reconsistute 
their groups in southern Libya. Headlines claiming that southern Libya 
now found itself “under the control of al-Qaeda” were certainly grossly 
misleading.86 Unlike the cities in the north, where jihadist currents have 
grown rapidly, the conflicts in the south are defined by mobilisation along 
ethnic and tribal lines.87 In these conflicts, conflicting parties have used 
the al-Qaeda label to tarnish their adversaries, to date without any evi-
dence. This has remained the case even after the advent of IS in Libya. The 
IS offshoot in Fezzan, which first came to attention in January 2015 when 
it claimed responsibility for deaths of fourteen soldiers north of Brak al-
Shati’, appears to have emerged from the Ansar al-Sharia milieu in Sirt, 
and has not moved south.88 There have been no signs of IS operating in the 
southern conflict areas of al-Shati’, Sabha and Ubari. 
Outlook 
There are many facets to the milieu of former and active jihadists in Libya. 
Politicians who have in fact gravitated towards centrism are often branded 
“al-Qaeda” without reason, or solely on the basis of their past. On the other 
hand, some very real extremists have appeared as harmless dignitaries 
within their communities. Clearly, however, jihadist currents are by now 
deeply rooted in several Libyan coastal cities, and Libyan jihadists are 
playing a key role in exchanges between the Islamic State and North 
African as well as Saharan networks. 
Containing the jihadist threat in Libya first of all requires the country’s 
stabilisation. As long as this remains out of sight, Libyan jihadists will 
further cement their influence in individual local strongholds. Since mid-
2014, the split through the state institutions and the rise of two rival poles 
of power has made this problem sheer insoluble. The “counter-terrorism” 
that the government in Tobruk and al-Bayda has committed to is based on 
painting all its political adversaries with the same brush as IS, and lobby-
ing for external assistance by grossly exaggerating the problem. In Ben-
ghazi, this approach drove moderate groups into an alliance with jihadists 
and persuaded influential actors in Misrata to lend logistical support to 
the Shura Council. While former LIFG leaders and other Islamist-leaning 
elements have played an important role in the loose “Libya Dawn” coali-
tion that took control of Tripoli in summer 2014, the coalition did not 
include jihadi groups as such. Tactical cooperation between “Dawn” and 
jihadist groups has been largely restricted to Benghazi. However, leading 
proponents of “Dawn” have maintained an ambivalent stance towards 
 
86  “Samuel Laurent: ‘Le désert libyen est devenu un haut lieu de la contrebande et du 
terrorisme’”, Radio France Internationale (RFI), 9 June 2013. 
87  Lacher, Libya’s Fractious South (see note 80). 
88  Relatives and commanders of the victims came to this conclusion. E-mail communica-
tion with an observer in Brak al-Shati’, January 2015. 
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hardcore jihadi factions. Both the first prime minister of the self-appointed 
government in Tripoli, Umar al-Hassi, and his successor Khalifa al-Ghwell 
have defended Ansar al-Sharia and lent their explicit support to the Ben-
ghazi Shura Council. Despite attacks conducted by the Tripolitanian IS off-
shoot in January 2015 on embassies and a hotel in the capital, representa-
tives of the Tripoli government refused to recognise the jihadist threat, in-
stead asserting that the “enemies of the revolution” had been responsible 
for the attacks.89 Others within the Tripoli-based camp have sought to dis-
tance themselves more clearly from jihadists, in particular since the 
appearance of IS. Since February 2015, Misratan forces have been involved 
in a confrontation with IS in Sirt and al-Naufiliya. However, as long as both 
camps’ focus lies on the overall political power struggle, confronting jihad-
ist groups comes a distant second. For actors on both sides, counter-terror-
ism serves to strengthen credibility with external actors and thereby im-
prove one’s negotiating position, at least as much as it serves the aim of 
local stabilisation. 
Jihadism in Libya is a long-term challenge, and by far the greatest of its 
kind in North Africa. This increases the pressure on Western leaders to act. 
But as long as the current state of polarisation persists and the two op-
posing camps prevent the formation of a unity government, tackling this 
growing problem will be impossible. Supporting the “counter-terrorism” 
of Haftar and his allies offers no realistic prospect of success, directed as it 
is against the whole range of this camp’s political opponents – which in 
fact further increases the attraction of the jihadists as tactical allies for 
Haftar’s enemies. While Libyan jihadism moves up Europe’s security agenda, 
the prospects for negotiations on a government of national unity remain 
uncertain. Even if these efforts fail, the task remains to develop responses 
where political solutions are not trumped by counter-terrorism. 
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 SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
51 
Going “Glocal”: Jihadism in Algeria and Tunisia 
Isabelle Werenfels 
Algeria’s militant Islamists were among the African continent’s very first 
jihadists in the early 1990s. Only in Egypt had Islamists been quicker to 
take up arms. The origins of the Algerian jihadist groups are to be found in 
national conflicts that had festered since independence and erupted into 
civil war in the 1990s. These groups internationalised in the 2000s, not 
least after losing support and influence at home. Tunisia, on the other 
hand, had but a scattering of jihadist actors before 2011. 
The “Arab Spring” was a game-changer for Algerian and Tunisian jihad-
ists, largely in their favour. New geographical vistas opened up: the 
jihadist triangle of Algeria–Mali–Mauritania, existant since the mid-2000s, 
has been joined by a new Algeria–Tunisia–Libya axis, while the civil war in 
Syria and the massive strengthening of the Islamic State (IS) in the Levant 
have further intensified jihadist networking between the Maghreb and the 
Near East. But the developments in Syria and Iraq have also had negative 
effects on jihadist dynamics in the Maghreb, massively heightening com-
petition for new members and splitting the spectrum between supporters 
of al-Qaeda and of IS. 
All Maghreb jihadists operate within a permanent tension between local 
social and political circumstances, national goals, and global objectives. 
Although their propaganda is directed particularly loudly against the “far 
enemy”, meaning above all the French, the Americans and Israel, their 
immediate target remains the Maghreb regimes, the “near enemy”. The 
fact that global jihad possesses local and national dimensions generates 
ideological contradictions and intra-jihadist conflicts. Tactical differences 
between individual groups and periodic signs of pragmatism can thus be 
explained in terms of local particularities. 
Local Conflicts and Precursors 
At first glance one might think that a similar combination of circumstances 
encouraged the emergence and rise of militant groups in Algeria and in 
Tunisia. First and foremost, the interaction of various factors created dis-
satisfaction and a lack of perspectives for many young men. These factors 
include the failure of the development models of the post-colonial elites, 
and ensuing socio-economic and identity crises within society. Major roles 
were also played by a youth bulge and the fact that the average age of mar-
riage has risen for economic reasons while premarital sexuality remains a 
taboo. The frustration produced by these developments often leads not 
only to attempts to flee to Europe or escape in drug consumption or petty 
crime, but also a turn to extremist religious positions. 
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Map 4: Algeria and Tunisia 
Another absolutely fundamental factor has been the political exclusion 
and repression of particular Islamist actors, which has caused one part of 
that spectrum to become increasingly radicalised. Western interventions 
and what are felt to be one-sided Western positions in conflicts such as Pa-
lestine have further boosted this tendency. The return of battle-hardened 
jihadists from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq proved especially fateful as 
they went on to form or support cells in their home countries. Finally, in 
both states (brief) periods of great political upheaval and the resulting new 
freedoms gave militant groups space to flourish. 
Yet, despite the many parallels, there are important differences between 
Tunisian and Algerian jihadist groups. They formed in different epochs 
and have to a certain extent been shaped by different international con-
flicts and different religious leaders. And their members have been social-
ised in different national social and political contexts. This has produced 
different approaches, positions, funding methods, and recruitment mecha-
nisms as well as distinct “corporate images”. 
Algeria: From Politics to Jihad 
In multiple respects the development of the Algerian groups represents 
the model for the trajectories of many jihadist organisations. While 
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Algeria’s jihadists began as (radical) Islamist oppositionists with a purely 
domestic political agenda, they developed over the course of time into 
transnationally operating jihadists with global propaganda and a closeness 
to al-Qaeda – but without relinquishing their local anchoring and national 
objectives. The Algerian militant groups also represent an early example of 
the close interconnection between religious militancy and organised crime. 
As far as Algeria is concerned, 1991 and 1992 were decisive for the for-
mation of jihadist groups. This was when the armed forces cancelled demo-
cratic parliamentary elections after the Islamist party FIS (Front islamique 
du salut) triumphed in the first round. The military coup was followed by 
massive repression not only against FIS functionaries, but also against tens 
of thousands of its sympathisers, comparable with the hounding of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood following the coup against President Morsi 
in summer 2013. The radical wing of the FIS went underground, marking 
the beginning of a civil war that was to last until the end of the 1990s. 
However, while the cancellation of the elections massively boosted 
jihadist activities, it was not their trigger. The first militant cells had al-
ready formed a decade earlier.1 Their emergence, like that of the FIS a few 
years later, was the outcome of a combination of several factors. The post-
colonial elites had marginalised the religious wing of the independence 
movement and ignored its demands for a dominant role for Islam in the 
new social and political order. This generated growing resistance in the 
ranks of these “cultural losers” among the former revolutionaries. And 
when economic crisis loomed in the 1980s – with the failure of the import 
substitution development model and a dramatic fall in oil and gas prices 
in 1986 – the ruling party was left without the financial means to continue 
buying social peace and political legitimacy. This paved the ground for the 
strong emergence of an Islamist protest party, the FIS, which wanted to 
replace a regime it perceived as corrupt, repressive, unjust and un-Islamic. 
After the FIS was cheated of its election victory, increasing numbers of Al-
gerian Salafists came to believe that this objective could only be achieved 
by force of arms and went underground. 
Many of the leaders of the new armed cells were returnees from Afghani-
stan, in other words international jihadists. But their fight was neverthe-
less directed (almost) exclusively against the Algerian state, its elites, 
cadres and officials. Whenever they did focus on the “far enemy”, the 
French and other Western foreigners, inside Algeria and sometimes in 
France, they did so in the first place because these were the backers of the 
Algerian military regime.2 
The more differentiated the armed spectrum became, the more diffuse 
and contested its goals. While the AIS (Armée islamique du salut), as the 
military arm of the banned FIS party, targeted the state’s security forces, 
representatives and infrastructure, the GIA (Groupement islamique armé) 
 
1  Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (Reading: Ithaca Univer-
sity Press, 1996). 
2  Guido Steinberg and Isabelle Werenfels, “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3 (November 2007): 407–13. 
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conducted indiscriminate massacres of the civilian population.3 Disa-
greements about attacking civilians led to a split in the GIA, out of which 
the GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat) emerged. The 
latter continued to target primarily state actors and symbols; until 2006 
the content of its pronouncements was 90 percent Algeria-related.4 
The Internationalisation of Algerian Jihadism 
The successive internationalisation of the Algerian armed groups can be 
explained in terms of their growing weakness in a changing national and 
international context. The militant groups came under increasing pressure 
from 2000 onward, in particular through the state’s reconciliation initia-
tives in 1999 and 2005, which included amnesties for repentant armed 
actors. About six thousand fighters responded by laying down their arms. 
Additionally, several large-scale massacres caused logistical support for the 
fighters to evaporate in an increasingly war-weary populace. Such acts of vio-
lence were also one reason for the decision by the AIS to disband from 1997. 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 initiated an international paradigm 
shift, and permitted the Algerian government and armed forces to success-
fully present their domestic conflict retrospectively as a fight against inter-
national terrorism. Now Algeria received military counter-terrorism tech-
nology that had hitherto been withheld, and cooperation with Western 
intelligence services intensified. This led to a thinning of the ranks of the 
armed groups, whose recruiting pool shrank. From 2005 the GIA practically 
ceased to exist. 
The military also succeeded in forcing part of the GSPC south, out of the 
population centres in the north and east. This, however, intensified the 
entanglement of armed Islamists with smuggling networks, and increas-
ingly blurred the boundaries between jihadism and international crime.5 
The process was associated with an internationalisation of the jihadist 
cells, which now included Mauritanians, Libyans, Tunisians, Moroccans 
and even a few Nigerians.6 The orientation toward the “far enemy” intensi-
fied – for pecuniary reasons: from 2003, ransoms for releasing kidnapped 
Western tourists filled the jihadist coffers. 
Finally, in 2006 what was then Algeria’s last relevant jihadist group, the 
GSPC, moved at least symbolically closer to al-Qaeda’s global network, by 
renaming itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In December 2007 
 
3  The theory that GIA cells were infiltrated by the intelligence services and manipulated 
to discredit Islamist actors at home and abroad is commonplace among Algerian opposi-
tion circles. To date, it has been neither proven nor disproven. 
4  Manuel R. Torres Soriano, “The Evolution of the Discourse of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb: Themes, Countries and Individuals”, Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2 (July 2011): 
279–98 (283). 
5  See the contribution on the Sahel in this volume, pp. 64ff. 
6  Widespread racism among Arab jihadists is one reason why the Algerian groups have 
never included many fighters from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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the group conducted attacks under its new name on a UN building and the 
seat of government in Algiers, causing dozens of civilian victims.7 
Tunisia: Internationalisation as a Consequence of a 
“State without Islamists” 
Militant Islamists are not a new phenomenon in Tunisia either, although 
the dimensions of jihadism there since 2011 certainly are. A few armed 
cells had already existed in the era of the dictator Ben Ali (1987–2011). In 
several incidents in the 1990s Tunisian police and security forces were 
killed in attacks on the border to Algeria that can be regarded as spill-over 
effects of the Algerian civil war and entered the public sphere only as 
rumours.8 The 2002 synagogue attack in the popular tourist resort of 
Djerba was the first for which al-Qaeda was responsible. In 2006 and 2007 
confrontations occurred close to Tunis between security forces and a 
Tunisian cell that had trained with the GSPC in Algeria and intended to 
attack tourist targets. 
In Tunisia, too, the roots of jihadism extend back several decades and 
are partially rooted in an identity conflict. One factor contributing to the 
rise of the religious counter-movement is the marginalisation of religious 
actors, structures and symbols in the course of the social modernisation 
project pursued under Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba. In the 
1980s an Islamist movement with a radical wing prepared to use violence 
grew in Tunisia too. After Islamist candidates received a respectable 
showing in the 1989 parliamentary elections, Bourguiba’s successor Ben 
Ali turned to repression, from the early 1990s banning all Islamist activ-
ities, even charity, and equating Islamism with terrorism.9 In so doing, the 
state forced even moderate Islamists to go underground or into exile. 
Without national Islamist authorities, many identity-seeking Islamist Tuni-
sians resorted to the internet and satellite television, and thus turned to 
often militant preachers and organisations from the Gulf states.10 The 
growing wealth gap vis-à-vis the coastal regions also contributed to a youth 
radicalisation in the south and along the border with Algeria. 
 
7  Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat? Carne-
gie Papers, Middle East Program 104/2009 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, October 2009). 
8  Interviews with local politicians in southern Tunisia, 2012. 
9  Isabelle Werenfels, Between Integration and Repression: Government Responses to Islamism in 
the Maghreb, SWP Research Paper 39/2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
December 2005). 
10  International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, Middle East/ 
North Africa Report 137 (Brussels, 13 February 2013), 11ff., http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/137-tunisia-violence- 
and-the-salafi-challenge.pdf (accessed 2 September 2014). 
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The “Arab Spring”: Booster for Jihadism in Tunisia 
Violent Tunisian Salafists are without a doubt among the beneficiaries of 
the Arab uprisings since 2011. The turbulence of the Tunisian “revolution” 
temporarily weakened the state’s authority. Above all, the forces of order 
became not only less repressive, but also less effective. On top of this, con-
trol over mosques and radical Salafists fell away more or less overnight. In 
the 1980s numerous Tunisians had left to join the jihad in Afghanistan 
and later Bosnia and/or Iraq, after which they lived in exile or sat in Tuni-
sian prisons. These Tunisian jihadists were now able to return or profit 
from amnesties. Some of them turned from 2011 to non-violent pietistic or 
purely political Salafism and founded political parties.11 Others continued 
to pursue the path of armed conflict. 
Developments in other Arab states affected by turmoil have also worked 
to the advantage of jihadism in Tunisia. According to official figures up to 
three thousand Tunisians have been drawn to the fight against the Syrian 
dictator, often only becoming (or being made into) jihadists after reaching 
Syria. Many of these have already returned to Tunisia. The collapse of state 
power in neighbouring Libya has made that country into a staging post, 
training camp and refuge for Tunisian jihadists. It is an easy matter to 
smuggle arms across the porous border. 
Not least, the governing coalition led by the moderate Islamist party 
Ennahdha (2011–2013) initially gave potentially violent Salafists a largely 
free hand. With the not entirely unreasonable argument that repression 
merely leads to radicalisation, as experience had shown, Ennahdha 
worked to integrate them into the political process.12 An eye to Salafist 
votes may also have played a role here. 
But the policy of tolerance was not to last. The nails in the coffin were 
the Salafist storming of the US embassy in September 2012, the killing of 
two left-wing opposition politicians in 2013, which was also attributed to 
Salafists, and a rapidly rising number of attacks on security forces. Since 
the 2013 break between Ennahdha and the militant Salafists, the latter can 
no longer operate legally and have been forced underground. 
The Current Protagonists: 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia 
Various jihadist groups exist in both Algeria and Tunisia. In northern 
Algeria AQIM remains the largest and in many places only one. A string of 
other groups operate in the southern Algerian regions bordering Mali and 
Libya, some of them splits from AQIM.13 In the first years after the revolu-
 
11  Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia”, 
Jadaliyya (online), 17 August 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6934/the-
emergence-of-salafism-in-tunisia (accessed 2 September 2014). 
12  Interview with Ennahdha leader Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunis, September 2012. 
13  See the contribution on the Sahel in this volume, pp. 64ff. 
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tion Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) and Katibat (Brigade) Uqbah Ibn Nafi 
emerged as the central actors in Tunisia. 
AQIM in Northern Algeria: Structures, Opportunities and Social Base 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb consists of several regional so-called bri-
gades (centre and north and in particular Kabylia, eastern provinces close 
to the Tunisian and Libyan borders, western provinces through to the 
Moroccan border, southern Algeria and Mali).14 The brigades differ in their 
levels of activity, with the lowest clearly in the west, and operate with 
varying degrees of autonomy. 
There is no “official” organigram of AQIM, but it is known that its offi-
cial leader (emir) is Abu Musab Abd al-Wudud, alias Abd al-Malik Droukdal, 
who previously headed the GSPC from 2004. Droukdal is suspected to be 
hiding in the Aurès Mountains of north-eastern Algeria. The organisation’s 
central organs include the Shura Council (executive) and the so-called 
senate, which includes the heads of the committees for military affairs, 
finance, sharia, medical care, politics, international relations and media.15 
For some years the organisation has found itself facing growing compe-
tition in southern Algeria, where Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who led the AQIM 
brigade in the Sahel until he was ejected by Droukdal, founded a group of 
his own in 2012 (“Those Who Sign in Blood”). With his spectacular attack 
on the gas plant at In Amenas in southern Algeria in January 2013 Bel-
mokhtar outstripped Droukdal as a “man of action”, and his exclusion 
may also have caused financial losses for Droukdal. 
AQIM funds itself through ransom payments, cigarette, drug and arms 
smuggling, and protection money extorted from smugglers,16 generating 
considerable resources that permit it to pay its fighters rather than having 
to rely solely on ideological loyalty.17 But since Belmokhtar’s departure 
and the emergence of new groups in the Sahel some of the revenues gen-
 
14  La situation sécuritaire dans les pays de la zone sahélienne, ed. Assemblée Nationale, Rapport 
d’information No. 4431 (Paris, 6 March 2012), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/ 
rap-info/i4431.pdf (accessed 2 September 2014). 
15  Ahmad Abu al-Walid, “Al-Qaeda’s Organisation: An Attempt to Understand the 
Strategy and Structure: The Example of the Organisation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb” (Arabic), Anba as-sahel (online), 9 October 2013, http://www.anbasahel.com/ 
index.php/2013-07-10-00-30-24/912-2013-10-09-16-27-39 (accessed 2 September 2014); “Who 
Are the Emirs of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?” (Arabic), France 24 (online), 24 Septem-
ber 2010, http://www.france24.com/ar/20100924-emirs-aqmi-terrorism-africa-maghreb/ 
(accessed 2 September 2014). 
16  Between 2003 and 2012 AQIM is reported to have received $89 million in ransom pay-
ments alone; Christian Nünlist, Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding, CSS 
Analysis in Security Policy 141/2013 (Zürich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 
October 2013), http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-141-EN.pdf (accessed 
2 September 2014). 
17  Xenia de Graaf, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Political Economy of 
Terrorism”, ISN ETH Zurich (online), 17 January 2012, http://isnblog.ethz.ch/conflict/ 
al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-aqim-and-the-political-economy-of-terrorism (accessed 2 
September 2014). 
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erated there no longer accrue to AQIM. Although it has expanded its “kid-
napping business” to Kabylia in northern Algeria, the victims there are 
Algerians, from whom generally only modest sums can be extracted. More-
over, the local Berber population is increasingly resisting kidnappings by 
denouncing supporters of the jihadists’ group.18 This is bringing AQIM 
under increasing pressure in northern Algeria, where it is reliant on local 
assistance for its supplies. 
Fundamentally, there is a certain amount of evidence that AQIM’s geo-
graphical leeway in this part of Algeria has shrunk. Any major recent 
attacks for which Droukdal has claimed responsibility have been concen-
trated with few exceptions in regions to the east and south-east of the 
capital and in particular Kabylia (for example an attack that killed 
fourteen soldiers on the eve of the 2014 presidential election). It has been 
some years since a spectacular attack in the west of the country compa-
rable to the one on the Cherchell military academy in 2011. The beheading 
of a French hostage in Kabylia in September 2014, which attracted great 
attention in the international media, was the work of a small AQIM break-
away named Jund al-Khilafa (Soldiers of the Caliphate), which claims to 
have joined the Islamic State (IS). However, despite growing competition 
from renegade jihadists, new possibilities have opened up for al-Qaeda in 
the Maghreb, namely in the Algerian-Tunisian border region and in Libya. 
For more than a decade estimates of the strength of AQIM within Algeria 
have ranged wildly between four hundred and one thousand fighters.19 
However, such figures must be treated with caution. For instance, every 
week local media report the “elimination” of one or more “terrorists” in 
northern Algeria. If those killed were indeed jihadis and the above esti-
mates of AQIM membership were correct, the group would have been 
wiped out long ago in northern Algeria – or it must possess formidable 
recruiting power. 
Algerian media reports about jihadists killed or captured suggest that 
the age range of the militants is broad and their social backgrounds quite 
varied. Alongside young fighters (the most prominent being the son of the 
former deputy leader of the FIS), the list includes ageing veterans of the in-
dependence struggle now disillusioned by developments in the post-
colonial state and amnestied civil war fighters, so-called “repentis”, who 
have found themselves unable to resume normal lives. 
Signs of Ideological Pragmatism in the “Arab Spring” 
At first glance the ideology, propaganda and overarching goals of al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb do not differ substantially from those of al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan. The essence is to establish an Islamic state that sweeps away the 
 
18  “Algeria Gains Crucial Help in Fight against Al Qaeda”, New York Times (online), 3 No-
vember 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/world/africa/algeria-gains-berber-help- 
in-pushing-out-al-qaeda.html?_r=0 (accessed 2 September 2014). 
19  For new estimates see Assemblée Nationale (ed.), “La situation sécuritaire dans les pays 
de la zone sahélienne” (see note 14). 
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colonial borders dividing the Islamic world and ends the “occupation of Is-
lamic soil” by unbelievers (“the alliance of Jews and crusaders”). In essence 
this is a late decolonialisation discourse, propagating the fight against the 
local elites who are perceived as the extended arm of the “far enemy”. In 
an interview in 2008 Droukdal said with respect to the “near enemy”: “But 
most importantly [sic] is to rescue our countries from the tentacles of these 
criminal regimes that betrayed their religion, and their people.”20 Drouk-
dal’s statements (including a document apparently written by him that 
journalists from Associated Press found in 2013 in Timbuktu) reflect a fun-
damentally political and strategic approach. Droukdal himself explains 
that expressing himself in political rather than religious terms is a tactic 
to mollify potential local partners and disguise AQIM’s strategic global 
expansion plans.21 
Droukdal’s tactical pragmatism was also seen in the “Arab Spring”, 
where jihadist forces played absolutely no role in the uprisings and were 
initially sidelined by the new freedoms and associated euphoria. Droukdal 
issued bombastic statements welcoming the toppling of the dictators and 
urged Tunisian jihadists to exercise restraint during the first year of the 
government led by the Islamist Ennahdha. When the jihadists lost the sup-
port of the population under their control in northern Mali in 2012, 
Droukdal condemned the destruction of Sufi shrines and argued for sharia 
corporal punishments to be introduced gradually, not imposed too abrupt-
ly.22 This demonstrates that AQIM finds itself forced to take heed of local 
moods. 
When increasing numbers of Maghrebi youth set off to join the jihad in 
Syria, Droukdal called on to them to stay and fight at home rather than 
“emigrate”.23 This appeal may be a result of recruitment difficulties and a 
loss of attractiveness of his organisation. Unlike jihadists in Syria and Iraq, 
AQIM has neither had major operational successes of its own for years, nor 
can it boast of control of territory. Another handicap is that the Maghreb 
al-Qaeda, unlike other groups, has brought forth no religious authorities 
with global appeal. Droukdal’s religious/ideological charisma is confined 
to the region itself. This may be partly due to the organisation’s own self-
presentation. It runs its own media platform under the name of al-Anda-
lus, symptomatically the Arabic name for the parts of the Iberian Peninsu-
la that stood under Muslim rule until 1492. Its videos comment on current 
political developments in the Maghreb and show, often in poor-quality 
images, statements and actions by generally ageing fighters in worn-out 
 
20  “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal”, New York Times (online), 1 July 2008, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all 
&_r=0 (accessed 2 September 2014). 
21  “Confidential Letter from Abdelmalek Droukdel, the Emir of al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb, to His Fighters in Mali”, http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/ 
_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf (accessed 2 September 2014). 
22  Ibid. 
23  “Al-Qa’idah in Maghreb Objects to Sending Jihadists to Syria”, BBC Monitoring Middle 
East, 9 April 2013. 
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clothing, living underground under obviously uncomfortable conditions. 
This neither radiates success nor serves the power fantasies of male youth. 
In the Maghreb, as elsewhere, it can be assumed that the younger genera-
tion of potential jihadists identifies more strongly with the celebrations of 
masculine brutality and territorial conquest transported via the visual lan-
guage of the Islamic State. 
Uqbah Ibn Nafi and Ansar al-Sharia: Structures, Actors and Social Base 
The Tunisian jihadist spectrum has been undergoing a process of differen-
tiation of groups and alliances since 2011. Ansar al-Sharia and Uqbah Ibn 
Nafi have emerged as the jihadist heavyweights. There are also autono-
mous local jihadist cells that have emerged since 2011 and are sometimes 
networked with the larger groups. 
The relatively small Uqbah Ibn Nafi has turned into a major challenge 
for the Tunisian security forces. According to the Tunisian government, 
the group stood behind the March 18 attack on the Bardo Museum in 
Tunis, which left more than twenty people dead, most of them tourists. 
The Uqbah Ibn Nafi operates in the border region to Algeria where it is also 
involved in smuggling. It first appeared in 2012, when it killed a border 
guard in an exchange of fire. In summer 2013 the group conducted an 
attack in which eight soldiers lost their lives. Despite close cooperation 
with the Algerian army, the Tunisian security forces have failed to stop its 
activities. The reason for this is not least the increasingly close networking 
between jihadists and smugglers in the Algerian-Tunisian border region, 
where above all fuel, drugs and arms are trafficked. Acting against the net-
works, which are widely connected and clearly outnumber the security 
forces, is also a delicate matter for the Tunisian government because the 
local population in the impoverished border regions also profits from 
smuggling and the associated black economy.24 
According to official Tunisian sources the rank-and-file of Uqbah Ibn 
Nafi consists principally of Tunisians, but it is led by Algerians. Estimates 
of the number of fighters range between several dozen and up to about 
one hundred. In 2012 the Tunisian government declared that Uqbah Ibn 
Nafi was a direct offshoot of Droukdal’s AQIM.25 But members of the group 
are also reported to have appeared at demonstrations by Ansar al-Sharia.26 
There is much to suggest that Uqbah Ibn Nafi originates from the AQIM 
milieu but has gravitated ever closer to Ansar. In September 2014, how-
 
24  ICG, Tunisia’s Borders (II): Terrorism and Regional Polarisation, Middle East and North Africa 
Briefing 41 (Tunis and Brussels, 21 October 2014), 8–10, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/b041-tunisia-s-
borders-II-terrorism-and-regional-polarisation-english.pdf (accessed 28 January 2015). 
25  Dorra Megdiche Meziou, “Al Qaïda, menace-t-elle vraiment la Tunisie?”, Business News 
(online), 21 December 2012, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Al-Qa%C3%AFda,-menace-t-
elle-vraiment-la-Tunisie--,519,35278,1 (accessed 2 September 2014). 
26  ICG, Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge (see note 10), 5. 
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ever, the group (or parts of it) declared its loyalty to the Islamic State.27 
This move set it somewhat apart from AQIM and Ansar, which are respec-
tively negative and ambivalent towards the IS. 
Ansar al-Sharia appeared on the scene just a few months after the fall of 
Ben Ali and rapidly gained support. In May 2012 between five and fifteen 
thousand sympathisers gathered in Kairouan for its first anniversary. In its 
first year Ansar could be regarded as a radical Salafist, but not yet clearly 
violent group. By 2013 it was rapidly radicalising and increasingly openly 
supporting jihadist activities in Tunisia that it had hitherto only advocated 
in Syria. 
Given its leader’s biography, Ansar’s radicalisation is unsurprising. In 
the mid-1980s Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi already played a role in the small vio-
lent Islamist scene in Tunisia and was later socialised into the internation-
al militant Salafist milieu while in exile in London. In the 1990s he went to 
Afghanistan, where he moved in Osama Bin Laden’s circles and is reported 
to have been involved in al-Qaeda’s 2001 attack on the Northern Alliance 
commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. After his capture in Turkey in 2003 
Abu Iyadh was imprisoned in Tunisia until a general amnesty of all politi-
cal prisoners in 2011. He went underground shortly after the storming of 
the American embassy in Tunis in September 2012 and is said to have been 
in Libya for some time. 
Little is known about the organisational structures of Ansar al-Sharia. It 
possesses a five-member shura council (leadership body). Its principal pub-
lic face is spokesman Seifeddine Erraies, who was detained in Kairouan at 
the end of July 2014 on suspicion of recruiting jihadists for Syria. Arrests 
of individuals officially stated to have led or supported Ansar military cells 
indicate a web of cells operating across large parts of the country. Because 
Ansar was able to operate legally for more than two years during which its 
(visible) focus lay on charitable work, there may still be associations in this 
field that look to it. In summer 2014 the Tunisian government – in a 
clampdown that was criticized by local and international human rights 
and democracy activists – arrested a number of charity workers and 
banned more than one hundred charities suspected of money-laundering 
or links to violent groups.28 
In contrast to AQIM, Ansar has not (yet) been primarily funded through 
organised crime. According to official Tunisian sources, it has received 
donations from home and abroad, including Yemen, Libya and Mali.29 
 
27  “‘Katiba Uqbah Ibn Nafi’ Swears Allegience to ‘Islamic State’” (Arabic), al-Hayat 
(online), 20 September 2014, http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/4686594/-ﺔﺒﯿﺘﻛ-ﺔﺒﻘﻋ-ﻦﺑ-ﻊﻓﺎﻧ--
ﺔﯿﺴﻧﻮﺘﻟا-ﻊﯾﺎﺒﺗ--ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا-ﺔﯿﻣﻼﺳﻹا (accessed 12 March 2015). 
28  “Charity Workers Held in Tunisia on Suspicion of Funding ‘Terrorism’”, BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, 16 May 2014. 
29  Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals”, Magharebia 
(online), 29 August 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html (accessed 12 
March 2015). Bassam Hamdi, “Tunis: Terrorist statements reveal funding sources of Ansar 
Al-Sharia” (Arabic), al-Masdar (online), 26 February 2014, http://ar.webmanagercenter. 
com/2014/02/26/22155/ﺲﻧﻮﺗ-تﺎﻓاﺮﺘﻋا-ﻲﺑﺎھرإ-ﻒﺸﻜﺗ-ردﺎﺼﻣ-ﻞﯾﻮﻤﺗ-ﻢﯿﻈﻨﺗ-رﺎﺼﻧأ-ﺔﻌﯾﺮﺸﻟا (accessed 
2 September 2014). 
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There are indications that the group has been supported by about one 
hundred twenty foreign organisations, including Kuwaiti and Saudi foun-
dations,30 whose contributions go to front organisations that combine 
charity, such as distributing medicines, food and clothing, with preaching 
and missionising. Funds are reported to have flowed to AST via the Tuni-
sian Society for the Preservation of Islamic Heritage, and been used to fund 
jihadist activities. Within Tunisia donations for Ansar are collected in un-
official mosques outside state control.31 The extent to which Ansar profits 
from the increasing confluence of jihadism and organised crime in the 
Tunisian-Algerian border region remains an open question. 
At the beginning of 2013 Ansar is reported to have had up to ten thou-
sand supporters,32 including above all (young) Tunisians who found them-
selves unable to identify with the transition process because they saw no 
economic fruits and rejected the new political order as un-Islamic.33 
Mosques have been important venues of radicalisation and recruitment. In 
December 2014 there were still about ninety unofficial places of worship 
(mosques) that the state was seeking to bring under its control.34 
Ansar is especially well anchored in the socio-economically disadvantaged 
interior provinces and in the border regions (such as Bizerte, Kébili, Kef, 
Jendouba, Kairouan, Gafsa, Kasserine). Media reports suggest that it can 
count upon loyalty or at least silence in small towns and rural areas where 
“everybody knows everybody else” and mistrust towards the government is 
strong.35 Even if its supporters have become practically invisible in public 
since the repression began in summer 2013, that does not mean that their 
sympathy for “the cause” has disappeared. A part of its following appears, 
like its leaders, to have turned to splinter groups close to AQIM or IS.36 
 
30  “Organisations and Associations from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia Implicated in Funding 
of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia” (Arabic), Turess, 3 June 2013, http://www.turess.com/ 
africanmanager/18005 (accessed 2 September 2014); Mona Yahia, “Tunisia: Ansar al-
Sharia Threatens Tunisia” (interview with Sami Brahem, Tunisian Institute for Strategic 
Studies, ITES), Magharebia (online), 13 December 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201312150228.html (accessed 2 September 2014). 
31  Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Uncharitable Organizations. Islamist 
Groups Are Bankrolling Terror Groups across the Middle East and Pretending It’s Aid 
Work”, Foreign Policy, 26 February 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/ 
26/uncharitable_ organizations (accessed 2 September 2014). 
32  Anne Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution”, CTC Sentinel 6, 
no. 1 (January 2013): 1–4. 
33  Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, Salafist Mouvance and Sheikh-ism in the Tunisian 
Democratic Transition, Working Papers in International Studies 7/2012 (Dublin: Dublin City 
University, 2012). 
34  Interview with the “Chef de cabinet” in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Tunis, 
12 December 2014. 
35  Frida Dahmani, “Tunisie: ‘Mon voisin est jihadiste’”, Jeune Afrique, no. 2787 (8–14 June 
2014): 16. 
36  ICG, Tunisia’s Borders (II): Terrorism and Regional Polarisation (see note 24), 4. 
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Vacillating between Preaching and Violence 
Ansar al-Sharia also wants to establish an Islamic state. But at least in its 
early days, its style of action and articulation differed decisively from other 
jihadist organisations due to its initial ability to operate legally and to the 
local socio-cultural context. Tunisian society is altogether more consensus 
oriented, educated and secular than most other Arab societies. This is like-
ly to have persuaded Ansar to pursue a pragmatic strategy of initially 
largely non-violent persuasion. 
In its media offerings up until its prohibition in August 2013 the group 
presented itself above all as the defender of the poor. Its propaganda 
videos show helpers in orange vests bearing the Ansar logo engaged in 
social work in poor quarters, or enthusiastic chanting masses at the orga-
nisation’s mass rallies. In fact, Abu Iyadh adopted an ambiguous stance on 
the use of violence from the outset, saying that he shared the call of the 
global jihadists to take up arms against the “far enemy”,37 but declared 
Tunisia the land of preaching (dawa). He placed his faith in “hisba”, the 
enforcement of Islamic norms, and in the control of social behaviour. So 
for example Ansar demonstrated for the legalisation of the face veil at 
Tunisian universities. Their early, in some cases already violent actions 
were directed against artists, intellectuals and media outlets they regarded 
as heretical.38 
Nonetheless Abu Iyadh’s agenda in 2012 still looked like the programme 
of a political party. Ansar al-Sharia propagated both the founding of 
Islamic trade unions and the Islamisation of the finance, media, education 
and tourism sectors.39 Its attempts to sell itself as a political actor put the 
group outside the Salafist mainstream, which strictly rejects participation 
in political processes not based on sharia. 
After it was banned in 2013, Ansar’s ideology radicalised with respect to 
the “near enemy”, and from then now on Ennahdha was classed as here-
tical. Ansar, unlike AQIM and other jihadist groups, still refrained from 
publishing videos of military actions, and in fact rejects its classification as 
“terrorist” – claiming instead to be a humanitarian organisation with 
broad support.40 But at the same time violence has come to play a growing 
 
37  M. Khayat, A Review of Ansar Al-Shari’a in Tunisia’s Facebook Page, Inquiry and Analysis 
Series Report 1095/2014 (Washington, D.C. et al.: Middle East Media Research Institute, 
28 May 2014), http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8005.htm (accessed 9 Septem-
ber 2014). 
38  Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, “An Escalation in Tunisia: How the State 
Went to War with Ansar al-Sharia”, War on the Rocks (online), 24 February 2014, http:// 
warontherocks.com/2014/02/an-escalation-in-tunisia-how-the-state-went-to-war-with-ansar-
al-sharia/# (accessed 3 September 2014). 
39  For example Lin Noueihed, “Radical Islamists Urge Bigger Role for Islam in Tunisia”, 
Reuters (online), 21 May 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/tunisia-salafis-
idINDEE84K 03420120521 (accessed 3 September 2014). 
40  David Gartenstein-Ross and Oren Adaki, “Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Social Media 
Activity”, jihadology (online), 6 June 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/06/06/guest-post-
ansar-al-sharia-in-tunisias-social-media-activity-in-2014/ (accessed 3 September 2014). 
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role in the group’s blogs and Facebook pages. In April 2014 it launched a 
“Jihad Umma” competition on Facebook where aspiring jihadists who 
could not make it to the front themselves could donate weapons for the 
“land of jihad”.41 In spring 2014 a new media platform linked to Ansar 
surfaced under the name Shabab at-Tawhid, whose activities include 
propaganda for the Islamic State.42 Finally, at the end of Ramadan 2014 an 
Ansar statement for the first time praised an attack within Tunisia, which 
had caused fifteen deaths among the security forces. 
The Transnational Dimension: 
Cooperation, Competition and Conflict 
The political upheavals in the Arab world, specifically in Libya and Syria, 
and the developments in Mali, have opened up opportunities for al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia, but also created considerable 
new challenges for their external relations. On the one hand, circumstanc-
es have greatly improved for more intense and to a certain extent even 
open cooperation between Maghrebi jihadists and like-minded operators 
from Nigeria to Iraq. On the other hand, major shifts in supply and 
demand have affected the jihadist market as new groups arise and their 
mobility improves. This sharpens competition between jihadist organisa-
tions and fosters infighting over leadership of the global jihadist spectrum. 
Moreover, conflicts have flared between jihadist groups concerning tac-
tical questions such as the form and dimensions of use of armed force, and 
are sometimes reflected in different attitudes towards local political actors. 
Disseminating Know-how – Logistical Cooperation 
For a good decade informed circles have been aware that the Algerian 
GSPC and its successor al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have been giving 
firearms training to jihadists from neighbouring Maghreb states and the 
Sahel.43 In 2010 Droukdal announced that he would also support Boko 
Haram with arms and training,44 and the mastermind behind the Boko 
Haram attack on the United Nations in Abuja 2011 had trained with 
AQIM.45 This dissemination of know-how by the Maghreb Qaeda is hardly 
surprising, given that the Algerian jihadists have now accumulated more 
than twenty years of experience in underground armed struggle. 
 
41  Ibid. 
42  Aaron Y. Zelin, Shabab al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia? PolicyWatch 
2250 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, 9 May 2014). 
43  Samuel L. Aronson, “AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Sahara”, CTC Sentinel 7, 
no. 4 (April 2014): 6–10 (7). 
44  Ibid.: 7. 
45  Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram too Extreme for ‘al Qaeda in West Africa’ Brand”, Reuters 
(online), 28 May 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-nigeria-bokoharam-
analysis-idU SKBN0E81D320140528 (accessed 3 September 2014). 
The Transnational Dimension: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict 
SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
65 
The conditions under which AQIM runs training camps and acquires 
arms have also been greatly improved by the “Arab Spring”. By November 
2011 it was already boasting that it had taken possession of arms from 
Gaddafi’s depots,46 and Libya has become a refuge for Algerian jihadists. It 
cannot be verified whether the Maghreb al-Qaeda is running its own 
training camps in Libya – or even in Tunisia, as Algerian media assert. But 
it is known that the fighters that attacked In Amenas, who belonged to the 
group led by former AQIM commander Belmokhtar, entered Algeria across 
the border from Libya. The Tunisian nationality of eleven of the attackers 
is also a clear sign of the regionalisation of this originally Algerian group. 
There are also indications of cooperation between Ansar al-Sharia and 
the Libyan jihadists. In 2014 the latter placed a video showing a kidnapped 
Tunisian diplomat and a message for the Tunisian government on the AST-
linked platform Shabab al-Tawhid.47 Ansar leader Abu Iyadh is suspected 
to be in Libya, and the country became a hub for Tunisian jihadists 
travelling to Syria and Iraq. Jihadists from Tunisia appear to represent the 
largest contingent of foreign fighters in Syria.48 According to official 
Tunisian figures, at least 2,400 Tunisians had travelled there by June 2014, 
of whom 376 are reported to have returned home by summer 2014.49 
In relation to the size of the Tunisian population as a whole there are 
disproportionate numbers of Tunisians in jihadist groups from Syria to 
Pakistan. The number of Algerians estimated to have left for Syria is 
significantly smaller, with about five hundred fighting for the IS,50 some-
what fewer for the al-Nusra-Front. These – for the Maghreb context modest 
– figures could reflect the success of Droukdal’s exhortations to fight the 
“near enemy”. Widespread war-weariness in Algeria after the long civil war 
could be another reason. 
 
46  “Aqmi affirme être en possession d’armes issues du conflit libyen”, France 24 (online), 
11 November 2011, http://www.france24.com/fr/20111111-aqmi-affirme-etre-possession-
armes-issues-guerre-libye-benghazi-islamiste-cnt-mali/ (accessed 4 September 2014). 
47  Stefano M. Torelli, “Tunisian Jihadists Establishing New Networks with Libyan Islam-
ists”, Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 11 (May 2014): 5f. 
48  Richard Allen Greene and Inez Torre, “Syria’s Foreign Jihadis: Where Do They Come 
From?” CNN (online), 1 September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2014/09/syria-
foreign-jihadis/?sr=fb090114foreignfightersinsyria7pinteractivephoto (accessed 10 Sep-
tember 2014). 
49  “Tunisia Improves Security, but Terrorist Threat Remains: Government Reports 367 
Arrests of Jihadists Returning from Syria”, ANSAmed (online), 28 August 2014, http://www. 
ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2014/08/28/tunisia-improves-security-
but-terrorist-threat-remains_efdacadf-55f5-4e9b-a41b-3b27da5b189f.html (accessed 4 Sep-
tember 2014); “Ministry: Around 2400 Tunisians Fighting in Syria”, Al-Arabiya (online), 
23 June 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/06/24/Ministry-around-2-400-
Tunisians-fighting-in-Syria.html (accessed 4 September 2014). 
50  “500 Algerians Fighting with ISIS in Iraq” (Arabic), El-Hayat (online), 30 June 2014, 
http://www.elhayat.net/article5119.html (accessed 4 September 2014). 
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Complicated Positioning in the International Jihadist Spectrum 
The flip side of the new freedoms and opportunities for cooperation for 
al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia is growing conflict 
with other jihadist actors. Here personal rivalries and competition for per-
sonnel and financial resources play just as much a role as tactical and ideo-
logical differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the two domi-
nant jihadist currents in the Arab world.51 It is not easy for al-Qaeda in the 
Maghreb and Ansar Tunisia to reconcile these diverging interests in their 
external relations. 
For example, AQIM’s leadership backs the al-Qaeda centre in its ideolog-
ical conflicts with the Islamic State.52 In Syria AQIM consequently supports 
the al-Nusra-Front, which is also allied with al-Qaeda. But Droukdal’s 
appeal to Maghrebi jihadists to fight at home rather than in the Near East 
has strained relations with al-Nusra.53 Nor is the decision to join forces 
with the al-Nusra-Front uncontested within al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, with 
leading figures declaring support for IS.54 The decision by AQIM breakaway 
Jund al-Khilafa to swear allegiance to IS leader Baghdadi confirms that 
even significant figures from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb are not immune to 
the ideological offensive of IS. 
The leader of Ansar Tunisia, Abu Iyadh, has promised support to both 
the Islamic State and the al-Nusra-Front and offered to serve as a mediator 
between them.55 Whether his prime interest is to strengthen the jihadists 
through reconciliation or to further personal ambitions remains an open 
question. Rivalry or cooperation between Tunisian jihadists could also play 
a role in these choices of position by Ansar, as a number of important IS 
commanders are Tunisians.56 
Finally, the Algerian and Tunisian groups are fighting for positions and 
resources in a rapidly changing jihadist environment. Al-Qaeda in the 
Maghreb and Ansar Tunisia must, as already mentioned, compete for 
recruits with a growing spectrum of transnational groups. They have no 
 
51  See the introduction to this study, pp. 7ff. 
52  “AQIM Invites ISIS to Consultations and Underlines Duty of Allegiance to az-Zawahiri” 
(Arabic), Al-Quds al-Arabi (online), 15 July 2014, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=193536 
(accessed 4 September 2014). 
53  “Algerian Security Says Al-Qa’idah Envoy in Region to Meet AQIM Leader”, BBC Moni-
toring Middle East, 11 September 2013. 
54  For example, “Islamic State Receives Aid from Abu Abdallah Uthman al-Asmy, ‘Judge’ 
of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (Arabic), YouTube (online), 27 June 2014, http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=HmaUmbKseeo (accessed 4 September 2014). 
55  “Declaration on Assistance and Support for Our Fellow Believers in Syria (Sham) to 
Sheikh Abu ‘Aiad al-Tunisy” (Arabic), YouTube (online), 14 January 2014, http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=jgbZ5V4xRv0 (accessed 28 January 2014). Official statements by Abu 
Iyadh provide no confirmation of repeated IS claims that Ansar Tunesia had joined it. 
56  “Tunisians Implicated in Iraq War Crimes: Recent Atrocity Highlights Need for 
Investigations”, Human Rights Watch, 25 June 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25/ 
tunisians-implicated-iraq-war-crimes (accessed 4 September 2014). According to rumours 
circulating in Tunisia, members of Ben Ali’s secret police joined the fighting in Syria for 
financial motives. 
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option but to take a position on IS as the world’s most powerful jihadist 
actor. But simply to escape the magnetic pull of IS they have to verbally 
ramp up the fight at home and build contacts with local non-jihadist 
political actors. Relations between Ansar and members of Ennahdha until 
2013 represent one example of this, AQIM’s (transient) arrangements with 
local non-jihadist actors in Mali another. Beyond this, simply by virtue of 
their funding channels AQIM and AST are reliant on networking with 
other jihadist organisations in the Sahel and Libya. Whether the Algerian 
and Tunisian groups can continue to flourish will be strongly determined 
by the trajectory of Libya’s statehood. 
The future strength and tactics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and 
Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia will thus depend to a decisive extent on how well 
they succeed in manoeuvring between their local circumstances and 
national objectives on the one side and the opportunities and imperatives 
of the global jihadist spectrum on the other. 
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Spreading Local Roots: 
AQIM and Its Offshoots in the Sahara 
Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg 
In January 2013, French forces launched an offensive in northern Mali to 
stop local rebels and jihadist groups advancing on cities in central Mali 
and dislodge them from their northern strongholds. While the French 
achieved their objectives within three weeks, most jihadists did not stay to 
fight but blended into local communities or fled to neighbouring coun-
tries. Coordinated attacks on a French uranium mine and a military base 
in neighbouring Niger in May 2013 and numerous smaller attacks in 
northern Mali have since demonstrated that the jihadists remain active. 
In the preceding years, northern Mali had become an important refuge 
for the Algerian al-Qaeda affiliate (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or 
AQIM) and allied groups. Algerian militants had settled in the region since 
the end of the 1990s and established contacts with the local population. 
Over time, groups emerged that were largely composed of northern 
Malians and recruits from other Sahel states. They used the Tuareg rebel-
lion that broke out in early 2012 – and ultimately led to the French inter-
vention – to gain control over most of northern Mali in alliance with local 
warlords. Their operations threatened the integrity of the Malian state. 
The leading jihadist figure was Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khalid Abu al-
Abbas), an Algerian field commander who fell out with the AQIM leader-
ship in northern Algeria at the end of 2012. Belmokhtar was responsible 
for the spectacular attack on the Algerian gas plant at In Amenas in Jan-
uary 2013, and subsequently conducted the aforementioned attacks in 
Niger together with the Group for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa 
(Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad fi Gharb Ifriqiya), which is known under its 
French acronym MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique 
de l’Ouest). 
The jihadist scene in the region is not dominated by a single large orga-
nisation, but instead characterised by changing alliances between numer-
ous smaller groups such as MUJAO, Ansar al-Din and al-Mulaththamin; its 
leading figures have been Belmokhtar, Abu Zaid and Iyad ag Ghali. Now 
that the French intervention has broken the alliances forged in 2012 
between local warlords and the jihadist hard core, the number of militant 
jihadists in the region is likely to have shrunk back to several hundred 
fighters, after the temporary recruitment spike of 2012. There are, how-
ever, no reliable sources on their strength. Belmokhtar, who was able to 
evade capture by the French, and his new group al-Mourabitoun, which 
was joined by many former AQIM fighters and some members of MUJAO, 
has become the most significant terrorist threat in the Sahara. Jihadist 
groups continue to profit from the region’s long-running crises, above all 
the unresolved conflict in northern Mali, and from the collapse of state 
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control in Libya. In this environment of instability, the jihadists can rely 
on solid and longstanding local ties, particularly in northern Mali. 
Conflicts and Collusion: The Regional Context 
The development of jihadist groups in the Sahel and Sahara has been 
strongly shaped by a changing regional environment. Three phases can be 
distinguished. During the second term of Malian President Amadou 
Toumani Touré (2007–2012), corruption and the proliferation of criminal 
networks created ideal conditions for the emergence of jihadist groups in 
northern Mali. After conflict broke out in northern Mali and Touré was 
ousted by a military coup in 2012, these groups expanded their control 
across vast expanses of northern Mali, recruited many fighters among the 
local population and consolidated alliances with the region’s elites. When 
the French-led intervention began in January 2013, most of these alliances 
successively dissolved. Some of the jihadists moved to neighbouring coun-
tries, while others remain in northern Mali but on the defensive. 
The Saharan regions of the Sahel states, where a small group of Algerian 
jihadists took hold from 2003, were by no means outside of state control. 
But to exercise their influence there, central governments have been de-
pendent on allies in their northern regions. Such local strongmen often 
enjoy extensive freedoms, which they exploit not least to profit from the 
region’s thriving smuggling economy. In this game, the central govern-
ment risks either losing control over its powerful allies, or provoking 
attempts by local rivals to violently contest these power relations. 
Under these circumstances, Algerian jihadists succeeded between 2003 
and 2011 in establishing local roots in northern Mali. To suppress a Tuareg 
rebellion that broke out in 2006, President Touré relied increasingly on 
militias mobilised by local rivals of the rebels. The Malian government 
gave the leaders of these militias, which were recruited above all from 
Arab groups in the regions around Timbuktu and Gao and from Imghad 
Tuareg, a free hand in regional drug smuggling. The head of State Security 
in Timbuktu even mediated successfully in 2007 in a local conflict over a 
delivery of cocaine.1 Close connections arose between local allies of Touré, 
criminal networks and armed groups, which in turn maintained connec-
tions to AQIM. Alongside drug smuggling, the business of kidnapping 
Western citizens played a central role. Leaving aside one initial spectacular 
case in 2003 (see below, p. 75), the series of AQIM kidnappings began five 
years later. Between early 2008 and November 2012 thirty-nine Western 
citizens were kidnapped in the Sahel/Sahara region. By May 2015 twenty-
nine of them had been released, one had been freed in a commando opera-
tion, seven had died or been killed, and two were still in captivity. The kid-
nappings took place in southern Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and 
 
1  “Tuaregs and Arabs Clash over Drugs in Northern Mali”, diplomatic cable, US Embassy 
Bamako, 31 August 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAMAKO961_a.html 
(accessed 20 January 2015). 
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southern Tunisia, but in all cases where hostages were released this was 
done by AQIM or MUJAO in northern Mali.2 
Although there is no hard information, ransoms were probably paid in 
all cases that ended without bloodshed. On the basis of various sources the 
average sum involved can be put in the low single-digit millions of euros 
per hostage.3 This would mean that between €35 and 50 million in ran-
soms were paid between 2008 and 2012.4 In northern Mali these were sig-
nificant sums, which played a decisive role in helping AQIM put down local 
roots. Notables and politicians from northern Mali, mostly close allies of 
Touré, received shares for their roles as mediators. An entire network of in-
terests was built on the kidnapping business, and the revenues turned 
AQIM in northern Mali into a financially powerful actor with influential 
allies. 
The ambivalent stance of the Malian leadership towards AQIM created 
tensions with Mauritania and Algeria, which protested vehemently against 
connivance with the organisation, and later refused to cooperate with Mali 
on counter-terrorism, not least because information exchanged with the 
Malians sometimes found its way to AQIM’s accomplices.5 European gov-
ernments worsened these tensions by successfully urging Mali and Mauri-
tania to exchange imprisoned criminals and AQIM members for European 
hostages.6 In northern Mali itself, the complicity between Touré’s circles 
and criminal networks led to a progressive erosion of state control. Accord-
ing to Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, first defence minister, later foreign 
minister under Touré, such complicity completely dominated the govern-
ment’s actions in the north in the late Touré era.7 Rivalries over control of 
the shadow economy further exacerbated tensions in the north. The lead-
ing actors – influential politicians, businessmen and militia leaders – prob-
ably pursued their individual interests above all. But they generally 
recruited their militias among individuals from their own tribal back-
 
2  Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region, Carnegie Paper 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012), http:// 
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf (accessed 4 March 2015). 
3  Principal sources include concurring media reports, statements by the former US am-
bassador to Mali, and a Swiss parliamentary document concerning approval of special 
funds; “6. ordentliche Tagung der Finanzdelegation der eidg. Räte”, Die Bundesversammlung 
– Das Schweizer Parlament, Bern, 20 November 2009, http://www.parlament.ch/d/mm/2009/ 
Seiten/mm-findel-2009-11-19.aspx; “Mali Conflict: French Ransom Cash ‘Funded Mili-
tants’”, BBC News, 8 February 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21391518 (ac-
cessed 4 March 2015). 
4  Lacher, Organized Crime (see note 2), 8–9. This estimate matches that of Rukmini Calli-
machi (“Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror”, New York Times, 29 July 2014), 
who puts the ransoms paid in the Sahel between 2008 and 2013 at €96 million, of which 
€50 flowed in 2013 alone. 
5  Wolfram Lacher, “The Malian Crisis and the Challenge of Regional Cooperation”, 
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 18 (2013): 1–5. 
6  Lacher, Organized Crime (see note 2), 14; Wolfram Lacher, Challenging the Myth of the Drug-
Terror Nexus in the Sahel, WACD Background Paper 4 (Geneva: West Africa Commission on 
Drugs, August 2013), 5. 
7  Interview by Wolfram Lacher with Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, Bamako, 14 July 2012. 
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ground, giving rise to conflicts between groups defining themselves in 
terms of their ethnic or tribal loyalties. 
The situation in northern Mali was therefore ripe for open conflict when 
hundreds of former members of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s armed forces 
returned from Libya in September and October 2011 in convoys of vehicles 
mounted with artillery. Most of these Malian Tuareg had served for years 
in Libya, or had grown up there.8 After arriving in northern Mali they 
divided into different camps. The largest joined with deserting Malian 
officers to form the military backbone of what was later to become the 
separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement 
National de Libération de l’Azawad, MNLA). The rebellion finally began in 
January 2012, with Malian government forces quickly suffering devastat-
ing defeats. After the March military coup against Touré, the Malian army 
in the north collapsed. 
AQIM and its offshoot MUJAO were able to profit decisively from the 
conflict in northern Mali because it involved not only a rebellion against 
the government in Bamako, but also a power struggle between northern 
Malian actors. Contrary to widespread belief abroad, the conflict in 
northern Mali was not rooted in a supposed “Tuareg problem”. The MNLA 
only represented some factions among the Tuareg community, which in 
turn constitutes a minority in northern Mali. Ansar al-Din (Defenders of 
the Faith) formed in January 2012 around a handful of influential Ifoghas 
Tuareg politicians, first and foremost Iyad ag Ghali, as a rival rebel group 
to the MNLA. In order to assert their claim to leadership, the Ifoghas 
politicians formed a close alliance with AQIM, whose financial and 
military strength allowed it to tip the balance in the internal conflicts in 
northern Mali. In the region around Gao, businessmen and politicians of 
the Tilemsi Arabs and Songhai joined forces with MUJAO to drive the 
MNLA out of the city. In the Timbuktu region, parts of the Arab militias 
formed the Arab Movement of Azawad (Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad, 
MAA), which pulled back to the Mauritanian border; others joined Ansar 
al-Din, which ran the city together with AQIM. The pro-government 
Imghad Tuareg militias led by al-Hajj Gamou fled to Niger; a smaller group 
also went over to Ansar al-Din. As a consequence, Gao and Timbuktu were 
under the control of MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar al-Din from July 2012. The 
Ifoghas leaders of Ansar al-Din controlled Kidal. The MNLA had been driven 
into peripheral areas, with some of its fighters joining Ansar al-Din for 
opportunistic and financial motives. The latter group appeared to have 
significant resources at its disposal through its connection to AQIM.9 The 
situation opened up completely new possibilities for AQIM and MUJAO to 
recruit and operate freely, but at the same time confronted them with the 
challenging task of building an Islamic state in northern Mali. 
 
8  Denis M. Tull and Wolfram Lacher, Die Folgen des Libyen-Konflikts für Afrika: Gräben zwischen 
der AU und dem Westen, Destabilisierung der Sahelzone, SWP-Studie 8/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2012). 
9  International Crisis Group (ICG), Mali: Eviter l’Escalade, Rapport Afrique 189 (Dakar and 
Brussels, 18 July 2012), 17–18. 
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The French-led intervention in January 2013 quickly skewered the jihad-
ists’ tentative efforts to administer the north, and the tactical alliances 
created in 2012 crumbled. The Ifoghas aristocrats in Kidal parted ways 
from Iyad ag Ghali and his allies in AQIM, and founded the Islamic Move-
ment of Azawad (Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad or MIA; later High 
Council for the Unity of Azawad, HCUA). Like the MNLA, they now also 
wanted to cooperate with the French army. Some of the Arab militias in 
the regions around Timbuktu and Gao returned to the government side, 
although without giving up their arms, in order to retain bargaining 
power. The Imghad militias initially returned as units of the Malian army 
and later formed the core of the pro-government GATIA militia (Groupe 
autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés). Parts of MUJAO henceforth operated 
as a splinter group of the MAA. One contingent of regional jihadists prob-
ably decamped to neighbouring states, although there is no evidence to 
suggest that they regrouped in Libya. In northern Mali itself, the remnants 
of the jihadist groups were driven back underground, always on the look-
out for operations by the French army and its African allies, which con-
siderably restricted their movements. But even after the end of major 
operations, frequent attacks on French, African and Malian forces showed 
that the jihadists retained a presence. 
The French intervention in early 2013 was successful to the extent that 
it deprived the jihadists of their northern Mali refuge. Beyond that, how-
ever, little progress was made on resolving northern Mali’s conflicts. 
Militias and rebel groups kept their weapons and regular clashes contin-
ued to occur; in May 2014 the Malian army again withdrew from large 
parts of the north following fighting with the MNLA. And the fragmenta-
tion of the armed groups frustrated mediation attempts. After the election 
of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïtas as president in August 2013, there were grow-
ing signs of a revival of the Touré-era alliances between central authority 
and local leaders, from which allies of the jihadists also profited.10 Despite 
the French presence, ongoing conflicts in the north continued to offer 
opportunities for jihadist groups, which were by now deeply rooted in 
local society. 
AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar al-Din 
Until 2012, the Saharan units of AQIM had been the leading jihadist group 
in the region. Its predecessor GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et 
le combat) had been operating in the Sahara since the late 1990s, already 
under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Belmokhtar is today far and 
away the best-known Algerian terrorist and personifies the shift of the 
 
10  For example, a former MUJAO member detained by the French army in August 2014 
was quickly released by the Malian justice system. The same month, the former head of 
the Islamic court in Timbuktu (an institution established by AQIM and Ansar al-Din) was 
released from prison. “Mali: l’ancien membre du Mujao Yoro Ould Daha relâché”, Radio 
France Internationale (RFI), 9 August 2014; “Mali: libération critiquée du chef du tribunal 
islamique de Tombouctou”, RFI, 25 August 2014. 
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armed struggle from northern Algeria to the Sahara. In fact, Belmokhtar is 
only one among many jihadist commanders operating in the region, some-
times cooperating, sometimes competing with each other. Factionalism is 
one of the essential characteristics of Saharan jihadism in recent years. 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khalid Abu al-Abbas) was born in 1972 in Ghar-
daia, southern Algeria, and by his own account spent a year and a half in 
Afghanistan in 1991–1992, where he trained in various camps run by the 
Arab Afghanistan fighters and also saw combat.11 After returning to 
Algeria in 1993 he joined the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement isla-
mique armé, GIA) and operated in the Sahara and Sahel. In the mid-1990s 
he rose to become Amir (commander) of the Saharan unit. In 1998 Bel-
mokhtar moved to the newly formed GSPC, where he retained his position. 
Because the security forces kept a strong presence in southern Algeria, in 
comparison to neighbouring states, he was unable to settle there perma-
nently. But he profited from the permeability of the borders. As well as the 
desert zones of southern Algeria, his area of operations encompassed 
northern Mali and regions of Niger and Mauritania. One of the most im-
portant functions of the Saharan group was to procure and smuggle 
weapons and other equipment for the GSPC headquarters in northern 
Algeria, and from 2007 for AQIM.12 
However, Belmokhtar did not restrict himself to logistics for AQIM. At 
least according to the pro-government Algerian press he also funded his 
activities by smuggling cigarettes on a grand scale (and according to some 
reports also cocaine). This earned him the nickname of “Mr. Marlboro”, 
which is rather unbecoming for a Salafist. In view of these activities his 
rivals within AQIM frequently accuse him of being more a profit-driven 
criminal that a convinced jihadist. Belmokhtar, however, consistently 
rejects such charges in interviews. Controversy over his role sharpened as 
the Sahara units of AQIM gained in prominence through numerous kid-
nappings and the ensuing ransom payments from European governments. 
In the first incident, in February 2003, an AQIM group under the com-
mand of Amari Saifi “al-Para” kidnapped thirty-two European tourists, 
mostly Germans, Austrians and Swiss, who were released several months 
later after payment of a ransom said to have amounted to €5 million.13 
Belmokhtar was only tangentially involved at that point, but entered the 
kidnapping business in a big way from 2008. Various AQIM units were 
 
11  Biographical information sourced from an interview given by Belmokhtar in the first 
half of 2006 and published on a jihadist website: “Interview with Khalid Abu l-Abbas – 
Commander of the Sahara Region of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” 
(Arabic), http://www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=6711 (accessed 12 August 2014). 
12  On AQIM see the contribution by Isabelle Werenfels in this volume, pp. 51ff. 
13  Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms” (see note 4). One German hostage, Michaela Spitzer, 
died of heatstroke. 
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responsible for the series of kidnappings that then ensued, which are 
described in greater detail on page 70. 
The proceeds enabled the jihadists to buy support in northern Mali and 
thus deepen a process that had already begun years earlier. Belmokhtar 
and other field commanders integrated themselves into northern Malian 
society, including by marrying into local tribes. Their wealth turned them 
into attractive business partners and allies for local elites. It also placed 
them in a position to expand their arsenal and recruit in northern Mali, 
Mauritania and other states of the Maghreb and Sahel. Soon Algerians 
were in a minority in the Saharan AQIM units.14 The ransoms, largely paid 
by European governments, were the single most important factor behind 
the groups’ growth in northern Mali, and their eventual takeover during 
the conflict of 2012.15 
Conflict between Belmokhtar and Abu Zaid 
The enormous influx of funds was not purely positive for AQIM as an 
organisation, because it offered field commanders like Belmokhtar the pos-
sibility to operate even more independently of their leadership, which is 
based in the mountains east of Algiers. The consequence was conflicts 
between Belmokhtar and AQIM Amir Abd al-Malik Droukdal, and rivalries 
with other field commanders in the Sahara. While Belmokhtar had long 
functioned as the Amir of AQIM’s Saharan group, the latter consisted of 
many smaller units and he enjoyed most effective control over his own, 
known as “al-Mulaththamin” or “the masked ones”. The extent of his 
authority over the other units fluctuated over the years. This applied in 
particular to the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade led by Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid, 
who was Belmokhtar’s most dangerous rival for leadership of AQIM in the 
Sahara from 2008 until his death in February 2013. Abu Zaid (originally 
Abid Hammadou or Mohammed Ghadiri) originated from Touggourt in 
the Algerian Sahara. He fought for several years at the side of AQIM leader 
Droukdal in northern Algeria, before he was sent to the Sahara and like 
 
14  In June 2010 the Algerian government asserted that of 108 identified members of 
Saharan AQIM units, thirty-four were Mauritanian, twenty-one Algerian, twenty-one 
Malian, fourteen from Niger, seven Chadian, six Libyan, five Moroccan and three Tunisian 
(the total named in the Algerian source – cited below – does not correspond to the sum of 
listed nationalities). Although the Algerian authorities have an interest in playing down 
the Algerian component of AQIM, their figures tally with those from other sources. For 
example, the Mauritanian journalist Mohamed Mahmoud Abu al-Maali, who travelled 
through AQIM-controlled areas in 2012 and spoke with leaders of the group, reported 
that northern Malians made up the largest contingent of AQIM fighters, followed by Mau-
ritanians and Algerians. But the leadership remained dominated by Algerians. Interview 
by Wolfram Lacher with Mohamed Mahmoud Abu al-Maali, Nouakchott, July 2012; 
“Algerian Newspaper Reveals: Most Fighters in Armed Groups in the Sahara Are Maurita-
nians” (Arabic), Elbidaya, 15 June 2010, http://www.elbidaya.net/spip.php?article6139 
(accessed 20 January 2015). 
15  Morten Bøås, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of 
Northern Mali”, CTC Sentinel 7, no. 4 (April 2014): 1–6 (2). 
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Belmokhtar set up his base in northern Mali. His unit copied Belmokhtar’s 
example and after 2008 took more than twenty Europeans hostage. Most of 
them were later released for large ransoms, but Abu Zaid had the British 
captive Edwin Dyers executed in June 2009, possibly because his country 
refuses on principle to pay ransoms. In 2010 his followers also killed the 
Frenchman Michel Germaneau, after a failed attempt by French and Mau-
ritanian special forces to free him.16 While these acts of violence earned 
Abu Zaid the reputation of being more strongly ideologically motivated 
than Belmokhtar, the latter’s spectacular attacks in southern Algeria and 
Niger in 2013 erased any doubts that (for all his profiteering) he must also 
be regarded as a convinced Jihadist. Consequently, there are no clearly 
discernible distinctions between the two AQIM units. 
Alongside the conflict with Abu Zaid, Belmokhtar also engaged in a 
power struggle with AQIM leader Droukdal. When Droukdal was appointed 
Amir of GSPC in 2006, Belmokhtar reportedly said he believed he should 
have been given the post. Subsequently, the AQIM leadership lost all con-
trol over its Saharan Amir, who concentrated above all on securing his 
refuge in northern Mali and running the kidnapping business. It is pos-
sible that Belmokhtar did not even share his revenues with the AQIM leader-
ship. In communications to followers in the Sahara, the AQIM headquar-
ters complained bitterly about Belmokhtar’s insubordination. In a letter of 
3 October 2012, for example, leading functionaries write that Belmokhtar 
ignores instructions and refuses to communicate with them.17 By that 
point Droukdal and his entourage had already begun to draw consequenc-
es. The AQIM leadership now switched their support to Belmokhtar’s ad-
versaries among the Sahara commanders, who included Abu Zaid. But by 
this point Belmokhtar was already too powerful for such a move to present 
any danger. In December 2012 he left AQIM and formed a new group 
named “al-Muwaqqi‘un bi-l-dam” (Those Who Sign in Blood), which was 
joined by the AQIM fighters under his command. In the following months 
he also worked increasingly closely with another group that had split from 
AQIM, the Group for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement 
pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, MUJAO). 
MUJAO and the Indigenisation of the Jihadists 
In October 2011 the group that later became MUJAO kidnapped an Italian 
and two Spanish citizens in the south-western Algerian town of Tindouf. 
The ransom they received enabled them to split from AQIM one month 
 
16  Edward Cody, “‘Emir of the South’ Abu Zeid Poised to Take over al-Qaeda in NW 
Africa”, Washington Post, 20 October 2010. 
17  An Associated Press team found one of these letters in spring 2013 in a building used 
by AQIM in northern Mali. Rukmini Callimachi, “Rise of al-Qaida Sahara Terrorist”, AP, 28 
May 2013. The Arabic original and an English translation can be found at http://hosted. 
ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-belmoktar-letter.pdf (accessed 
20 January 2015). 
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later.18 MUJAO’s emergence offered further evidence that the previously 
mostly Algerian jihadist groups were putting down roots in the Sahara. 
The core of MUJAO was initially formed by Arab jihadists and businessmen 
from the Tilemsi Valley north of Gao, and former AQIM members from 
Mauritania and Western Sahara.19 Even more than Belmokhtar, MUJAO 
subsequently acquired a reputation as a link between jihadists and crimi-
nal networks, especially drug smugglers.20 
The increasing tendency of jihadists to go local also applied to the AQIM 
units. A new AQIM unit named al-Ansar formed around 2010 and recruited 
above all among Malian Tuareg, and Abdelkrim al-Targui became the first 
non-Algerian to take command of an AQIM unit.21 Another unit, the Al-
Furqan brigade, consisted principally of Mauritanians and Berabiche Arabs 
from the Timbuktu region, though it was led by an Algerian, Yahia Abu 
al-Hammam (originally Jamal Okasha). MUJAO and the Saharan AQIM 
units were the first armed groups to draw upon a transnational recruiting 
base in a region where rebel groups had hitherto formed almost exclusive-
ly along ethnic and tribal lines. With their strong local contingents the 
jihadists later became central actors in the conflict that broke out in Jan-
uary 2012 in northern Mali. 
The “Saharisation” of the AQIM units was also reflected in their tactics. 
Unlike their counterparts in northern Algeria, the Saharan groups made 
little effort to attack Algerian security forces, with the exception of one 
operation just across the border in June 2010.22 This only changed in 2012. 
In northern Mali, AQIM factions and the security forces apparently sought 
to avoid each other, with occasional signs of cooperation. According to 
concurring reports, AQIM’s 2009 killing of the above-mentioned (S. 70) 
head of State Security in Timbuktu was attributable to a disagreement over 
business relations. After pro-government militias had suffered severe losses 
in pursuit of the suspected perpetrators, the Malian leadership returned to 
its policy of avoiding any confrontation with AQIM. Until 2011, the 
Saharan units of AQIM largely focused on the kidnapping business. Only in 
Mauritania did they conduct regular attacks, likely due to the prominent 
role of Mauritanian fighters in these units, which thereby provoked re-
peated Mauritanian military incursions into Malian territory.23 
 
18  Lacher, Organized Crime (see note 2), 7. 
19  Mohammed Mahmoud Abu al-Maali, Al-Qaeda and Its Allies in the Sahel and the Sahara 
(Arabic) (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, April 2012); Andrew Lebovich, “Trying to 
Understand MUJWA”, al-Wasat, 22 August 2012, https://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/08/ 
22/trying-to-understand-mujwa/ (accessed 20 January 2015). 
20  Lacher, Organized Crime (see note 2), 15; Lacher, Challenging the Myth (see note 6), 5–6. 
21  Abu al-Maali, Al-Qaeda and its allies (see note 19), 5. 
22  “11 gardes frontières assassinés à Tinzaouatine”, Liberté, 1 July 2010. 
23  Mauritania’s Goals in Its Struggle against al-Qaeda (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 
25 July 2011). 
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Taking Control in Northern Mali 
While the uprising that broke out in January 2012 initially bore all the 
hallmarks of another Tuareg rebellion, it was usurped by the jihadists 
within just a few months. The reasons lay in their financial and military 
strength, which made them important allies for local conflict parties, as 
well as in the rivalries between local warlords, who therefore had every 
reason to cultivate such alliances. 
Officially it was the MNLA that sparked the uprising, but it did not 
inflict the defeats suffered by the Malian army on its own. During the first 
weeks Ansar al-Din,24 led by Iyad ag Ghali, and probably parts of AQIM, 
such as the al-Ansar brigades, fought alongside the MNLA.25 Ag Ghali, a 
veteran of the 1990s rebellion and prominent Tuareg leader, had already 
embraced Salafist ideas over the years. However, his rivalries with the 
MNLA were not only ideological in nature, but also concerned the leader-
ship of the rebellion.26 In order to gain the upper hand, Ag Ghali and 
allied politicians entered a close alliance with AQIM and MUJAO. 
After the Malian army had been defeated in the north, the three groups 
jointly turned on the MNLA, which by early summer 2012 ceased to play 
any role in the major cities of the north and was being driven to the mar-
gins. Subsequently, the jihadists divided the north amongst themselves: 
Ansar al-Din and the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade of Abu Zaid and set up their 
headquarters in Timbuktu, while Belmokhtar and MUJAO dominated 
Gao.27 In both cities they set about laying the foundations of an “Islamic 
state”, in which they enforced their interpretation of Islamic law. From 
this now fully established safe haven they conducted two attacks on tar-
gets in southern Algeria in 2012.28 
The jihadist takeover led to a further intertwining of regional extrem-
ism and local interests. Many Arabs from the Tilemsi Valley joined MUJAO 
largely because they regarded it as a protector against what they saw as a 
hostile MNLA,29 and the jihadists were able to mobilise local manpower 
using revenues from the kidnapping business. MUJAO now also recruited 
increasingly among the Peul and Songhai, outside its initial ethnic base.30 
The boundaries between the individual groups blurred increasingly. 
Unlike the fighters of MUJAO and AQIM, Ansar al-Din’s members were 
 
24  Different versions of the name, such as Ansar Dine, appear in press reports and 
research literature. 
25  ICG, Mali: Eviter l’Escalade (see note 9), 14–17. 
26  Emmanuel Grégoire, “Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens: alliances, rivalités et 
ruptures”, EchoGéo, 3 July 2013, 7–8, http://echogeo.revues.org/pdf/13466 (accessed 
5 March 2015). 
27  Lacher, Organized Crime (see note 2), 8. 
28  Ibid. 
29  “Mali – Yero Ould Daha: ‘Le Mujao nous protégeait du MNLA’”, Jeune Afrique, 11 August 
2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140811174449/ (accessed 5 March 
2015). 
30  Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali”, CTC Sentinel 6, no. 6 
(June 2013): 4–10. 
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almost exclusively local and it pursued no agenda extending beyond Mali’s 
borders. Its Tuareg fighters in the regions around Kidal and Tessalit did, 
however, maintain close relations with AQIM’s al-Ansar brigade; after the 
defeat of the MNLA many of its fighters also joined Ansar al-Din. In Tim-
buktu, on the other hand, it was above all Berabiche Arabs who operated 
under the name of Ansar al-Din, some of whom had close contacts to the 
local AQIM unit or were in fact AQIM members.31 It thus became increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish between regional jihadists and local fighters. 
The French intervention of early 2013 put paid to the jihadists’ attempts 
at state-building. Most of the jihadists declined to stand and fight against 
clearly superior forces, and many succeeded in retreating in time. The pos-
sibilities that control over northern Mali offered to the jihadists were 
demonstrated five days after the beginning of the French intervention. On 
16 January 2013, a group sent by Belmokhtar occupied an Algerian gas 
plant at In Amenas close to the Libyan border and took hostages. It took 
the Algerian army four days to recapture the complex. Forty staff and 
about thirty terrorists were killed.32 While the perpetrators claimed that 
the attack was in response to the French intervention in Mali, they had 
most likely been planning the operation for months. More broadly, the 
attack had a strong political dimension, as it was directed against both the 
Algerian gas industry and the Western presence in the Sahara. Even if the 
operation may have aimed at hostage-taking for ransom, its primary objec-
tive was clearly political. This was even more obvious in the twin attack in 
neighbouring Niger in May 2013, for which the newly founded “Moura-
bitoun” commanded by Belmokhtar claimed responsibility.33 Suicide 
attacks on an army base in Agadez and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit 
left twenty-one dead.34 Economic motives demonstrably played no role 
here. With these three spectacular attacks, Belmokhtar underlined his 
claim to leadership among the region’s jihadists. 
The Saharan Jihadists after the French Intervention 
Since the attacks at Agadez and Arlit in Niger, jihadist groups in the 
Sahara have conducted no further attacks of comparable nature (as of May 
2015). This would suggest that they have been weakened by the French 
intervention. Parts of the regional contingent were probably able to 
 
31  Ibid., 6–7. 
32  The In Amenas Attack: Report of the Investigation into the Terrorist Attack on In Amenas, Report 
Prepared for Statoil ASA’s board of directors (n.p., February 2013), 33. 
33  Al-Mourabitoun was founded by Belmokhtar and MUJAO in early 2013, and named 
after a North African dynasty that ruled the western Maghreb and Islamic Spain in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Algerian jihadists have long emphasised references to the 
Mourabitoun (Almoravid) Empire, possibly pointing to a vision of an Islamic state in 
north-west Africa and Spain. “Interview with Khalid Abu l-Abbas” (see note 11). 
34  Adam Nossiter, “Suicide Bombings in Niger Kill Dozens in Dual Strikes”, New York 
Times, 23 May 2013. 
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decamp to neighbouring countries, although not to regroup there – not 
even in Libya where state authority had completely broken down.35 
In northern Mali regular attacks continued against MINUSMA forces 
(Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisa-
tion au Mali), whose deployment began on 1 July 2013, and against local 
allies of the French, especially the MNLA.36 Late 2014 saw a resurgence of 
attacks by MUJAO in the Niger-Mali border region and AQIM splinter 
groups around Timbuktu, suggesting that the groups were regenerating. 
Their stubborn resistance demonstrated how deeply rooted the jihadist 
groups have become locally. An attempt to kidnap two French journalists 
in MNLA- and HCUA-controlled Kidal in November 2013, which ended in 
the deaths of both victims, again revealed the fluid boundaries between 
AQIM, the former Ansar al-Din and the MNLA.37 The depth of confusion 
over the distinction between local actors and regional jihadists was also 
demonstrated by controversy over the massacre of a Tuareg group in 
February 2014, which some observers attributed to MUJAO, others to tribal 
militias.38 In fact, MUJAO remains a vehicle for certain militias, such as 
those of the Peul, to fight local adversaries from other ethnic groups. 
Jihadists also remained political players in northern Mali. Iyad ag 
Ghali’s threats against “France and the crusaders” should probably be 
interpreted as partly a protest against his exclusion from the talks between 
northern Malian groups and the Malian government, which began in July 
2014 in Algiers.39 But for various armed groups, the extremists continue to 
represent potential allies. Former members or affiliates of MUJAO and 
Ansar al-Din have been sitting at the negotiating tables under new names, 
and likely see the possibility of resuming the armed struggle with their 
former allies as an important means of pressure. Accordingly, the refusal 
of the negotiating platform formed by MNLA, HCUA and MAA to recognise 
the agreement negotiated with the Malian government in March 2015 in 
Algiers was a worrying sign. 
Jihadists now possess a solid social base in northern Mali and adjoining 
regions. As long as the conflicts there continue to fester, they will be able 
 
35  On Libya see the contribution by Wolfram Lacher in this volume, pp. 31ff. 
36  For example “Nord du Mali: un jihadiste malien revendique l’attentat de Kidal auprès 
de l’AFP”, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 14 December 2013; “Mali: Aqmi exécute un jeune com-
battant du MNLA”, RFI, 19 January 2014; “Nord du Mali: un groupe jihadiste revendique 
des tirs de roquettes sur Gao”, AFP, 14 February 2014; “Mauritanie: ‘Almourabitoune’ 
revendique des attaques à la roquette contre les aéroports de Gao et Toumbouctou”, 
Agence Nouakchott Info, 2 March 2014; “Au Mali, un commando jihadiste tue des informa-
teurs de l’armée française”, AFP, 6 May 2014. 
37  “Mali: Qui est Ag Bakabo, le suspect n°1 du meurtre des deux journalistes de RFI à 
Kidal?” Jeune Afrique, 18 November 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB 
20131118185038/ (accessed 5 March 2015). 
38  “Mali: Le Mujao suspecté d’avoir commis un massacre à Tamkoutat”, Jeune Afrique, 10 
February 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140210183334/ (ac-
cessed 5 March 2015); “Massacre de Tamkoutat: Le ministre de la Réconciliation ‘blanchit’ 
le MUJAO”, La République, 14 February 2014. 
39  “Iyad Ag Ghali, le leader d’Ansar Dine, réapparaît et menace la France”, RFI, 7 August 
2014. 
The Saharan Groups and the Jihadist Movement 
SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
81 
to mobilise that base. And to the extent that there is any truth in reports 
that a record ransom was paid for the release of four French hostages in 
October 2013, jihadist groups in the region likely continue to enjoy access 
to considerable resources.40 
The Saharan Groups and the Jihadist Movement 
Due to the role of Belmokhtar, the relationship between AQIM’s Saharan 
factions and al-Qaeda is a particularly complex one. Even when he still 
belonged to AQIM, Belmokhtar accepted orders only reluctantly – if at all – 
and may have maintained closer relations with the al-Qaeda leadership in 
Pakistan than to AQIM Amir Droukdal in northern Algeria. Neither Bel-
mokhtar nor Abu Zaid adhered to Droukdal’s ideas on strategy. 
Belmokhtar and AQIM 
The AQIM leadership had no success with its efforts to bring Belmokhtar 
and his followers under their control. Nor did they succeed altogether in 
persuading AQIM units and MUJAO (let alone Ansar al-Din) to adopt 
Droukdal’s ideas on strategy. This is revealed by an undated letter from 
Droukdal to his followers and Ansar al-Din in northern Mali, which was 
written sometime after the break with the MNLA in March 2012 but before 
the French intervention in January 2013.41 Droukdal begins by pointing 
out the great dangers facing the attempt to establish an Islamic state in 
northern Mali, owing to the weakness of the jihadists. In order to remedy 
that weakness, he calls upon AQIM units to seek allies and expand their 
contacts into northern Malian society. The jihadists should keep a low 
profile, because building a state would overstretch AQIM. Nevertheless, 
Abu Zaid and Belmokhtar should remain in close contact with tribes and 
local rebel groups. In Droukdal’s view, terminating the alliance with the 
MNLA was a grave error, which he urges his followers to correct. In order 
to protect their own position, AQIM should refrain from rapidly enforcing 
its own interpretation of sharia. In particular, Droukdal criticises the 
destruction of shrines in Timbuktu and the application of Koranic punish-
ments by the jihadists in Mali. 
With this advice, Droukdal was pushing the same line as the al-Qaeda 
leaders bin Laden and Zawahiri, who had for several years been demand-
ing that their “branches” in the Arab world integrate themselves into 
existing rebel movements even if that meant making ideological compro-
mises. In his letter, Droukdal went as far as demanding that AQIM in Mali 
conceal its jihadist character and its ties to al-Qaeda in order to avoid 
 
40  Jacques Follorou, “Otages d’Arlit: les dessous de la négociation”, Le Monde Afrique, 
30 October 2013. 
41  An AP team found the letter in an AQIM building in Timbuktu following the French 
intervention in January 2013. Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook (English and Arabic), http:// 
hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf (accessed 
20 January 2015). 
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drawing the attention of the jihadist project’s enemies. This corresponded 
exactly to the approach of the al-Nusra-Front in Syria, which also originat-
ed in advice from al-Qaeda Central. Local leaders must have known that 
this was al-Qaeda’s official stance, because it essentially echoed the advice 
given by Yemeni al-Qaeda leader Nasir al-Wuhaishi (alias Abu Basir) in a 
letter to AQIM.42 
It is especially striking that neither Abu Zaid nor Belmokhtar and 
MUJAO appear to have followed the orders from northern Algeria, and that 
Ansar al-Din also followed a different line. The alliance with the MNLA was 
not mended, and the jihadists acted so provocatively that the French 
government ordered an intervention. In fact, Droukdal appears to have 
misinterpreted the situation in northern Mali, because it was less the 
AQIM leaders than their local allies who implemented their ideas about 
law enforcement particularly ruthlessly.43 Notably, Abu Zaid and Ansar 
al-Din in Timbuktu exhibited rather less zeal in enforcing al-Qaeda’s inter-
pretation of sharia than MUJAO in Gao, and their enthusiasm ebbed yet 
further towards the end of 2012.44 In sum, these events showed how weak 
the influence of al-Qaeda over local groups was, even if they had officially 
placed themselves under the authority of Bin Laden, Zawahiri or Droukdal. 
And if not even Droukdal was able to get his way with his field command-
ers, it can hardly be expected that al-Qaeda Central in far-off Pakistan 
would enjoy more success. There is to this day no evidence of Belmokhtar 
sharing the revenues from the kidnapping business with Bin Laden and 
Zawahiri. 
Transnational Networks: Libya 
Nevertheless, AQIM’s forces in northern Mali were not purely locally orien-
tated, but clearly integrated into transnational networks. The takeover of 
northern Mali created the possibility to offer jihadists from other regions a 
refuge or training. Boko Haram, for example, appears to have made limited 
use of this.45 
Connections to Libya were of particular importance to Saharan jihadists. 
From 2011 onwards, AQIM factions built contacts to like-minded Libyans 
and increasingly used southern Libya as a transit route. The country’s 
special importance to Belmokhtar and his Mourabitoun was seen in the In 
Amenas attack in January 2013. The attackers came not only from Mali and 
Algeria, but also Egypt and Tunisia. Their participation became possible 
after Belmokhtar established contact with Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi in 
 
42  This letter, addressed to AQIM leader Droukdal, was also found in Timbuktu; 
Associated Press, Al-Qaida Papers, http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/ 
_pdfs/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf (accessed 21 January 2015). 
43  Lebovich, “The Local Face” (see note 30): 9. 
44  Bøås, “Guns, Money and Prayers” (see note 15), 4. 
45  Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s International Connections”, CTC Sentinel 6, no. 1 (January 
2013): 7–13. 
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2012, and is even said to have spent some weeks in Libya.46 At the end  
of 2012 and beginning of 2013, several dozen jihadists from Derna, Ben-
ghazi and Ajdabiya in north-eastern Libya travelled to Mali to fight with 
AQIM. Fighters travelling between north-eastern Libya and northern Mali 
were able to rely upon at least logistical support from actors in southern 
Libya.47 Not by chance did the In Amenas attack target a facility close to 
the Libyan border. Coming from northern Mali, the group gathered on the 
Libyan side and may have hoped to be able to return there after the attack. 
The incident revealed the extent to which Saharan jihadists profited from 
state collapse in Libya. They may have lost their refuge in northern Mali, 
but in Libya they have gained a new alternative that would never have 
existed before 2011. According to local observers, Belmokhtar and part of 
al-Mourabitoun are believed to have been located largely in southern Libya 
since the end of 2013.48 Ongoing conflicts in Libya will ensure that AQIM 
remains active in the region. 
Outlook 
Within a decade, an initially very limited number of Algerian jihadists in 
the Sahara has developed into a firmly rooted local movement. A combina-
tion of factors contributed to this, the most important being European tax-
payers’ money in the form of ransom payments. There is no sign of this 
source of jihadist funding drying up in the near future. Another important 
factor has been local conflicts and the collapse of state structures, which 
jihadist groups have been able to exploit for their own ends. Both factors 
continue to exist in northern Mali despite the French intervention, and in 
Libya a new potential refuge has emerged. The case of northern Mali shows 
that building a local jihadist base requires time. The same applies in south-
ern Libya. The French intervention likely marks only the beginning of a 
long confrontation between external actors and jihadist groups in the 
Sahara. 
 
46  “AQIM Chief Buying Arms in Libya: Source”, AFP, 12 March 2012. 
47  Wolfram Lacher, Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability, Security Assessment in 
North Africa, Dispatch 3 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, February 2014), http://www. 
smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/R-SANA/SANA-Dispatch3-Libyas-Fractuous-South.pdf 
(accessed 5 March 2015). 
48  Discussions and personal communication between Wolfram Lacher and observers 
from Ubari, November and December 2014. 
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Boko Haram: Threat to Nigeria and 
Its Northern Neighbours 
Moritz Hütte, Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 
The terror organisation Boko Haram has massively destabilised the northern 
federal states of Nigeria since 2009 and has come to present a serious 
threat to the Nigerian state. Measured by frequency of attacks and number 
of deaths – more than ten thousand in 2014 alone – Boko Haram is one of 
the world’s most dangerous terrorist groups. Nigeria now occupies top 
places in two important terrorism indexes, with the number of deaths 
greater than in Syria or Pakistan.1 With frequent attacks in neighbouring 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger, Boko Haram’s sphere of operations is of 
regional extent, although the rhetoric of its leader Abubakar Shekau con-
centrates largely on war within Nigeria. A large-scale attack on the United 
Nations compound in Nigeria’s capital Abuja on 26 August 2011 has re-
mained an isolated incident. The only sign of a more international agenda 
has been kidnappings of Western foreigners by a small splinter group 
named Ansaru. Without external assistance Boko Haram (and/or Ansaru) 
will find it difficult to conduct more frequent attacks on international 
organisations within Nigeria or outside its borders. Although Boko Haram 
maintains contacts to jihadist groups in Mali, these are not very intensive 
and have thinned since the French intervention in January 2013. The Boko 
Haram threat mainly concerns Nigeria and its northern neighbours: It has 
come to control large parts of the state of Borno and many areas along the 
borders to Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Its successive territorial gains spot-
light the weakness of the Nigerian state in the north. The possibility of 
civil war can no longer be excluded. 
Boko Haram and the Nigerian State 
With a population of 178.5 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous coun-
try. It is deeply divided along political, socio-economic and religious lines. 
The fractures date back to British colonial rule, which began about 1860 in 
the Christian south and at the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
majority Muslim north. At that time large parts of northern Nigeria be-
longed to the Caliphate of Sokoto and the Emirate of Borno, whose origins 
lay in the Islamic reform movement of Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817).  
In 1804 dan Fodio launched a “jihad” against the neighbouring statelets in 
 
 
1  Global Terrorism Index Report 2014, ed. Institute for Economics and Peace, (New York, 
2014); Peter R. Neumann, The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot (London: The International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, in collaboration with the 
BBC World Service and BBC Monitoring, 2014), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
12/ICSR-REPORT-The-New-Jihadism-A-Global-Snapshot.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015). 
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Map 5: Nigeria (north-eastern provinces) 
northern Nigeria, southern Niger and northern Cameroon. He criticised 
the mingling of local religious traditions with Islam by Muslims in these 
areas, and enforced sharia in the realm he went on to found. 
The British granted Nigeria its independence in 1960, with a federal 
structure reflecting its ethnic and religious diversity. Today about 50 per-
cent of Nigerians are Muslims, 40 percent Christians and 10 percent 
adherents of indigenous religions. The political crisis of the Nigerian state, 
economic disadvantage in the north and increasing dissemination of 
Islamist and Salafist ideas among Nigeria’s Muslims have all encouraged 
the rise of Boko Haram. 
Until 1999 Nigeria was ruled by predominantly Muslim generals, and 
representatives of the north enjoyed great influence over the central gov-
ernment. That changed with the transition to democracy. It was originally 
agreed that the presidency would rotate between (Muslim) representatives 
of the north and (Christian) representatives of the south. Thus the Chris-
tian President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) was succeeded by the Mus-
lim Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua. When Yar’ Adua died in 2010, he was followed 
by his deputy, the Christian Goodluck Jonathan. Confirmed in office in the 
2011 elections, he was seeking a second full term in 2015, but lost the elec-
tion to his Muslim rival Muhammadu Buhari. In the north of the country, 
this long period of rule by Christian presidents gradually consolidated an 
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impression that the north has been disadvantaged since the end of the 
military dictatorship. That feeling is confirmed by a glance at the main 
economic indicators. Despite its strong revenues from oil exports, Nigeria 
remains one of the world’s poorest countries. About 62.6 percent of the 
population lives below the poverty line, and the poverty rate is considera-
bly higher in the north than in the south. It is highest in the north-east 
(75.4 percent) and lowest in the south-west (47.9 percent).2 
Growing sections of the northern population interpret the quarrel with 
the south as a conflict between Christians and Muslims. This has in turn 
generated a growing following for Islamist and Salafist ideas among Ni-
gerian Muslims, and led to pressure on the local, strongly mystical popular 
Islam. Between 2002 and 2003 twelve northern states introduced Islamic 
law, or sharia. These developments have seen the two parts of the country 
growing increasingly apart. Academic literature and press reports supply 
numerous indications of local political actors in the north supporting 
Boko Haram in order to intensify this process and place the central govern-
ment under pressure.3 
The Origins 
In 2002 a young Salafist preacher named Mohammed Yusuf (1970–2009) 
founded a group in Maiduguri that later named itself Sunni Group for the 
Call to Faith and Holy War (Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da’wa wa-l-Jihad). 
Some also referred to the initially nameless group as the “Yusufiya” after 
its founder and leader. Yusuf originated from the north-eastern state of 
Yobe, but lived in Maiduguri, the capital of the neighbouring state of 
Borno, which was later to become Boko Haram’s stronghold. He appears to 
have received no formal religious education, but impressed followers 
above all through his charisma and his rhetorical abilities. As a young man 
he joined the Salafists, who in Nigeria are organised in the Izala move-
ment.4 This non-violent and rather state-supporting movement is strongly 
orientated on the pro-regime Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia. His more 
radical views led Yusuf to fall out with Izala and establish his own group. 
Yusuf, who did not in fact come out unambiguously in favour of vio-
lence before 2009, initially sought to win supporters for his ideas through 
preaching. The principal arena for his missionising efforts was a religious 
 
2  World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, Nr. 2 (Washington, D.C., 2014), http://documents. 
worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19883231/nigeria-economic-report-no-2 (accessed 24 
November 2014). The figure for the poverty line ($1.25/day) is for 2010, as no more recent 
data has been published by reliable international sources. More recent calculations 
suggest considerably lower poverty rates. But even if the calculation methods were cor-
rected and the estimates more realistic, a striking discrepancy between north and south 
would still remain. 
3  Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in 
Nigeria”, Africa Spectrum 47, no. 2–3 (2012): 137–55. 
4  The full name is “Removal of Innovation and Establishment of the Sunna” (Izalat 
al-Bida‘ wa-Iqamat al-Sunna). The group was founded in 1978 by the scholar Abubakar 
Mahmud Gumi (1922–1992). 
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centre with a mosque and school in Maiduguri, which was named after an 
important model for all Salafists, the Damascene scholar Taqi al-Din 
Ahmad Ibn Taimiya (1263–1328). Yusuf called for the establishment of an 
Islamic state based on his interpretation of Islamic law, the sharia. 
Although sharia had already been introduced in the twelve northern states 
by this point, Yusuf held it to be incomplete as long as the secular federal 
laws and constitution continued to apply there, believing that they strong-
ly restricted the effectiveness of the sharia rules.5 Nigerian Muslims were 
well aware that local Muslim politicians had demanded the introduction 
of sharia principally to strengthen their hand in negotiations with the new 
rulers in Abuja; accordingly sharia was implemented only half-heartedly.6 
Yusuf’s core demand and uppermost objective was to introduce the 
Salafist interpretation of sharia across the whole country. He tied that call 
to a biting criticism of Western influences and education, and treated any 
collaboration with the Nigerian state as an act of overt disbelief.7 Although 
Yusuf condemned leaders across the whole of Nigeria, his criticism was 
directed above all towards the northern religious and cultural elites, who 
responded with harsh counter-attacks, often denigrating Yusuf and his fol-
lowers as “Kharijites”. Although the term strictly speaking designates the 
third Islamic confession alongside Sunni and Shia, governments and pro-
government scholars in the Islamic world like to use it to stigmatise mili-
tant groups as sects.8 
In 2003 a group of militant Salafists from Maiduguri, who stood in at 
least close contact with Yusuf, withdrew to the small rural settlement of 
Kanama in the state of Yobe to live out their interpretation of Islam away 
from the corrupted society of northern Nigeria. They were also preparing 
for an armed uprising, setting up a training camp and from the end of 
2003 attacking police stations nearby and in the neighbouring state of 
Borno. The group was broken up by the army in autumn 2004. In order to 
escape apprehension by the security forces, Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia 
while the uprising was still in progress. He resumed his activities after 
returning in 2005,9 travelling to various cities in the north to promote his 
ideas with some success and becoming a preacher known across the whole 
of northern Nigeria. His supporters, including the remnants of the mili-
tant Kanama group, now operated increasingly frequently as vigilantes, 
patrolling Muslim cities and calling on residents to behave in conformity 
with Islam. This increasingly drew them into conflict with the police. 
 
5  Kyari Mohammed, “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram”, in Boko Haram: Islamism, 
Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, ed. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, West African 
Politics and Society Series, vol. 2 (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), 9–32 (22). 
6  Johannes Harnischfeger, “Boko Haram and Its Muslim Critics: Observations from Yobe 
State”, in Boko Haram, ed. Pérouse de Montclos (see note 5), 33–62 (37). 
7  Mohammed, “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram” (see note 5): 16ff. 
8  The Kharijites emerged out of the civil war between supporters of Ali and of the 
Umayyad Muawiyah, where they refused to back either side. Today members are found 
only in Oman and Algeria. 
9  Mohammed, “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram” (see note 5): 12f. 
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Open conflict came in July 2009, after tensions had grown over the 
preceding months and years. Yusuf’s followers had come increasingly into 
conflict with the mainstream Salafists of Izala. Initially Izala continued to 
maintain close contacts to Yusuf in the hope that he would distance him-
self from his radical positions. However, when the differences between the 
preacher and the state came to a head, it became clear to Izala’s leaders 
that they would have to come down on one side or the other. Conflicts 
over control of mosques occurred with increasing frequency from 2008, 
with the police regularly intervening and detaining many of Yusuf’s sup-
porters.10 At the beginning of 2009 the state took the offensive against the 
militant Salafists, whereby in many cases it appeared as though the 
security forces deliberately provoked the group. The situation escalated in 
June 2009 at a funeral for members of the group who had died in a car 
accident. Security forces opened fire and injured seventeen Yusuf support-
ers.11 At roughly the same time Yusuf published an open letter to the 
federal government, calling on the government to approach him within 
forty days, otherwise he would proclaim jihad against it.12 
In response the security forces went on the offensive. In July they at-
tacked and destroyed the Ibn Taimiya centre in Maiduguri. Up to eight 
hundred of Yusuf’s supporters were killed, hundreds more detained – 
including Yusuf himself, who died while still in police custody. A video 
showing his death quickly circulated on the internet and was broadcast 
globally on the Qatari television station al-Jazeera.13 Those of Yusuf’s fol-
lowers who were able to escape detention now went underground and 
built a powerful terrorist organisation. Their first spectacular operation was 
an attack on a prison in the state of Bauchi on 7 September 2010, in which 
they freed seven hundred inmates.14 Under its new leader Abubakar She-
kau, Boko Haram launched a campaign of terror that continues to this day. 
Ideology and Objectives 
Since 2010 the organisation has been calling itself “Sunni Group for the 
Call to Faith and Holy War” (Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da’wa wa-l-Jihad), 
making no secret of its new militancy. Although it has become known as 
“Boko Haram”, which means more or less “Western education is forbid-
den”, it rejects the designation itself. The group regards Western education 
and the dominance of the English language in Nigeria as a threat to the 
cultural identity of Nigeria’s Muslims. The Christians in the south, it 
 
10  Ibid., 24. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Dr Ahmad Murtadā, Boko Harām in Nigeria: Its Beginnings, Principles and Activities in Nigeria 
(N.p.: SalafiManhaj, 2013), 8, http://download.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_ 
BokoHaram.pdf (accessed 24 November 2014). 
13  “Video Shows Nigeria ‘Executions’”, al-Jazeera (online), 9 February 2010, http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news%20/africa/2010/02/2010298114949112.html (accessed 22 December 
2014). 
14  David Smith, “More than 700 Inmates Escape during Attack on Nigerian Prison”, 
Guardian, 8 September 2010, 18. 
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claims, seek to subjugate the Muslims in the north. The fact that Christian 
presidents had governed the country for all but a couple of years since 
1999 was evidence enough of the truth of the theory, it asserts.15 
The only way to rebuff the southern assault, it says, is to introduce 
sharia in all of Nigeria and abolish all rival legal systems. This does not just 
mean introducing the “hudud” punishments mentioned in the Koran, 
such as beheading for murder, stoning to death for adultery, and amputat-
ing a hand for theft, but extends to a complete transformation of public 
and political life in accordance with Salafist ideals. With this project Boko 
Haram joins a global phalanx of jihadist groups all demanding such a 
transformation. The Nigerian group is characterised by the exceptional 
brutality it displays not only towards declared enemies and other reli-
gions, but also towards Sunni Muslims. In this respect it is considerably 
closer to the particularly violent Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria than to 
al-Qaeda and its allies. So it came as no surprise when Shekau declared his 
support for IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in July 2014.16 
In August 2009, shortly after the suppression of the Yusuf group in 
Maiduguri, Boko Haram published its “declaration of war” against the 
Nigerian state, in which it repeated its demand for full implementation of 
sharia across Nigeria and the “fall of Western civilisation”. What the docu-
ment does not contain is any clear ideas about political governance: 
 
Having made the following statement we hereby reinstate our demands: 
1. That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can 
stop. The aim is to Islamise Nigeria and ensure the rule of the majority 
Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one. 
2. That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series of bombing in 
Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, 
Enugu and Port Harcourt. The bombing will not stop until Sharia and 
Western Civilisation is wiped off from Nigeria. We will not stop until 
these evil cities are tuned [sic] into ashes. 
3. That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irre-
sponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who 
oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not 
go unpunished. 
4. We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall 
focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one 
encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilisation into the shores of 
Nigeria. 
5. We call on all Northerners in the Islamic States to quit the follower ship 
[sic] of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, 
 
15  Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo and Nicholas A. Heras, “The Ideological Evolution of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria: Merging Local Salafism and International Jihadism”, RUSI Journal 158, 
no. 4 (2013): 46–53 (50ff.). 
16  “Boko Haram Voices Support for Islamic State’s Baghdadi, Al-Qaeda”, Vanguard, 13 July 
2014, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/boko-haram-voices-support-islamic-states-
baghdadi-al-qaeda/ (accessed 24 November 2014). 
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irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership, and join the 
struggle for Islamic Society that will be corruption free, Sodom free, 
where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace under Islam. 
6. That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria’s South West 
and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah17 
 
 ITS EITHER YOU ARE FOR US OR AGAINST US18 
Structure, Leadership and Personnel 
Abubakar Shekau has been the organisation’s emir since 2010. He origi-
nates, like Yusuf, from the state of Yobe and was probably born around 
1970. Shekau owes his position and reputation to his close ties to Moham-
med Yusuf, as whose right hand he functioned. But he lacks the charisma 
and probably also the religious education of his predecessor, even though 
he was already preaching at his own mosque in Maiduguri before 2009.19 
Shekau tries to lead his organisation in authoritarian style, but possesses 
effective authority over only those members operating in or close to the 
state of Borno. In other parts of the country semi-autonomous leaders have 
established their own power bases, both within Boko Haram and as splits 
outside it. Opponents of Shekau criticise most of all the brutal violence 
against civilians, which represents a major departure from Mohammed 
Yusuf’s ideas. Shekau is also frequently accused of favouring ethnic Kanuri 
from Borno over Hausa and Fulani. The Kanuri are the largest ethnic group 
in Borno and the adjoining regions of Niger, Chad and Cameroon (while 
the Hausa and Fulani predominate in the other states of northern Nigeria). 
Kanuri also make up the bulk of Boko Haram’s leadership and member-
ship.20 
These fractures led to a power struggle between leading figures in Boko 
Haram. Mamman Nur, a Cameroonian who had been number three under 
Mohammed Yusuf, became Shekau’s most dangerous internal adversary. 
When Shekau was injured and later arrested in 2009, Nur took over the 
reins. Upon his release, Shekau declared himself the new emir, while his 
rival Nur is believed to have spent some time with al-Shabaab in East 
 
17  There has been speculation on the internet whether this completely incomprehensi-
ble formulation is actually supposed to mean “Allahu Akbar”. Some commentators see 
this as evidence that the document is a forgery. 
18  “Boko Haram Ressurects, Declares Total Jihad”, Vanguard, 14 August 2009, http://www. 
vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/ (accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2014). 
19  Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko 
Haram Crisis, Chatham House Research Paper (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, September 2014), 32. 
20  Zenn, Barkindo and Heras, “The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria” (see 
note 15). 
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Africa.21 Following his return, Nur operated above all in Kano and Nige-
ria’s so-called Middle Belt, the religious and ethnically mixed strip from 
Adamawa through Abuja to Niger. He is said to have masterminded the 
spectacular attack on the UN compound in Abuja and been implicated in 
the wave of attacks on churches that began in December 2011. Nur may 
also have been behind the car bombing of the federal police headquarters 
in Abuja on 16 June 2011, which was the first suicide attack in Nigerian 
history.22 His activities clearly exhibit efforts to spare Nigerian Muslim 
civilians at the expense of foreign targets and Christians. 
Whereas Nur apparently remained loyal to Boko Haram, other leaders 
split in the course of 2011, and in January 2012 founded Ansar al-Muslimin 
fi Bilad al-Sudan (Supporters of the Muslims in Black Africa), or Ansaru. 
The group’s leading figure is Khalid al-Barnawi (“from Borno”), who spent 
several years in Mali with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and was involved in kid-
nappings in the Sahara. After returning to Nigeria he shaped the strategy 
of Ansaru, which sharply criticised Boko Haram for killing Nigerians and 
Muslims and from May 2011 (even before the group’s existence was 
announced) concentrated above all on kidnapping foreigners. Barnawi is 
also said to have been more open than Shekau towards talks with the gov-
ernment. The conflict between the two is reported to have escalated to a 
point where each was betraying the other’s leadership to the security 
forces.23 In 2013 and 2014, on the other hand, there were also repeated in-
dications of closer cooperation between Barnawi and Shekau, Boko Haram 
and Ansaru. 
If the relationship between Shekau, Barnawi and Nur is opaque, even 
less is known about Boko Haram’s wider leadership. As in all jihadist 
organisations there is a leadership council (shura, for consultation), whose 
members’ identities are kept secret for reasons of security. The rate of fluc-
tuation in the council also appears to be high, on account of internal con-
flicts and counter-measures by the security forces. For example, Nur and 
Barnawi are always named as members even though Barnawi had turned 
his back on Boko Haram at least for a time to lead Ansaru. Finally, a 
number of leading figures were killed in spring 2013.24 
Mamman Nur’s activities suggest that at least commanders operating 
outside of Borno enjoy very broad autonomy. This also appears to apply to 
many lower-level regional leaders, who have profited from the great pres-
sure under which Shekau has come since 2013, which has left him largely 
isolated. As long as they adhere roughly to the strategic guidelines laid out 
 
21  Jacob Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria“, CTC Sentinel 7, 
no. 2 (24 February 2014): 23–29 (24). This was also when Shekau first used the organisa-
tion’s new name: “Sunni Group for the Call to Faith and Holy War”. 
22  Ibid.: 24. 
23  Jacob Zenn, “A Brief Look at Ansaru’s Khalid al-Barnawi – AQIM’s Bridge into Northern 
Nigeria”, Militant Leadership Monitor 4, no. 3 (27 March 2013), http://mlm.jamestown.org/ 
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40648&tx_ttnews[backPid]=686#.VJgfxs8BNVA (accessed 21 Janu-
ary 2015). 
24  Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria” (see note 21): 27. 
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by Shekau and the leadership, they are relatively free to plan and act as 
they wish. One likely explanation for this broad local autonomy is Boko 
Haram’s very rapid growth within the space of just a few years, from four 
thousand fighters in 2009 to six to eight thousand in 2014,25 which makes 
rigid central control almost impossible. At the same time Boko Haram now 
possesses enough fighters to capture and control territory. So the growth 
in numbers will have been a contributing factor in the group’s switch 
since 2014 to taking control of larger areas. 
The Boko Haram fighters are almost all young Nigerian men, most of 
whom come from Borno and Yobe and belong to the Kanuri ethnic group. 
But the organisation has also recruited in Cameroon, Niger and Chad. 
Most of the fighters are unemployed, illiterate, and have little or no 
schooling. Many attended Koran schools, and are known in Nigeria as 
“almajirai” (from the Arabic al-muhajirun = emigrants), because they 
attend school far from their homes and live either from alms or casual 
labour – a consequence of the crisis of the Nigerian education system.26 In 
view of the widespread corruption, nepotism and neglect of the northern 
parts of the country, they have been turning increasingly to religion in 
recent years – and finding convincing answers neither in traditional popu-
lar Islam nor from the Salafists of Izala or the conservative Sunni scholars. 
Boko Haram offers them the possibility not only to protest against the for-
malistic religiosity of their parents’ generation and the traditional reli-
gious elites, but also against a political system in northern Nigeria that is 
supported and dominated by the older generation.27 Boko Haram exploits 
the political and socio-economic problems of the young men and offers 
them the opportunity to articulate their protest in the form of violence. 
The organisation’s propaganda operates above all through videos revolving 
around massive acts of violence against all its adversaries. Since 2015 She-
kau’s video messages clearly allude to the visual language of the Iraqi 
Islamic State and evince his sympathies for that organization.28 In March 
he even publicly swore loyalty to IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Strategy and Tactics 
Boko Haram’s strategies have changed over the course of the years. In the 
early phase revenge for the destruction of the Yusuf group was uppermost. 
Boko Haram frequently responded to army attacks by killing opponents 
and terrorising local Christians.29 But these early operations also demon-
 
25  Pérouse de Montclos, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? (see note 19),15. 
26  International Crisis Group, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, 
Africa Report 216 (Brussels, 3 April 2014), 4. Other researchers differ on the role of the 
Koran students. See for example Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “Introduction and 
Overview”, in idem (ed.), Boko Haram (see note 5), 1–6 (4). 
27  ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II) (see note 26), 5ff. 
28  “Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?” BBC Monitoring, 4 March 2015, http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31522469 (accessed 13 March 2015). 
29  Pérouse de Montclos, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? (see note 19), 12f. 
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strated that the group was capable of directed action. In order to expand 
its fighting strength, Boko Haram attacked Bauchi prison in Bauchi state 
on 7 September 2009 and freed more than seven hundred inmates, in-
cluding more than one hundred of its own members.30 After this it 
launched a campaign of terror designed to undermine state structures in 
the north and destabilise the country as a whole. The attacks almost all 
took place in the north-east and targeted state institutions (especially police 
and army), the Muslim religious establishment and the Christian minority 
in the north.31 
As the organisation grew, the frequency and intensity of operations 
increased. Attacks in Abuja in June 2011 on the federal police headquar-
ters and in August on the UN regional headquarters marked an initial high 
point; these were also the first suicide attacks ever to occur in Nigeria.32 
While the June attack fitted Boko Haram’s known spectrum of targets and 
the police remained an important target afterwards, the attack on the UN 
was an exception. Since August 2011 Boko Haram has conducted no more 
significant attacks on international targets. As well as being its first suicide 
attacks in the style of other jihadist groups, it was also striking that Boko 
Haram succeeded in reaching heavily protected sites in the capital, far 
from its original strongholds. 
The objective of the Abuja attacks may have been to provoke the Nigeri-
an state and security forces into over-reacting, as well as to intimidate the 
local population. From summer 2011 Boko Haram routinely conducted 
suicide attacks, above all in the north-east, where it not only accepted but 
actively sought out civilian victims. From December 2011 this strategy of 
provocation also included increasing attacks on churches to spark conflict 
between Christians and Muslims.33 Since mid-2012 mosques and schools in 
the north have also been targeted. The strategy was certainly successful, 
with the military steadily increasing its forces in the north-east since 2011. 
In fact, the army’s offensive at the beginning of 2012 and the declaration 
of a state of emergency in May 2013 appear to have been successful. Boko 
Haram has been driven back to its original source in the north-east and 
placed under pressure there too.34 The organisation has subsequently 
stepped up its efforts to intimidate and terrify the population, increasingly 
shifting its attacks to unprotected soft targets in rural regions and con-
 
30  Daniel E. Agbiboa, “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency 
in Nigeria”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, no. 1 (2014): 41–67. 
31  David Cook, “Boko Haram: Reversals and Retrenchment”, CTC Sentinel 6, no. 4 (April 
2013): 10–12. 
32  Agbiboa, “Peace at Daggers Drawn?” (see note 30). 
33  Ibid. 
34  Scott Stewart, Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever? Security Weekly (Austin: Stratfor 
Global Intelligence, 12 December 2012), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/boko-haram-
more-dangerous-ever?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20121 
213&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=3bfd456e3f8c4ab09a8ab3106f 168 
27d#ax zz3KvCgiZSl (accessed 4 December 2014). 
Strategy and Tactics 
SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
95 
ducting more kidnappings.35 The victims of the first larger-scale kidnap-
ping, which took place on 19 February 2013 in Cameroon, were a seven-
member French family. The three adults and four children were released 
in Nigeria on 18 April 2013 after a ransom had been paid and nineteen im-
prisoned Boko Haram fighters released.36 But this kidnapping of foreigners 
was an exception. Many observers suspect that it may actually have been an 
operation by Ansaru.37 Boko Haram was now kidnapping Nigerians with 
increasing frequency, some of whom the government says it forcibly 
recruited, while the women and girls were reportedly sold into forced mar-
riages.38 At the same time the group continued to attack police and army 
bases. 
At the beginning of 2014 Boko Haram began to change its approach yet 
again. Alongside attacks on the police, the army, infrastructure, churches, 
mosques and schools, the group increasingly sought headline-grabbing 
operations to attract attention throughout and beyond the country. On 14 
April 2014 members of the group kidnapped almost three hundred 
schoolgirls from a boarding school in Chibok in the state of Borno. Months 
later more than two hundred of them were still in the hands of Boko 
Haram and there is currently little reason to hope for their release. No 
reliable information is available about their whereabouts or well-being.39 
Alongside that case, other examples confirm an escalation of attacks since 
early 2014. Thus for example on 14 March 2014 Boko Haram fighters 
attacked the infamous Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, which serves as the 
main prison for Boko Haram members, and freed those imprisoned there. 
According to Amnesty International more than six hundred people died in 
the incident, largely fleeing prisoners killed by state security forces.40 
The frequency and destructiveness of suicide attacks has also increased 
since the beginning of 2014, now choosing targets having greater prestige. 
A bomb attack on a bus stop in Abuja in April killed more than seventy. 
Shortly afterwards, in May, a second attack very close to the scene of the 
first killed about nineteen. The next attack in Abuja followed in June, 
 
35  Matthew Bey and Sim Tack, The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group, Security Weekly 
(Austin: Stratfor Global Intelligence, 21 February 2013), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ 
rise-new-nigerian-militant-group?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_ 
campaign=20130221&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq= efad4a67cb3940 
f98f8a036effcd01c6 (accessed 4 December 2014). 
36  The ransom is reported to have been more than $3 million. Zenn, “Leadership Analy-
sis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria” (see note 21), 27. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Aminu Abubakar, “Chadian Troops Rescue 85 Nigerian Hostages from Boko Haram”, 
CNN (online), 17 August 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/16/world/africa/boko-haram-
hostages-rescued/ (accessed 22 December 2014). 
39  “Boko Haram Unrest: Nigerian Militants ‘Kidnap 200 Villagers’”, BBC News Africa 
(online), 18 December 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30529178 (accessed 18 
December 2014). 
40  Amnesty International, “Nigeria: More than 1,500 Killed in Armed Conflict in North-
Eastern Nigeria in Early 2014”, (London, 31 March 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/ 
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killing twenty-one.41 Nor are the attacks restricted to Abuja: in the mean-
time almost all cities in northern and central Nigeria are affected. Kano, 
the fourth-largest city and economic powerhouse of the north, was the 
scene of numerous attacks in 2014. The bitter culmination of this series 
was marked in November by an attack on the city’s central mosque, direct-
ly beside the palace of the Emir of Kano. This attack alone is said to have 
cost more than one hundred lives.42 As well as Kano, attacks targeted Jos 
(in Plateau state), Maiduguri, Borno and many other places in Nigeria. 
The situation in the rural areas in the north-east is no better. The kid-
napping of entire villages, as occurred most recently in December 2014 in 
Gumsuri (Borno state), terrifies the population, leading many to flee to the 
cities. But they do not necessarily find protection there either. Reports 
from Maiduguri suggest that at the end of 2014 Boko Haram was in con-
trol of the city by night. Its attack on Maiduguri on 24 and 25 January 
2015, shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan had held election rallies 
there, and another attack hardly a week later, are further indications of 
the group’s strength. Since 2015 most suicide attackers have been adoles-
cent girls, with speculation as to whether these may be Boko Haram kid-
napping victims. Officially the million-strong capital of Borno state is “con-
trolled” by the Nigerian military, but it has not succeeded in establishing 
its authority throughout the city. 
In summer 2014 Boko Haram began taking control of rural territories in 
the north-east and in August proclaimed a “caliphate”. In the meantime 
the group has established a firm hold over large parts of the north-east. 
The Nigerian army presence is limited to the cities, while the rural areas 
are controlled by Boko Haram. Although the group failed to capture its 
erstwhile stronghold of Maiduguri, it has taken numerous smaller towns 
in the vicinity. By the beginning of December Boko Haram controlled or 
threatened most places in the Maiduguri area, although since then the 
army and militias have succeeded in recapturing a number of important 
cities, such as Chibok (Borno state) and Mubi (Adamawa state). At the end 
of December 2014 Boko Haram expanded its radius of operations beyond 
Nigeria’s borders to attack five towns and the Achigachia military base in 
Cameroon. After the group briefly succeeded in taking control of the mili-
tary base, air strikes were required to dislodge them.43 Shortly after this, 
Boko Haram fighters captured the Nigerian military base at Baga, which 
served as the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 
 
41  “Nigeria: Abuja Bomb Blast in Wuse District Kills 21”, BBC News Africa (online), 25 June 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28019433 (accessed 18 December 2014). 
42  Will Ross, “Boko Haram Kano Attack: Loss of Life on Staggering Scale”, BBC News Africa 
(online), 30 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30266868 (accessed 18 
December 2014). 
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north-eastern Nigeria.44 MNJTF was established in 1994 for counter-terror-
ism purposes, and has contingents from Nigeria, Niger and Chad. The arms 
depot in Baga fell into the hands of Boko Haram almost without a fight, 
after the Nigerian forces based there fled their attackers. These incidents 
suggest that the direct conflict between the group and the military within 
Nigeria is escalating, and that forces from neighbouring countries are 
becoming drawn into the conflict. The events also demonstrate that it is 
not a lack of weaponry but inadequate political will to take effective action 
against the group that promotes instability in the north-east. 
International Connections 
The extent to which Boko Haram also poses a danger outside Nigeria’s 
borders is a matter of some debate. Boko Haram leader Shekau is reported 
to have spent time in 2012 with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 
Mali and the attack on the UN compound in Abuja 2011 initially appeared 
to suggest an internationalisation of the spectrum of operations. But since 
then there have been no new attacks on international targets. The kidnap-
ping of a French family in Cameroon in spring 2013 remained an isolated 
incident, but demonstrated the potential threat to eastern Nigeria’s 
immediate neighbours. The international dimension tends to be repre-
sented by the splinter group Ansaru led by Khalid al-Barnawi. 
Ansaru first came to public notice at the end of January 2012, when it 
distributed leaflets in Kano, the capital of the eponymous state. Like later 
video statements, its message opposed attacks against innocent Muslims 
except for self-defence, even treating members of the Nigerian security 
forces as innocent. Ansaru’s ideology (like that of MUJAO in Mali) reaches 
across the whole of West Africa, with its acts of violence directed above all 
against non-Africans. Although outwardly the group strictly differentiates 
itself from Boko Haram, the two organisations maintain close operational 
and personal ties.45 
Although the relationship between Mamman Nur and Ansaru is not 
entirely clear, it is known that the Ansaru leader Abu Usama al-Ansari is 
Khalid al-Barnawi. As already mentioned, Barnawi spent several years in 
Mali where he trained with AQIM before returning to Nigeria. As a 
member of the group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar he is reported to have 
participated in kidnappings in the Sahara.46 But Ansaru’s founder and first 
leader was Abubakar Adam Kambar. Like Barnawi he came from Borno and 
was a follower of Mohammed Yusuf. After Yusuf’s death he followed 
Barnawi to Mali, where he also trained at an AQIM camp, but returned to 
 
44  “Boko Haram Seizes Nigerian Army Base”, al-Jazeera (online), 4 January 2015, http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/boko-haram-seizes-nigerian-army-base-20151421315 
330265.html (accessed 5 January 2015). 
45  Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria” (see note 21). 
46  Zenn, Barkindo and Heras, “The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria” (see 
note 15): 51. 
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Nigeria before Barnawi.47 In summer 2012 his hideout in Kano was 
betrayed and Kambar died in the Nigerian security operation to capture 
him. Barnawi succeeded him as the new emir of Ansaru. In their modus 
operandi, Kambar and Barnawi orientated strongly on Belmokhtar and 
attracted attention especially through kidnappings of Western citizens. 
The victims of the first major kidnapping attributed to Ansaru, which took 
place in May 2011 in the western state of Kebbi, were a British and an 
Italian engineer. Both died in March 2012 during a failed British operation 
to liberate them.48 The second kidnapping in January 2012 also ended with 
the death of the hostage, a German engineer, although this time AQIM 
said it was responsible. In November 2012 Ansaru claimed responsibility 
for an attack for the first time, after a number of its members attacked a 
prison in Abuja and freed several Boko Haram commanders. Further kid-
nappings followed, most of which ended with the deaths of the hostages.49 
In late 2012 and early 2013 the group concentrated on targets connected 
with the French deployment in Mali, which was directed against the up-
rising by militant Islamists there. For example, Ansaru attacked a Nigerian 
army convoy heading for Mali.50 In this case the motive was clearly to 
support beleaguered comrades from AQIM and MUJAO. 
From spring 2013 less was heard from Ansaru, and there was specula-
tion that it had rejoined Boko Haram, to which ties had never been 
broken. Shekau’s choice of Babagana Assalafi, a loyal follower of Barnawi, 
to become his deputy might be one indication for this. However, Assalafi 
was killed in March 2013.51 The changing situation in Mali, which hinders 
direct connections to AQIM and no longer offers a safe refuge, may have 
played a role in the reconciliation. But an even more important factor was 
heightened pressure from the Nigerian security forces, which smashed 
many Ansaru cells in the states of Kaduna, Sokoto and Kano. It is certainly 
possible that Ansaru has become a part of Boko Haram and could develop 
into a unit concentrating on international attacks. 
The greatest danger is without doubt still presented by Boko Haram. It 
is, like al-Shabaab until 2012, both a jihadist organisation and a political 
factor. Its reign of terror has won it control over large parts of northern 
Nigeria. To date the Nigerian state has proven incapable of mastering the 
steadily growing threat. Should Boko Haram grow even stronger, there 
would be a threat of civil war that could spill over into neighbouring 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon. In this event one would have to expect a 
further internationalisation of the group’s activities. 
 
47  Pérouse de Montclos, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? (see note 19). 
48  Zenn, “A Brief Look at Ansaru’s Khalid al-Barnawi” (see note 23). 
49  A German hostage kidnapped from Nigeria by Boko Haram was rescued by Came-
roonian special forces in January 2015. “Deutsche Geisel aus den Händen von Boko 
Haram befreit”, Die Zeit, 21 January 2015. 
50  Jacob Zenn, “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali 
Intervention”, CTC Sentinel 6, no. 3 (März 2013): 1–8. 
51  ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II) (see note 26), 28. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 
Even if the Middle East and South Asia generally attract greater political 
and media attention, the large and growing problem of jihadism in Africa 
can no longer be ignored. This is perhaps illustrated most vividly by the 
data of the 2013 Global Terrorism Index.1 For number of deaths attributa-
ble to terrorist violence, Nigeria came fourth after Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. In a newer survey at the end of 2014 it even comes second for 
number of deaths, behind Iraq but ahead of Afghanistan. In November 
2014 alone 786 people were killed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.2 If one con-
siders that the number of victims in Nigeria increased significantly in 
2014, and also includes deaths in Somalia, Kenya, Tunisia, Libya and 
Algeria, it becomes clear that Africa is in fact one of the most important 
arenas of jihadism. 
Although some jihadist groups in Africa possess well-developed regional 
networks and lend one another manpower and technical support, there is 
no overarching command structure within or outside the continent. Nor 
do the much-discussed connections to al-Qaeda or ISIS, which certainly 
exist, create any central controlling instance. The virtually autonomous 
freedoms of the individual groups and leaders are evidence enough that an 
absence of central control is no obstacle to effective operations. 
The comparison of the very different African terrorist organisations laid 
out in this study clearly demonstrates that there is no independent pan-
African jihadist ideology. The groups’ propaganda rests on a rather narrow 
shared base, according to which the governments in the region, regardless 
whether Muslim or Christian, are all lackeys of Western (or Christian) im-
perialism (or unbelief) and must therefore be violently removed. In Libya 
the efforts of Ansar al-Sharia and other groups are directed above all 
against the attempts by non-Islamist political forces to form a secular cen-
tral government. Their actions have played a decisive role in bringing the 
country to the brink of a devastating civil war. In Tunisia the jihadists have 
also grown stronger since 2011. Their objective is to prevent a stabilisation 
of the new political system through sporadic attacks. This has not succeed-
ed, but the jihadists hold out in the mountainous regions along the 
 
1  Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index (online), http:// 
economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indices-data/global-terrorism-index (accessed 4 Feb-
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Algerian border, while the open border to Libya remains a source of dan-
ger for Tunisia’s internal security. In northern Algeria al-Qaeda in the Is-
lamic Maghreb is greatly weakened and no longer in a position to threaten 
the stability of the state. Much more threatening are the activities of 
groups operating in the name of AQIM or as splits from it in Mali and the 
Sahara. Although they have lost their refuge since the French intervention 
of early 2013, they continue to profit from the permeability of the region’s 
borders. 
Nigerian jihadism is currently stronger than its North African counter-
part and characterised by spectacular acts of violence. The pure numbers 
of victims, as well as targets including the major city of Maiduguri in the 
north-eastern state of Borno, military bases in Cameroon and villages in 
Chad, demonstrate that the formerly local group of Boko Haram has 
mutated into a powerful violent organisation with a wide radius of opera-
tions. It no longer mobilises to introduce sharia, but to destroy the entire 
state and its disbelieving citizens. In Africa’s most populous nation, the 
occupation of even just one region by violent actors has far-reaching and 
catastrophic repercussions on security, as well as on the economy of the 
entire country. In Somalia al-Shabaab stands under pressure after im-
portant senior figures were killed in US drone attacks or defected to the 
government. Yet the organisation continues to grow, as does its support in 
Kenya’s coastal regions where the Muslim population feels excluded and 
disadvantaged by the Kenyan state. 
Especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria and Somalia) the jihadists dem-
onstrate a pronounced interest in establishing their own state. And the 
major territorial gains of Boko Haram in Nigeria leave no doubt as to the 
importance of finding new approaches to dealing with terrorist groups in 
Africa. These will have to focus above all on the local causes of their popu-
larity. 
Although both al-Shabaab and Boko Haram operate successfully in their 
own terms, each binding several thousand supporters and placing weight 
on formal acceptance by al-Qaeda (al-Shabaab) or solidarity with the Islamic 
State (Boko Haram), the fighters of both organisations operate largely in 
their own countries and rarely travel to join jihadist operations in Syria, 
Iraq or Afghanistan. The reason for this may well be the widespread racism 
towards Africans in the Arab world. The consequence is that jihadists from 
sub-Saharan Africa are more likely than their counterparts from Tunisia or 
Algeria to be found operating in their home region. This expands the pos-
sibilities to find responses to the jihadist challenge at the local or regional 
level. The flip side is that it is considerably more difficult to reintegrate 
fighters who have attacked “their own people”. 
Germany and Europe should fundamentally reassess their own perspec-
tives on the issue, taking into consideration the following recommenda-
tions: 
 In order to understand why jihadist organisations arise and how they 
grow (and in order to be able to weaken or destroy them) it is imperative 
to expand knowledge about their composition and the local circum-
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stances under which they operate. Germany lacks expertise on Africa 
across the board: in politics, the military, intelligence, academia and the 
media. 
 As this study repeatedly demonstrates, there appears to be a causal con-
nection between political, economic and social marginalisation and 
jihadist radicalisation. In Nigeria and Mali it is the northern parts of the 
country that object to the neglect by their central governments. In 
North Africa young men without hope or employment take up arms 
against society. This would suggest that conventional approaches, such 
as strengthening the central government’s security forces, may actually 
worsen the problem. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa the need is to 
rectify regional imbalances and find decentralised solutions for the 
areas where the jihadists are especially strong. 
 Fragile states consistently provide lawless spaces that in recent years 
have increasingly been filled by jihadist organisations. It is therefore 
necessary to consolidate and renew state structures. Where these have 
practically disappeared, as in Libya or Somalia, governments and admin-
istrations must be rebuilt and stabilised – frequently in a more decen-
tralised form than was hitherto the case. Where these structures are still 
robust enough, the principal task is to establish democratic governance 
and social infrastructure. Improving the security situation through police 
work is imperative to enable states to challenge jihadist law-and-order 
structures – but intervention must not be restricted to this measure. 
 As well as the motivations of the terrorist organisations, their respective 
strengths and the statehood of the country or region in which they 
operate must also be analysed. Initiatives such as participation in gov-
ernment or transformation of a jihadist movement into a political party 
are only auspicious and meaningful where the state possesses the 
strength and authority required to implement political decisions. Rein-
tegrating fighters into society is an enormous challenge requiring long-
term support. In this connection concepts for education and reconcilia-
tion processes are needed. Altogether the legal systems and rule of law 
programmes of the affected states should be supported. 
 There is another point where Germany and the European Union have an 
opportunity to contribute to containing jihadist organisations. This is by 
promoting national and regional socio-economic projects that offer 
ordinary people an economic perspective and thus an alternative to 
radicalisation. Here too, however, the strength of the state is decisive for 
the success or failure of such projects. For example with respect to Mali 
it cannot be assumed that participation in national government would 
be attractive to jihadist organisations in the north, because the alterna-
tives offered by jihadist and criminal networks are much more lucrative. 
In Nigeria and Somalia the overlap between jihadist groups, national 
government and local political networks also represents an obstacle to 
reintegration programmes. Instead there is a danger of jihadists helping 
themselves from all funding sources. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
Jihadism in Africa 
June 2015 
 
 
102 
 A one-sided concentration on military counter-terrorism has tended to 
boost recruitment to jihadist movements in Somalia, and even more so 
in Kenya and Nigeria. This insight should guide choices in cooperation 
with the affected states. As experience shows, an exclusively repressive 
counter-terrorism policy does nothing to promote security and social 
peace in societies affected by jihadist violence. 
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Appendix 
Abbreviations 
AFP Agence France-Presse 
AIAI al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union) 
AIS Armé islamique du salut 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
AP Associated Press 
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
AST Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia 
AU African Union 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
CNN Cable News Network 
CSS Center for Security Studies (ETH Zürich) 
CTC Combating Terrorism Center (West Point) 
FIS Front islamique du salut (Algeria) 
FSA Free Syrian Army 
GATIA Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés 
GIA Groupement islamique armé (Armed Islamic Group, Algeria) 
GSPC Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat; Algeria) 
HCUA Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (High Council for the Unity of Azawad) 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IS Islamic State 
ISI Islamic State in Iraq 
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
ISS Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) 
ISVG Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (Boston, University of New Haven) 
ITES Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques (Tunisian Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Tunis) 
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (al-Jama’a al-Islamiya al-Muqatila bi-Libiya) 
MAA Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (Arab Movement of Azawad) 
MEMRI Middle East Media Research Institute 
MIA Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad (Islamic Movement of Azawad) 
MINUSMA Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation 
au Mali (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali) 
MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force 
MNLA Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad) 
MUJAO Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa; Jama’at at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad fi Gharb Ifriqiya) 
MYC Muslim Youth Center 
RFI Radio France Internationale 
UNITAF Unified Task Force 
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia 
USIP United States Institute of Peace 
WACD West Africa Commission on Drugs 
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